integral postmetaphysical enaction

[Edward theurj Berge]

It is with much ado that I change the name of my blog to “integral postmetaphysical enaction” but will keep the same address. The term nonduality is too limited and too attached to certain metaphysical schools of philosophy and religion. Yes, I can recontextualize the term, make it mean whatever I want, but the weight of its historical association is more than my miniscule influence can overcome. On the other hand the term enaction is within the historical context of recent developments in cognitive science yet applicable to all methodologies across the spectrum. Plus it specifically denotes the kind of nonduality in which I'm interested through continuity, both within an individual and between an individual with others and the environment. In AQALese, the integrated and inseparable relations between the one and the many, the inside and the outside. And all within a postmetaphysical, developmental trajectory that dynamically enacts a worldspace, not discovers a universal, given world. It also demonstrates the relation of action and theory, for it is my hope to inspire action in those who read these theoretical ramblings.

 

By the way, I did an internet search on those terms in  parentheses and again it is currently the only link on the web, another first.

 

Here is a good working definition of enaction from Enaction School 2010:

 

“The term enactive is used to identify a way of thinking about, and a set of methodologies for conducting, cognitive science. This approach to describing, explaining and investigating the mind emphasises the valued, meaningful interaction between a living agent and its environment. It emphasises the continuity between the basic processes of living (e.g. metabolism) and cognition. It recognises the autonomy of living systems and the way in which meaning, thought and experience emerge within the dynamic, skilful activity of the agent - the enaction of meaning, thought and experience.

 

“Standing in contrast to much of mainstream thinking within Cognitive Science, the enactive approach challenges many of the basic assumptions of extant theory. The body (including but not limited to the brain) is considered to have an integral role in the processes of the mind. Cognitive processes are seen as the means by which an agent adapts their behavior so as to maintain their values (in the simplest case, biological values such as continued existence but in more complex cases, social and cultural values come into play). The nature of such processes is considered to be dynamic and adaptive, rather than a set of structures that are universal and modular in character.”

[Edward theurj Berge]

The depth of the exteriors.

[Edward theurj Berge]

Related to the last post (and recent musings in the real/false reason thread), from the journal Speculations (2, May 2011), Bryant's “On the reality and construction of hyperobjects with reference to c...”:

“Class, as an entity in its own right, comes to function as a statistical sorting machine...like a gravitational or attractive field for those persons or human bodies that find themselves within its orbit.... The output these machines produce are the manner in which human beings are formed at the affective, cognitive, and even the physiological level” (88-9).

“In Understanding Media Marshall McLuhan famously argues that the essence of media consists in being an extension of man.... Crucial to these extensions is that they also transform modes of affectivity, cognition, and social relations.... Along these lines, Latour will argue that nonhuman objects should be treated as full-blown actors in associations or assemblages” (94 – 6).

[Edward theurj Berge]

I found the following Vygotsky quote on Bogost's blog dated 9/16/10, from Mind in Society:

"A special feature of human perception—which arises at a very young age—is the perception of real objects. This is something for which there is no analogy in animal perception. By this term I mean that I do not see the world simply in color and shape but also as a world with sense and meaning. I do not merely see something round and black with two hands; I see a clock and I can distinguish one hand from the other. Some brain-injured patients say, when they see a clock, that they are seeing something round and white with two thin steel strips, but they do not know that it is a clock; such people have lost their real relationship with objects. These observations suggest that all human perception consists of categorized rather than isolated perceptions."

[Edward theurj Berge]

Also recall the following from Philosophy in the Flesh:

“Living systems must categorize. Since we are neural beings our categories are formed through our embodiment. What that means is the categories we form are part of our experience. They are the structures that differentiate aspects of our experience into discernible kinds. Categorization is thus not a purely intellectual matter, occurring after the fact of experience. Rather the formation and use of categories is the stuff of experience…. We cannot, as some meditative traditions suggest, get ‘beyond’ our categories and have a purely uncategorized and unconceptualized experience. Neural beings cannot do that” (19).

According to this even animal perception is so categorized. Vygotsky though differentiates human perception, since the animal doesn't further categorize perception as humans do via symbolic enculturation, which begins very early on and changes our biologically inherent perceptual categories.

[Edward theurj Berge]

Some responses to the Magellan course.

[Edward theurj Berge]

The logoi of power relations.

[Edward theurj Berge]

America is not old-white-male enough?

[Edward theurj Berge]

Forget some specious post-partisanship: The Republicans are the problem.

[Edward theurj Berge]

Austerity and disaster capitalism.

[Edward theurj Berge]

Varieties of nondual experience.

[Edward theurj Berge]

pOOOntong anyone?

[Edward theurj Berge]

Let Republicans in your vagina.