Radical Buddhism and the paradox of acceptance

[Edward theurj Berge]

See this article by the above title at this link. Here's an excerpt:

 

In other words, for Zizek, Buddhism, in the context of a Western consumer culture, allows the individual to believe he is transforming his mind without actually changing the conditions of suffering that shape the individual's society. This represents a dangerous type of inner peace - a peace not based on true insight into the interdependent nature of reality, but instead based on withdrawal into a mental cocoon, some personal oasis isolated from the turmoil of the world outside. In this cocoon, the whole world can go to hell, and the meditator can -- put simply -- be ok with that. In fact, the meditator can even be a willing actor in a system aiding great oppression, and still live at ease, because it's "all good" anyway. By practicing "acceptance," we simply become comfortable with the status quo.

 

 

[Christophe]

Interesting. The text quotes Zizek with:

"[Western Buddhism allows us to] fully participate in the frantic pace of the capitalist game, while sustaining the perception that you are not really in it, that you are well aware how worthless the spectacle is -- what really matters to you is the peace of the inner self to which you know you can always withdraw."

Basically I hear Mr. Nichtern say that of course a totally independent state of Nirvana is a myth, but, you know, the show must go on, these are hard times, the recession and so on and so on, so in order to keep beginners interested in the whole agenda you gotta simplify a few things. So what. Let's not make a big deal out of it, eh.

He argues that Zizek doesn't practice meditation so he cannot make valid statements about it. Well Mr. Nichtern is no psychoanalyst so following this logic he cannot make any valid statements about repression, the unconscious, and the libido. FYI I consider psychoanalysis a tradition complete with practices and lineage holders etc.

I get the impression that this whole article is a rationalization, the result of a cognitive dissonance, triggered by the admittedly harsh (but justified) critique of Zizek's. While I appreciate the usefulness of a good defense mechanism, some are better and more functional than others. Time will tell which will hold and which will break down.

Warmly,

[kelamuni]

Wow. All the rhetorical elements of the usual apologetic response are present in this short article. Lovely. :-)

The bifurcation into factions here reminds me a lot of Koestler's dichotomy of Yogi and Commisar. Here's an article on Koestler written in 1960, an amusing review of Koestler's reflections: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,874206-1,00.html

[kelamuni]

I'd like to take a few moments to expand upon my initial comments.

The charge Zizek here makes is a familiar one usually associated with the charge of "quietism." It may help to keep in mind that many forms classical Buddhism, like Yoga and Vedanta, are renunciatory traditions, and as such they do indeed advocate being "in the world but not off it." So I don't think that Zizek is all that far off the mark in his characterization, here.

Zizek appears to be going after the idea that one should "change oneself" before one sets out to change the world, which is precisely Nichtern's position. Here, whether takes the "psychological path" or one takes the sociological path is a choice, an open question subject to debate.

As in Koestler's day, a version of this dichotomy also appeared in the 70's, most notably in the Berkeley area. At this time, Western Marxism was undergoing a transformation and becoming more popular on campuses. In this approach we sometimes find the dictum, "if yer not part of the solution, yer still part of the problem," and those who engaged in the self-help movement and the human potential movement (EST, Esalen, etc), or and the "new religious consciousness" and efforts aimed at self-transformation, associated with either new traditions like TM or older ones like Zen, were seen as falling into the "still part of the problem" side of the dichotomy. In other words, the "social" approach began to criticize the "psychological" approach.

But instead of actually engaging Zizek's charge in a fully reflective manner, the sense I get is that Nichtern gives a rather superficial and off the cuff apologetic response that is defensive and apologetic, if not also completely drab and to be expected. He begins by making use of a well known strategy, one that implies a certain distinction; he refers to, " 1) how mindfulness actually works, 2) what acceptance really means, and 3) how genuine transformation comes about." (italics added) The modifiers here are instructive; they imply, "you don't really understand true Buddhism," or at least, "true Buddhism is not like that." To me this comes very close the what has been referred to as the "no true scotsman" fallacy. While I personally don't think of this little gambit as necessarily fallacious, it is a rhetorical move that can be problematic, particularly if the distinction between "true" or good" and "false" or "bad" is forced.

What for example do you make of this argument: "meditation is not a passive withdrawl because it is really hard." I don't follow this line of argumentation; it sounds like a red herring to me. We then get something like an inkling of an argument when he makes the assertion that "avoidance of ourself is the basis of mindless consumer culture," but then he falls back instead on yet another well known gambit, the argument from privileged access. And here, outside of its usual epistemic context, the argument from privileged access really does sound problematic. Nichtern writes, "Without having an actual practice, however, there's no way Slavoj Zizek or any of the rest of us could really see the irony of this realization." I'm sorry, but I don't get his line of argumentation here. It sounds like he's preaching to the converted, so that they can all nod their heads in agreement. It's fluff.

The author then goes on about how we all want want "real" change, inward and outward, and then makes a cursory comment about Buddhism being about "changing the world." Is it? Is this classical Buddhism or a new reformulation? We return briefly to the vague idea that Buddhism allows us to resist materialism, but this does not really address Zizek's concerns; it is actually restating the idea that Buddhism is about renouncing the world, and that meditation aids us in this quest. In other words, it is still simply about the individual and not society or the world at large.

The next phase in the argument evokes arguments first put forward by Vivekananda and Yogananda and later taken up by Wilber, viz., that meditation is a "scientific" procedure. Again I'm perplexed by the relevance of this statement. Is it simply meant to bamboozle us with the idea that meditaiton is "relevant" to the modern world, because it is "scientific?" Here again not even the original epistemic context remains; we are simply left with the idea that meditation is, somehow or other, "scientific," as if that should impress us.

The argument then shifts back to familiar ground. He states, "We need to realize that we live in a state of deep assumption about the way the mind works, which then extends to our understanding of the world." In other words -- as would appear to be his argument -- we first need to understand how our mind works, and only then we can set about changing the world. But then he goes back to talking about "science," as if that were relevant, and then makes the assertion that we should be established in mindfulness before we set out to change the world. If his point is that we need to be very careful as to what it is that we want to change, and how it is that we should change it, then the point is well taken. But what makes Buddhism or Buddhists such vastly superior beings that their "mindfulness" is going to ensure against political stupidity, or naivity and excessive idealism, or even, and this is possible among any relgionist, reactionary, fundamentalist authoritarianism? The assumption here is that the Buddhist will be "wise" simply because he practices meditation. I don't think that that is justified, and indeed, to me it sounds rather idealistic and naive to think so. So much for wisdom.

Next he brings up acceptance, but the relevance is again lost on me. There are some significant critiques of the political relevance of acceptance, of "Gelassenheit," and of tolerance, but our author appears to be igornant of these. I don't see him engaging these critiques in a substantial way. Instead he talks about "self-loathing" and "voyeuriusm."

He ends with a diatribe about truly accepting oneself. This may be relevant to someone on the "path," but I don't see how it adresses our initial problem: "change oneself or change the world?" Rather it simply comes off sounding like circular reasoning.

He then concludes with a flowery statement about how people who accept themselves and who have transformed themselves are powerful agents of global change. Is this in fact due to their meditation? Or where they born like that, with that sort of predisposition? And are they always interested in global change, or is something new and modern? I would say that assessment here is a rather severe overstatement. Some of them might be agents of that type, but then I'm not convinced that that is entirely due to their "practice."

He then says, "Eventually you have to get up and do something." OK. Is that a dictum of the Buddhist faith, or something added to it, like a political afterthought? He concludes by basically restating his thesis, which has gone unsubstantiated for the most part, and tagging on in front of it an odd metaphysical thesis: "trying to change your life or the world without a real method for changing your own mind is inherently doomed to failure, because society is just a matrix of the hearts and minds of those who inhabit it." What does this mean? Unfortunately, we are not given much more clarity as to his position. We might well also question what appears to be an assumption here: Society may be made up of a collection (matrix?) of minds, but I don't think it can be reduced to such. Society is not simply a collection of subjectivites; it is also intersubjective.

[Balder]

I think Slavoj Zizek's critique has some merit, but it is too general, treating "Western Buddhism" as some monolithic entity concerned only with "acceptance" and "peace" and contemplative withdrawal. That is not what I see happening on the ground in Western Buddhist circles, though -- not in a way that would merit a sweeping dismissal of "Western Buddhism" as complicit in the consumerist status quo. There are many examples of Western Buddhists trying to find ways to turn Buddhist principles and practices towards a critique of Western culture. David Loy comes to mind. Judith Simmer Brown is another. Donald Rothberg is another. And Joanna Macy, Bernie Glassman, etc...

[kelamuni]

Balder said:

I think Slavoj Zizek's critique has some merit, but it is too general, treating "Western Buddhism" as some monolithic entity concerned only with "acceptance" and "peace" and contemplative withdrawal. That is not what I see happening on the ground in Western Buddhist circles, though -- not in a way that would merit a sweeping dismissal of "Western Buddhism" as complicit in the consumerist status quo. There are many examples of Western Buddhists trying to find ways to turn Buddhist principles and practices towards a critique of Western culture. David Loy comes to mind. Judith Simmer Brown is another. Donald Rothberg is another. And Joanna Macy, Bernie Glassman, etc...

Yes, but what about Nichtern's response. He deals almost exclusively with Buddhism as the practice of developing "mindfullness."

[Balder]

Yes, I agree; that is weak. I am not sure I agree with all of your critique -- you are harder on him than I would be -- but I also wasn't very impressed with his rebuttal.

I just wanted to add a counter-statement to yours, because I thought Zizek's critique was kind of weak too. (As if Marxists have been any more successful in positively transforming humanity or lessening human complicity to stupidity and atrocity. Don't get me started on what the friggin' Maoists and Marxists are doing right now in Nepal...)

[kelamuni]

Balder said:

Yes, I agree; that is weak. I am not sure I agree with all of your critique -- you are harder on him than I would be -- but I also wasn't very impressed with his rebuttal.

I just wanted to add a counter-statement to yours, because I thought Zizek's critique was kind of weak too. (As if Marxists have been any more successful in positively transforming humanity or lessening human complicity to stupidity and atrocity. Don't get me started on what the friggin' Maoists and Marxists are doing right now in Nepal...)

I think that both positions are relatively generalized, and more or less amount to basic undeveloped thesis statements. In other words, they amount to "positions," and as such presume assumptions that I guess could be treated as "working hypotheses" that need to be fleshed out to see where they go.

I would not necessarily want to say that the Marxist is the actual detractor here, though at one time he would have been. And I would agree that there is no shortage of naivity, idealism, and extremism among the various Marxist positions. Indeed, one argument against the "sociological" position, is that it is rather presumptuous in itself to think that material conditions can be changed in any significant way without a great deal of social upheaval resulting from it. There are some fairly cogent "organic" conservative arguments (not neo-conservative), that point out that Marxist ideologies, in which there is the attempt to change social reality in a radical way, are problematic. As I say, we need to think about what it is we are trying to change, how we are to do so, and why we even need, very carefully.

Chris Lasch had argued at one point that both Western Marxism ala Berkeley and the self-help human potential movement ala the Bay area c. 1970 both reflected a kind of "narcissism."

I am interesting, though, in the basic dialetical debate here between the "psychological" and "sociological" approaches and think it is worth while thinking about.

[kelamuni]

But I guess the thread was about Zizek to begin with.

I was interested in Nichtern's reaction, though. When I was younger I too used to have defensive, knee-jerk reactions to criticisms of Buddhism, Vedanta, eastern "spirituality," or Indian "philosophy."

[Balder]

For the debate between of psychological and social approaches you mention, I have been thinking of the earliest influence on me regarding that topic: Thomas Merton's reflections on contemplation and activism. I am listening to this lecture right now to see if I can glean anything useful from it for this discussion... So far, I'm not sure it will bear fruit, but we'll see...

[kelamuni]

Balder said:

For the debate between of psychological and social approaches you mention, I have been thinking of the earliest influence on me regarding that topic: Thomas Merton's reflections on contemplation and activism. I am listening to this lecture right now to see if I can glean anything useful from it for this discussion... So far, I'm not sure it will bear fruit, but we'll see...

The question of activism as it relates to modern Indian thought is interesting. I deal with Vivekanand's "practical Vedanta" at my blogger site. Aurobindo also reinterprets the Gita's "karma yoga" in terms of a social activism, something that is absolutely foreign to the Gita historically, where "karma yoga" referred merely to doing the brahmanic rituals and nothing else.

The question of contemplation vs. activism probably has deep roots in the Christian tradition. Canadian social democratic thought has its own roots in the social gospel of the turn of the century. Its founder, Tommy Douglas, one of my political heros, was a preacher before he became a politician.

[Balder]

I think it's likely that the social activist reading of karma yoga is a response to exposure to Judeo-Christian social ideals. I recall reading in Worthy is the World, by Beatrice Bruteau, that Aurobindo, for instance, was particularly inspired by that aspect of Christianity and wanted to "integrate" it into his yoga. Similarly, the Dalai Lama sometimes has commented on his admiration for the social activism of the Judeo-Christian world, which, while not without precedent in Buddhism (I'm thinking of some of the stories in the Ashokavadana and the Jataka tales), has been less stressed, and he has urged modern Tibetan Buddhists to focus more on socially responsible action.

Thomas Merton gave an "activist" spin to the contemplative vocation in some of his writings, suggesting that society is served by "marginal men," by people who withdraw to the edges of the social order, disengaging from many of the externals of the social machinery, the better to see and observe society, and ultimately to serve it (with clarified vision). But perhaps he wrote this because he himself was ambivalent about his withdrawal from the world, and wanted to make a case to his superiors that it was important for him to remain so "engaged" with the world (through his letter-writing, protest essays, books, etc).

[kelamuni]

Balder said:

I think it's likely that the social activist reading of karma yoga is a response to exposure to Judeo-Christian social ideals. I recall reading in Worthy is the World, by Beatrice Bruteau, that Aurobindo, for instance, was particularly inspired by that aspect of Christianity and wanted to "integrate" it into his yoga. Similarly, the Dalai Lama sometimes has commented on his admiration for the social activism of the Judeo-Christian world, which, while not without precedent in Buddhism (I'm thinking of some of the stories in the Ashokavadana and the Jataka tales), has been less stressed, and he has urged modern Tibetan Buddhists to focus more on socially responsible action.

Thomas Merton gave an "activist" spin to the contemplative vocation in some of his writings, suggesting that society is served by "marginal men," by people who withdraw to the edges of the social order, disengaging from many of the externals of the social machinery, the better to see and observe society, and ultimately to serve it (with clarified vision). But perhaps he wrote this because he himself was ambivalent about his withdrawal from the world, and wanted to make a case to his superiors that it was important for him to remain so "engaged" with the world (through his letter-writing, protest essays, books, etc).

Interesting. Re: Merton -- That's a more cogent expression than what we get from Nichtern.