Object-oriented ontology

[Edward theurj Berge]

In my research today I came upon this interesting article, “Here comes everything: the promise of object-oriented ontology” by Timothy Morton. (New link, old one broken.) It is of interest not only to speculative realism but also to some recent discussions on Caputo's ontology, modes of apprehension of such, and quantum theory. The article is 27 pages of text so I've culled some excerpts, lengthy in themselves.

 

Excerpts:

 

Speculative realism...asserts the deep mystery of a Non-Nature....object-oriented ontology (OOO)...goes further than this, rejecting essentialist Matter.... OOO is a form of realism that asserts that real things exist--these things are objects, not just amorphous “Matter”.... OOO extends Husserl's and Heidegger's arguments that things have an irreducible dark side: no matter how many times we turn over a coin, we never see the other side as the other side--it will have to flip onto “this” side for us to see it, immediately producing another underside. Harman simply extends this irreducible darkness from subject–object relationships to object–object relationships.... Causation is thus vicarious in some sense, never direct. An object is profoundly “withdrawn”--we can never see the whole of it, and nothing else can either.... We've become so used to hearing “object” in relation to “subject” that it takes some time to acclimatize to a view in which there are only objects, one of which is ourselves.

 

The notion of the “withdrawal” of objects extends my term strange stranger to non-living entities. Strange stranger names an uncanny, radically unpredictable quality of life forms. Life forms recede into strangeness the more we think about them, and whenever they encounter one another--the strangeness is irreducible....the uncanny essence of humans that Heidegger contemplates extends to nonhumans.... The more we know about a strange stranger, the more she (he, it) withdraws. Objects withdraw such that other objects never adequately capture but only (inadequately) “translate” them....This is what “irreducible” means.

 

Rhetoric is not simply ear candy for humans: indeed, a thorough reading of Plato, Aristotle and Longinus suggests that rhetoric is a technique for contacting the strange stranger....[it] amplifies imagination rather than trying to upstage it, and it revels in dislocation, not location.... Harman's imagery differs from ecophenomenological ecomimesis that confirms the localized position of a subject with privileged access to phenomena.... Harman's rhetoric produces an object-oriented sublime that breaks decisively with the Kantian taboo on noncorrelationist scientific speculation....ekphrasis is not about the reaction of the (human) subject, but about rhetorical modes as affective-contemplative techniques for summoning the alien.

 

The aesthetic, as we shall see, is the secret door through which OOO discovers a theory of what is called “subject”.... Melancholia is precisely a mode of intimacy with strange objects that can't be digested by the subject.... To lapse into Californian, OOO is so about the subject. There is no good reason to be squeamish about this. The more the ekphrasis zaps us, the more we fall back into the gravity well of melancholy. Sentience is out of phase with objects, at least if you have a nervous system. So melancholia is the default mode of subjectivity: an object-like coexistence with other objects and the otherness of objects--touching them, touching the untouchable, dwelling on the dark side one can never know, living in endless twilight shadows. If the reader has experienced grief she or he will recognize this state as an object-like entity that resides somewhere within the body, with an amortization schedule totally separated from other temporalities (in particular, the strict digital clock time of contemporary life). Through the heart of subjectivity rolls an object-like coexistence, none other than ecological coexistence--the ecological thought fully-fledged as dark ecology . The inward, withdrawn, operationally closed mood called melancholy is something we shake off at our peril in these dark ecological times.

 

Melancholy starts to tell us the truth about the withdrawn qualities of objects. OOO thus differs from theistic ecophilosophy that asserts, “There is a Nature.” It maintains no absolute distance between subject and object; it limits “subject” to no entity in particular. Žižek's suspicion of SR to do with the “feminine” self-absorption of objects: precisely what he doesn't like about Buddhism. Changing “self-absorption” to “withdrawal” or “operational closure” discloses what's threatening about Buddhism: an object-like entity at the core of what is called subjectivity. Like ecomimesis, Harman's passage affirms a real world beyond mentation. Unlike ecomimesis, this world doesn't surround a subject--it's a world without reference to a subject.

 

If OOO construes everything as objects, some may believe that it would have a hard time talking about subjects--indeed, Slavoj Žižek has already criticized SR in general along these lines. This subjectivity is profoundly ecological and it departs from normative Western ideas of the subject as transcendence. Thus we see off Nature and its correlate, the (human) subject. I argue that OOO enjoins us to drop Matter just as we must drop Nature, and that this means that it can save the appearance of the most coherent and testable physical theory we have, namely quantum theory.

 

Let's turn our attention to... things....how far “down things” does OOO really go? Are these things made of some kind of substrate, some kind of unformed matter? Does “withdrawal” mean that objects are impenetrable in some non-figurative, nonhuman sense? Do objects have a spatial “inside”? Surely they might. But the principle of irreducibility must mean that this inside is radically unavailable. It's not simply a case of the right equipment passing through it, like a knife through butter. Even a knife through butter would not access the butter in all its essential butteriness. The proliferation of things that ecology talks about--from trees to nuclear power--do not compromise a holistic Nature. Nor yet are they comprised of some intrinsic, essential stuff. To dispatch Matter, we must explore the most rigorous and testable theory of physical Matter we know: quantum theory.

 

Unlike some thinkers who discovered OOO in spite of deconstruction, I backed into OOO through deconstruction. SR tends to mistake deconstruction for nominalism, subjectivism and Meillassoux's correlationism.... Contemporary physics concurs with a principle tenet of Lacan and Derrida: there's no “big Other,” no device, for instance, that could measure quantum phenomena without participating in these phenomena. All observations are inside the system, or as Derrida puts it, “There is nothing outside the text” (or, in Gayatri Spivak's alternative, which I prefer, “There is no outside-text”). Arkady Plotnitsky has traced the affinities between deconstruction and quantum physics. People commonly misconstrue “there is no-outside-text” as nominalism: we can only know things by their names. Far more drastically, the axiom means: (1) Any attempt to establish rigid boundaries between reality and information results in unsustainable paradoxes; (2) Language is radically nonhuman--even when humans use it. It would be a mistake to hold that (1) is correlationism. “There is no outsidetext” occurs in a passage in which Derrida is analyzing Rousseau's position on Nature, so it's worth pausing here since this issue is directly relevant to ecocriticism. Derrida tacks close to the text he’s analyzing, which is why he appeals to close readers in the first place. He is not making a sweeping generalization about reality. Derrida is only saying, “Given the kind of closed system textuality that Rousseau prescribes, there is no outside-text.” That is, Rousseau can’t go around making claims about nature, not because there is nothing out there, but because the way he models thinking sets textuality up as a black hole....[but] Derrida abstained from ontology: he considered it tainted by the generalization-disease. Unfortunately this defaults to various forms of antirealism. Derrida's is a sin of omission.... OOO shares one thing at least with deconstruction--refraining from assertions about some general essence or substance at the back of things that guarantees their existence.

 

OOO is troubling for materialisms that rely on any kind of substrate, whether it consists of discrete atoms or of a continuum.... Certain uncontroversial facts, demonstrable in highly repeatable experiments, shatter essentialist prejudices concerning Matter.... Quantum phenomena are not simply hard to access or only partially “translated” by minds and other objects. They are irreducibly withdrawn.

 

OOO is form of realism, not materialism. In this it shares affinities with quantum theory. Antirealism pits quantum theory against its opponents, since quantum theory supposedly shows reality is fuzzy or deeply correlated with perception and so forth. In fact, quantum theory is the only existing theory to establish firmly that things really do exist beyond our mind (or any mind). Quantum theory positively guarantees that real objects exist! Not only that--these objects exist beyond one another. Quantum theory does this by viewing phenomena as quanta, as discrete “units” as described in Unit Operations by OOO philosopher Ian Bogost. “Units” strongly resemble OOO “objects.” Thinking in terms of units counteracts problematic features of thinking in terms of systems. A kind of systems thinking posed significant problems for nineteenth-century physicists. Only consider the so-called black body radiation problem. Classical thermodynamics is essentially a systems approach that combines the energy of different waves to figure out the total energy of a system. The black box in question is a kind of oven. As the temperature in the oven increases, results given by summing the wave states according to classical theory become absurd, tending to infinity.

 

By seeing the energy in the black box as discrete quanta (“units”), the correct result is obtained. Max Planck's discovery of this approach gave birth to quantum theory. Now consider perception, for the sake of which antirealism usually cites quantum theory. What does quantum theory show about our mental interactions with things? Perceptual, sensual phenomena such as hardness and brilliance are at bottom quantum mechanical effects. I can't put my hand through this table because it is statistically beyond unlikely that the quanta at the tip of my finger could bust through the resistance wells in the quanta on the table's surface. That's what solidity is. It's an averagely correct experience of an aggregate of discrete quanta. This statistical quality, far from being a problem, is the first time humans have been able to formalize supposedly experiential phenomena such as solidity. What some people find disturbing about quantum theory (once in a gajillion times I can put my finger through the table) is precisely evidence for the reality of things. (This is a version of an argument in Meillassoux, AF 82–5).

 

Quantum theory specifies that quanta withdraw from one another, including the quanta with which we measure them. In other words quanta really are discrete, and one mark of this discreteness is the constant (mis)translation of one quantum by another. Thus when you set up quanta to measure the position of a quantum, its momentum withdraws, and vice versa. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle states that when an “observer”--not a subject per se, but a measuring device involving photons or electrons (or whatever)--makes an observation, at least one aspect of the observed is occluded (QT 99–115). Observation is as much part of the Universe of objects as the observable, not some ontologically different state (say of a subject). More generally, what Niels Bohr called complementarity ensures that no quantum has total access to any other quantum. Just as a focusing lens makes one object appear sharper while others appear blurrier, one quantum variable comes into sharp definition at the expense of others (QT 158–61). This isn't about how a human knows an object, but how a photon interacts with a photosensitive molecule. Some phenomena are irreducibly undecidable, both wavelike and particle-like. The way an electron encounters the nucleus of an atom involves a dark side. Objects withdraw from each other at a profound physical level. OOO is deeply congruent with the most profound, accurate and testable theory of physical reality available. Again, it would be better to say it the other way around: quantum theory works because it's object-oriented.

 

Probing the quantum world, then, is a form of auto-affection. Bohr argued that quantum phenomena don't simply concatenate themselves with their measuring devices. They're identical to it: the equipment and the phenomena form an indivisible whole (QT 139–40, 177). This “quantum coherence” applies close to absolute zero, where particles become the “same” thing.

 

Implication and explication suggest Matter being enfolded and unfolded from something deeper. Even if it were the case that OOO should defer to physics, in the terms set by physics itself objects aren't made “of” any one thing in particular. Just as there is no top level, there may be no bottom level that is not an (substantial, formed) object.

 

To this extent, “object” (as a totally positive entity) is a false immediacy. Positive assertions about objects fail because objects have a shadowy dark side, a mysterious interiority like the je ne sais quoi of Kantian beauty. Is this nothing at all? Is there a path from the carnival of things to a bleak nothingness? Nihilism, believing that you have no beliefs, maintains that things emerge from an impenetrable mystery. Nihilism, the cool kids' religion, shuns the inconveniences of intimacy. We have objects--they have us--under our skin. They are our skin. OOO can't be a form of nihilism. It's the opposite view (relationism) that tends towards nihilism. Relationism holds that objects are nothing more than the sum of their relations with other objects. This begs the question of what an object is, since the definition implies a potential infinite regress: what are the “other objects”? Why, nothing more than the sum of their relations with other objects--and so on ad obscurum. At least OOO takes a shot at saying what objects are: they withdraw. This doesn't mean that they don't relate at all. It simply means that how they appear has a shadowy, illusory, magical, “strangely strange” quality. It also means they can't be reduced to one another. OOO holds that strangeness is impossible if objects are reducible to their relations. Since relationism is hamstrung by its reluctance to posit anything, it tends towards obscurantism. Relationism is stuck in a Euthyphronic dilemma: objects consist of relations between other objects—and what are those objects? An object as such is never defined. So while ecological criticism appears to celebrate interconnectedness, it must in the end pay attention to what precisely is interconnected with what.

 

This radical finitude includes a strange irreducible openness.

[Joseph Camosy]

Posted a comment to Bryant's blog post:  "Does Matter Matter?"

Don't know yet if he's going to approve it, but I wrote:

codelion Says:

Your comment is awaiting moderation.
July 23, 2013 at 3:34 am

Whether you say everything is matter, or everything is Spirit, or everything is energy doesn’t matter. What matters is that avoid creating two separate things opposed to each other such as matter vs. non-matter, or matter vs. spirit, or matter vs. energy.

Instead I see it as more helpful to posit one substance which can show up in different ways. So if someone wishes to see this one substance as matter, that’s perfectly fine. For either way, we’re all interested in the “First Matter,” or primary substance and how it shows up.

The primary task is to discover the “first matter.”

Joe

Non-duality!

Joe

[Joseph Camosy]

Bryant responded, but I don't think he understands, or I was not clear. 

At its root, we really don't know what "matter" is, or what "electricity" is, or what "Spirit" is (the thing in itself), but we do have evidence of phenomena within different domains or quadrants and we have different paradigms to explain it.

Whatever IT is ... when it shows up in the UL quadrant, we call it one thing, and when it shows up in the UR quadrant, we call it something else, like it is some totally different thing. 

He definitely wants to keep the dualism.

Joe

[Edward theurj Berge]

I don't see Bryant as a dualist at all. If you see it I'd say look to your own perspective and how it's projecting that.

[Edward theurj Berge]

For example, see this blog post on matter:

"I think there’s plenty of room for an irreductive materialism (through theories of emergence).  Harman argues that there are immaterial objects and therefore believes, for example, that reincarnation is possible because soul can be separated from body (a consequence that would follow from his defense of substantial forms via Suárez), whereas I reject the notion that there are any immaterial entities.  In my view, there are only physical beings.

"In his post Wherewithal seems to contrast matter and energy.  However, in my view, the two terms are synonyms.  All that is required for a position to count as a materialism, in my view, is a commitment to the physical as exhaustive of all being, whatever the physical might turn out to be.  However, while I find much of value in Lucretius’s atomism, I do not advocate his conception of matter as being composed of ultimate, impenetrable and indivisible particles.  Rather, I think of matter as energy."

Also see this post and following in another thread, how Bryant here also addresses content and context. Bryant even criticizes Luhmann for focusing on content to the exclusion of a material context.

[Edward theurj Berge]

Key argument: It's all a nondual 'physical,' meaning matter-energy, whatever that "might turn out to be." What it is not is a reduction to the usual meaning of matter, since it allows for emergence. Granted his view is a form of transcendental immanence, not to be confused with a dichotomy between the transcendent. The latter is dualism (or dualistic nondualism) of the kennilingual kind. Even AQAL has been criticized for this kind of dualism. See for example this from Edwards:

"There are associated questions concerning the actual interpretation and application of the Four Quadrants and the AQAL model itself. The Quadrants seem to impose a fundamental double dualism at the very heart of the Kosmos. How do these subject-object and one-many dimensions relate to the obvious holistic intent of Integral studies in general? Isn't it essentially dualistic to see the subjective human experience as 'fitting' into certain sectors of the Four Quadrants framework while the objective, behavioural side of life resides in others? Does Integral Theory actually want us to see interior "thought holons" occupying the Left Hand quadrants of the Kosmos while exterior behavioural holons are segregated to the Right Hand quadrants of objective reality?"

[Balder]

Bryant's most recent blog is pretty interesting, and relevant to some of the current discussion on the forum.  Perhaps he has said it before, but I was surprised to see him rejecting, for instance, the idea that a "hammer" is an object (due to its relational or enacted identity). 

[Balder]

Yes, I was a little surprised to see this distinction at this point, because this was one of my (our) first Wilber- and Uexkull- and/or Derrida-influenced reactions to OOO's discussion of objects.  Harman called a hammer an object and described its withdrawn nature, and I understood his point, but I felt he should also more clearly distinguish "hammer" (as a relational/developmental signified) from the unique whatsit that withdraws (as "that which exceeds our apprehension and signification").  (Perhaps he avoids this because it could lead back to Lockean substance as a featureless lump that ends up making all objects indistinguishable from one another, rather than standing, as substance should, for their unique essence...)  And, of course, he also wants to argue, as do Bryant and Bhaskar, that we need to be wary of identifying "what something is" with "what something means" (as that is the epistemic fallacy).

There's more to say on this, and I will, but unfortunately these days I am quite short on time...

I'm also interested in Bryant's wrestling with the nature / culture distinction, in light of Wilber's AQAL model.  More on this later.

[Edward theurj Berge]

From one of Bryant's recent talks according to this post:

"The properties of an object arise from its interaction with a field of other bodies producing these qualities as effects. This is the core of my dispute with the object-oriented philosophy of Graham Harman and why I am reluctant to continue referring to myself as an object-oriented ontologist. For Harman objects are withdrawn from all relations and we are to think of objects independent of their relations. As he argues, objects never touch. While I hold that objects can be severed from the relations they currently entertain—though in many instances this can lead to death or destruction–-it seems to me that what is most important is what happens when entities encounter one another. It is not entities in isolation that we should be investigating, but rather encounters between entities, how they affect one another, and how they are affected by one another" (11).

[Balder]

Here he leans closer to Latour, who acknowledges withdrawal but focuses much more on inter-entity relations.  (The description of Latour's "object-oriented" approach is quite lucid and helpful in a book I linked here earlier, Speculative Grace.  Here, the author emphasizes withdrawal and relation at once in his phrase, resistant availability).

[Edward theurj Berge]

Baudrillard was mentioned a few pages back. In re-reading this Caputo piece I came upon this:

"The hyper-real at work in Derrida is neither real nor unreal in the classical sense, neither a hallucination nor the domesticated res of ontological realism. But neither is it hyper-real in the Baudrillardian sense of a dazzling and seductive display of simulacra which replace and displace commonplace reality [....] which would have to do instead with what precisely withdraws from view and slips away, which makes no display of itself, which is sheltered and secreted on the other shore, eluding the phenomenality of both commonplace phenomenological givenness and the spectral hyper-givenness of virtual reality.”

[Edward theurj Berge]

This Bryant post discusses Latour's new book on modes of existence. He still prefers Luhmann to Latour. It sounds like another version of IMP but he still criticizes Latour (and Luhmann) for a lack of the virtual Real outside of any 'mode,' i.e., modes are correlationist.

[Balder]

Interesting.  I've only read a portion of that book so far, but this motivates me to get back into it soon.  Miller and Harman both regard Latour as an object-oriented ontologist, in part based on his principle of irreduction, but Harman has also criticized Latour for his relationism.  Of course, if we consider him to be a prepositional (and/or adverbial) philosopher, then an emphasis on relations is not surprising.  It is not my understanding, however, that Latour tries to define objects only through our practices and discourses about them, or that he argues that objects can be "reduced to how they are as correlates for another system."  Yes, he says they can be so reduced, but he also says they are not simply thus reducible without remainder; he says they are also (and at once) irreducible.

When talking about the distinction between objects-in-themselves and objects-for-others, by the way, it is interesting that Bryant actually describes this in terms of modes of relating:  "There are two ways in which we can view objects.  We can approach objects as they are in-themselves, regardless of whether they are observed or related to by anyone, or we can observe how various types of subjects or observers relate to objects."