Object-oriented ontology

[Edward theurj Berge]

In my research today I came upon this interesting article, “Here comes everything: the promise of object-oriented ontology” by Timothy Morton. (New link, old one broken.) It is of interest not only to speculative realism but also to some recent discussions on Caputo's ontology, modes of apprehension of such, and quantum theory. The article is 27 pages of text so I've culled some excerpts, lengthy in themselves.

 

Excerpts:

 

Speculative realism...asserts the deep mystery of a Non-Nature....object-oriented ontology (OOO)...goes further than this, rejecting essentialist Matter.... OOO is a form of realism that asserts that real things exist--these things are objects, not just amorphous “Matter”.... OOO extends Husserl's and Heidegger's arguments that things have an irreducible dark side: no matter how many times we turn over a coin, we never see the other side as the other side--it will have to flip onto “this” side for us to see it, immediately producing another underside. Harman simply extends this irreducible darkness from subject–object relationships to object–object relationships.... Causation is thus vicarious in some sense, never direct. An object is profoundly “withdrawn”--we can never see the whole of it, and nothing else can either.... We've become so used to hearing “object” in relation to “subject” that it takes some time to acclimatize to a view in which there are only objects, one of which is ourselves.

 

The notion of the “withdrawal” of objects extends my term strange stranger to non-living entities. Strange stranger names an uncanny, radically unpredictable quality of life forms. Life forms recede into strangeness the more we think about them, and whenever they encounter one another--the strangeness is irreducible....the uncanny essence of humans that Heidegger contemplates extends to nonhumans.... The more we know about a strange stranger, the more she (he, it) withdraws. Objects withdraw such that other objects never adequately capture but only (inadequately) “translate” them....This is what “irreducible” means.

 

Rhetoric is not simply ear candy for humans: indeed, a thorough reading of Plato, Aristotle and Longinus suggests that rhetoric is a technique for contacting the strange stranger....[it] amplifies imagination rather than trying to upstage it, and it revels in dislocation, not location.... Harman's imagery differs from ecophenomenological ecomimesis that confirms the localized position of a subject with privileged access to phenomena.... Harman's rhetoric produces an object-oriented sublime that breaks decisively with the Kantian taboo on noncorrelationist scientific speculation....ekphrasis is not about the reaction of the (human) subject, but about rhetorical modes as affective-contemplative techniques for summoning the alien.

 

The aesthetic, as we shall see, is the secret door through which OOO discovers a theory of what is called “subject”.... Melancholia is precisely a mode of intimacy with strange objects that can't be digested by the subject.... To lapse into Californian, OOO is so about the subject. There is no good reason to be squeamish about this. The more the ekphrasis zaps us, the more we fall back into the gravity well of melancholy. Sentience is out of phase with objects, at least if you have a nervous system. So melancholia is the default mode of subjectivity: an object-like coexistence with other objects and the otherness of objects--touching them, touching the untouchable, dwelling on the dark side one can never know, living in endless twilight shadows. If the reader has experienced grief she or he will recognize this state as an object-like entity that resides somewhere within the body, with an amortization schedule totally separated from other temporalities (in particular, the strict digital clock time of contemporary life). Through the heart of subjectivity rolls an object-like coexistence, none other than ecological coexistence--the ecological thought fully-fledged as dark ecology . The inward, withdrawn, operationally closed mood called melancholy is something we shake off at our peril in these dark ecological times.

 

Melancholy starts to tell us the truth about the withdrawn qualities of objects. OOO thus differs from theistic ecophilosophy that asserts, “There is a Nature.” It maintains no absolute distance between subject and object; it limits “subject” to no entity in particular. Žižek's suspicion of SR to do with the “feminine” self-absorption of objects: precisely what he doesn't like about Buddhism. Changing “self-absorption” to “withdrawal” or “operational closure” discloses what's threatening about Buddhism: an object-like entity at the core of what is called subjectivity. Like ecomimesis, Harman's passage affirms a real world beyond mentation. Unlike ecomimesis, this world doesn't surround a subject--it's a world without reference to a subject.

 

If OOO construes everything as objects, some may believe that it would have a hard time talking about subjects--indeed, Slavoj Žižek has already criticized SR in general along these lines. This subjectivity is profoundly ecological and it departs from normative Western ideas of the subject as transcendence. Thus we see off Nature and its correlate, the (human) subject. I argue that OOO enjoins us to drop Matter just as we must drop Nature, and that this means that it can save the appearance of the most coherent and testable physical theory we have, namely quantum theory.

 

Let's turn our attention to... things....how far “down things” does OOO really go? Are these things made of some kind of substrate, some kind of unformed matter? Does “withdrawal” mean that objects are impenetrable in some non-figurative, nonhuman sense? Do objects have a spatial “inside”? Surely they might. But the principle of irreducibility must mean that this inside is radically unavailable. It's not simply a case of the right equipment passing through it, like a knife through butter. Even a knife through butter would not access the butter in all its essential butteriness. The proliferation of things that ecology talks about--from trees to nuclear power--do not compromise a holistic Nature. Nor yet are they comprised of some intrinsic, essential stuff. To dispatch Matter, we must explore the most rigorous and testable theory of physical Matter we know: quantum theory.

 

Unlike some thinkers who discovered OOO in spite of deconstruction, I backed into OOO through deconstruction. SR tends to mistake deconstruction for nominalism, subjectivism and Meillassoux's correlationism.... Contemporary physics concurs with a principle tenet of Lacan and Derrida: there's no “big Other,” no device, for instance, that could measure quantum phenomena without participating in these phenomena. All observations are inside the system, or as Derrida puts it, “There is nothing outside the text” (or, in Gayatri Spivak's alternative, which I prefer, “There is no outside-text”). Arkady Plotnitsky has traced the affinities between deconstruction and quantum physics. People commonly misconstrue “there is no-outside-text” as nominalism: we can only know things by their names. Far more drastically, the axiom means: (1) Any attempt to establish rigid boundaries between reality and information results in unsustainable paradoxes; (2) Language is radically nonhuman--even when humans use it. It would be a mistake to hold that (1) is correlationism. “There is no outsidetext” occurs in a passage in which Derrida is analyzing Rousseau's position on Nature, so it's worth pausing here since this issue is directly relevant to ecocriticism. Derrida tacks close to the text he’s analyzing, which is why he appeals to close readers in the first place. He is not making a sweeping generalization about reality. Derrida is only saying, “Given the kind of closed system textuality that Rousseau prescribes, there is no outside-text.” That is, Rousseau can’t go around making claims about nature, not because there is nothing out there, but because the way he models thinking sets textuality up as a black hole....[but] Derrida abstained from ontology: he considered it tainted by the generalization-disease. Unfortunately this defaults to various forms of antirealism. Derrida's is a sin of omission.... OOO shares one thing at least with deconstruction--refraining from assertions about some general essence or substance at the back of things that guarantees their existence.

 

OOO is troubling for materialisms that rely on any kind of substrate, whether it consists of discrete atoms or of a continuum.... Certain uncontroversial facts, demonstrable in highly repeatable experiments, shatter essentialist prejudices concerning Matter.... Quantum phenomena are not simply hard to access or only partially “translated” by minds and other objects. They are irreducibly withdrawn.

 

OOO is form of realism, not materialism. In this it shares affinities with quantum theory. Antirealism pits quantum theory against its opponents, since quantum theory supposedly shows reality is fuzzy or deeply correlated with perception and so forth. In fact, quantum theory is the only existing theory to establish firmly that things really do exist beyond our mind (or any mind). Quantum theory positively guarantees that real objects exist! Not only that--these objects exist beyond one another. Quantum theory does this by viewing phenomena as quanta, as discrete “units” as described in Unit Operations by OOO philosopher Ian Bogost. “Units” strongly resemble OOO “objects.” Thinking in terms of units counteracts problematic features of thinking in terms of systems. A kind of systems thinking posed significant problems for nineteenth-century physicists. Only consider the so-called black body radiation problem. Classical thermodynamics is essentially a systems approach that combines the energy of different waves to figure out the total energy of a system. The black box in question is a kind of oven. As the temperature in the oven increases, results given by summing the wave states according to classical theory become absurd, tending to infinity.

 

By seeing the energy in the black box as discrete quanta (“units”), the correct result is obtained. Max Planck's discovery of this approach gave birth to quantum theory. Now consider perception, for the sake of which antirealism usually cites quantum theory. What does quantum theory show about our mental interactions with things? Perceptual, sensual phenomena such as hardness and brilliance are at bottom quantum mechanical effects. I can't put my hand through this table because it is statistically beyond unlikely that the quanta at the tip of my finger could bust through the resistance wells in the quanta on the table's surface. That's what solidity is. It's an averagely correct experience of an aggregate of discrete quanta. This statistical quality, far from being a problem, is the first time humans have been able to formalize supposedly experiential phenomena such as solidity. What some people find disturbing about quantum theory (once in a gajillion times I can put my finger through the table) is precisely evidence for the reality of things. (This is a version of an argument in Meillassoux, AF 82–5).

 

Quantum theory specifies that quanta withdraw from one another, including the quanta with which we measure them. In other words quanta really are discrete, and one mark of this discreteness is the constant (mis)translation of one quantum by another. Thus when you set up quanta to measure the position of a quantum, its momentum withdraws, and vice versa. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle states that when an “observer”--not a subject per se, but a measuring device involving photons or electrons (or whatever)--makes an observation, at least one aspect of the observed is occluded (QT 99–115). Observation is as much part of the Universe of objects as the observable, not some ontologically different state (say of a subject). More generally, what Niels Bohr called complementarity ensures that no quantum has total access to any other quantum. Just as a focusing lens makes one object appear sharper while others appear blurrier, one quantum variable comes into sharp definition at the expense of others (QT 158–61). This isn't about how a human knows an object, but how a photon interacts with a photosensitive molecule. Some phenomena are irreducibly undecidable, both wavelike and particle-like. The way an electron encounters the nucleus of an atom involves a dark side. Objects withdraw from each other at a profound physical level. OOO is deeply congruent with the most profound, accurate and testable theory of physical reality available. Again, it would be better to say it the other way around: quantum theory works because it's object-oriented.

 

Probing the quantum world, then, is a form of auto-affection. Bohr argued that quantum phenomena don't simply concatenate themselves with their measuring devices. They're identical to it: the equipment and the phenomena form an indivisible whole (QT 139–40, 177). This “quantum coherence” applies close to absolute zero, where particles become the “same” thing.

 

Implication and explication suggest Matter being enfolded and unfolded from something deeper. Even if it were the case that OOO should defer to physics, in the terms set by physics itself objects aren't made “of” any one thing in particular. Just as there is no top level, there may be no bottom level that is not an (substantial, formed) object.

 

To this extent, “object” (as a totally positive entity) is a false immediacy. Positive assertions about objects fail because objects have a shadowy dark side, a mysterious interiority like the je ne sais quoi of Kantian beauty. Is this nothing at all? Is there a path from the carnival of things to a bleak nothingness? Nihilism, believing that you have no beliefs, maintains that things emerge from an impenetrable mystery. Nihilism, the cool kids' religion, shuns the inconveniences of intimacy. We have objects--they have us--under our skin. They are our skin. OOO can't be a form of nihilism. It's the opposite view (relationism) that tends towards nihilism. Relationism holds that objects are nothing more than the sum of their relations with other objects. This begs the question of what an object is, since the definition implies a potential infinite regress: what are the “other objects”? Why, nothing more than the sum of their relations with other objects--and so on ad obscurum. At least OOO takes a shot at saying what objects are: they withdraw. This doesn't mean that they don't relate at all. It simply means that how they appear has a shadowy, illusory, magical, “strangely strange” quality. It also means they can't be reduced to one another. OOO holds that strangeness is impossible if objects are reducible to their relations. Since relationism is hamstrung by its reluctance to posit anything, it tends towards obscurantism. Relationism is stuck in a Euthyphronic dilemma: objects consist of relations between other objects—and what are those objects? An object as such is never defined. So while ecological criticism appears to celebrate interconnectedness, it must in the end pay attention to what precisely is interconnected with what.

 

This radical finitude includes a strange irreducible openness.

[Edward theurj Berge]

I enjoyed Bryant's post on art, and the linked article on art. One line reminded me of my old article, "Who decides what Wilber means?":

"The artist herself is an interpreter of her own work, not the authority of her work."

I also like his focus on the art as material medium. Often when enjoyed a work of art, say a painting, I don't look for a meaning or interpretation but rather just appreciate the brush or knife strokes, the texture, the color scheme, etc.

And his take on interpretation as creative co-enaction with an art object is preferable to interpretation as getting at the meaning of said object. As such they are "pluripotent." This is how I view rhetaphor, as both an art suobject in itself and as interpretative co-enaction with other suobjects.

And his point that, given the above, art suobjects affect and enact a change in the world, often revolutionary. For the open us to new worlds, new ways of being in the world, that both challenge and change sedimented ideologies. We are all familiar with the power of art to affect, a power that comes from its own virtual proper being and not from its origin or context.

[Edward theurj Berge]

P2P Foundation highlights an article by Andre Ling that is appropriate in this thread, as it addresses Latour, Bennett, DeLanda, Stengers, Harman, Morton, Bryant, Bogost. A good, broad overview of the movement.

[Edward theurj Berge]

The new issue of Speculations is out. The table of contents follows. In addition to Bryant's article I'm interested in the articles on Derrida and Badiou, post-theological thought and magical Marxism. There's also a review of TDOO, and here's Bryant's blog response to it.

--TABLE OF CONTENTS--

Editorial Introduction

ARTICLES

Re-asking the Question of the Gendered Subject after Non-Philosophy
Benjamin Norris

Thing Called Love: That Old Substantive Relation
Beatrice Marovich

The Other Face of God: Lacan, Theological Structure, and the Accursed Remainder
Levi R. Bryant

Improper Names for God: Religious Language and the “Spinoza-Effect”
Daniel Whistler

Namelessness and the Speculative Turn: A Response to Whistler
Daniel Colucciello Barber

Diagonals: Truth-Procedures in Derrida and Badiou
Christopher Norris

Synchronicity and Correlationism: Carl Jung as Speculative Realist
Michael Haworth

TRANSLATIONS

Über stellvertretende Verursachung [On Vicarious Causation]
Graham Harman (trans. Sergey Sistiaga)

Speculative Realism: After Finitude, and Beyond?
Louis Morelle

POSITION PAPERS AND INTERVIEW

Outward Bound: On Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude
Christian Thorne

The Noumenon's New Clothes (Part 1)
Peter Wolfendale

Of Realist Turns: A Conversation with Stathis Psillos
Fabio Gironi

BOOK REVIEWS

In Defense of Unfashionable Causes: The Democracy of Objects by Levi Bryant
Daniel Sacilotto

Assessing the French Atheistic Turn: Difficult Atheism: Post-theological thought in Badiou, Nancy and Meillassoux by Christopher Watkin
Fabio Gironi

Fight and Flight: Magical Marxism: Subversive Politics and the Imagination by Andy Merrifield
Dave Mesing

Circus Philosophicus by Graham Harman
Maxwell Kennel

Joseph Nechvatal’s nOise anusmOs Installation
Youting Zou

[Edward theurj Berge]

In reading Norris' reading of Badiou's reading of Derrida I am in awe of his philosophical acumen. Not only does he understand both of them, and the philosophers they investigate, but he is acutely accurate and precise in parsing all of that while also effusing his own exacting style. Truly impressive. For now I like this quote:

"It is seen to manifest an incipient grasp of the contrary truth according to which multiplicity precedes and outruns any...count-as-one.... 'In-consists'...[is] the neologism [that] nicely and compactly denotes...that absolute precedence of the multiple over the one" (165-6).

[Balder]

Thanks for the heads up.  I look forward to digging in to some of these.

[Balder]

I thought this little video on tardigrades belonged here:

[Edward theurj Berge]

As I am wont I'll engage in some hyperbolic speculation. The extraterrestrial origin of life on earth! Our Creator! Glory be unto the Tardigrade, amen. Hmmm, perhaps we might then call the human race, in not so politically correct terms, retardigrades?

[Balder]

:-D  That's hilarious.

[Balder]

Bryant's article on onto-cartography is interesting.  He's arguing, among other things, for the idea that space-time is produced by objects -- or, that there are object-related space-times.  This is akin to Harman's model, where "time" and "space" are aspects of his fourfold objects.

(...Although he does use that atrocious non-word, irregardless...)

[Edward theurj Berge]

Being the retardigrade that I am, I toyed for a bit with adding the ir to my theurjianism* rhetaphor making it irrhetaphor. Ir is a variant of in denoting not used with words starting with r, like irreducible, because it just doesn't sound right to say inreducible. So I kind of like that monstrosity irregardless, as if to double-negate itself and by so doing assert itself in a virtual sort of way, not quite present or absent yet both. Do you follow my irreasoning?** It's very much like how suobjects warp space-time.

Or as Jean-Luc used to say when ordering the jump to warp speed: "Engage!" Perhaps in light of recent developments we might now say: "Enact!"

* I am also pondering changing this word to just theurjism, since it has the jizm sound on the end. The urj jism definitely makes for these expressions being described as dickwads.

** Not to be confused with inseasoning, meaning, e.g., singing Christmas carols in the month of December only. Same with being aware of Chia Pets. The rest of the year they go back to being dark suobjects.

[Edward theurj Berge]

In Bryant's blog post 9/6/12 he mentions the epistemologist Tylor Burge. Having a name similar to mine I looked at his wiki entry. I was further synchronicitied when it discussed his views on de re belief within philosophy of mind, since one of my theurjisms is de-re to indicate de/reconstruction of worldviews in general. But there's more. I found one of Burge's articles, "Five theses on de re states and attitudes." An excerpt:

"To be a de re state or attitude is to bear a peculiarly direct epistmic and representational relation to a particular referent in perception or thought.... The five theses are developed against a background rejection of Russell's notion of acquaintance, a supposed perspective-free mental relation to an object.... I believe that perception and thought are fundamentally and ineliminably perspectival" (246-7).

[Balder]

Wow.  Downright uncanny.  Spooky action (affinity) at a distance, to be sure.