Spinbitz

[Edward theurj Berge]

In my research I came upon this free e-book called Spinbitz: Interface Philosophy, Mathematics and Nondual Rational Empiricism, A Philosophy of Vision-Logic Interfaces. Here's the "spin" on it from the site:

 

SpinbitZ is a playful, whirling, churning, folding and unfolding set of concepts for the illumination and integration of abstract philosophical ideas, through the integrated use of the imagination and its percepts.  SpinbitZ constructs a set of philosophical "graphical user-interfaces" at the vision-logic level of cognition.  It is thus a philosophy of vision-logic interfaces, employing the "triune interfaces," or "cultivated thirds" hidden within the polarities of every duality, dichotomy, controversy and paradox to build a consistent system for the effective understanding and resolution of their key esoteric truths, rather than for their dualistic and reactionary refutation.  In using these interfaces to trace a nondual thread of rationality to its historical roots, it is discovered that only the dualistic, exoteric (or commonly understood) forms of rationality begin with the Greek trinity:  Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.  By reconnecting to the earlier nondual truths of Heraclitus and Parmenides, the conceptual axis-mundi itself (what Lao Tzu called "the door to all wonders") is found spinning at the core of Zeno's paradox, and thus at the core of nondual rationality.  Through a fusion of Art, Science, Mathematics and Philosophy—and with the help of nearly a hundred detailed diagrams and illustrations—this embryogenesis of rationality is traced as it reconnects to the alternative lineage of philosophy uncovered by Deleuze, with a nondual fusion of the systems of Spinoza and Leibniz.

In esoteric Theosophy it is said that in the "shock" of the interface between Spinoza and Leibniz "the essence and Spirit of esoteric philosophy would be made to appear."  Unfolding through these vision-logic interfaces, this Interface Philosophy finally appears to reconcile many of the dualities plaguing the history of exoteric rationality.  In its nondual interface with empiricism and Integral theory, for example, a detailed sketch of an Interface Epistemology is unfolded.  Operating at the crossroads of the ontic-epistemic (reality vs. knowledge) and subject-object polarities, the evolutionary symbiogenesis of the exoteric dichotomies at the foundations of human knowledge is examined—illuminating and reconciling the "ontic-shadow" of post-modernity. 

The process of reanimating these hidden nondual truths of rationality demonstrates that mathematics itself mirrors this holarchic structure implicit in the embryogenesis of the concept.  This is because mathematics, as the art and science of pure relation, employs the most rarefied and abstract form of the concept, e.g. numbers and operations.  Unfolding in layer upon layer, this Interface Mathematics transitions from the "oppositional forces" of dualism, ultimately again to the "intensive," integral or "second-tier" truths, and to the originary axis-mundi of the nondual.  In making mathematics visible, visceral and understandable—a Vision-Logic Coordinate System is constructed revealing two fundamental axes of conceptual thought (one of which is this axis mundi or immanent/transcendent axis).  Spinoza's "three infinities" are then shown as the triune interface, or cultivating third between these binary axes, for illuminating and reconciling the many paradoxes and controversies of infinity—e.g. Zeno's, Galileo's and Cantor's—as they wind their way into the truths of our modern mathematics of the continuum and set-theory.

[Edward theurj Berge]

An excerpt:

Deleuze, like Nagarjuna, before him, implores us to think “acategorically,” to “pulverize the categories” inherited through a past hermeneutic—the forces of representation—driven by the distorting effects and purposes of power. This acategorical or aperspectival thinking is the injunction required to explore this Deleuzian “alternative lineage that challenges the Hegelian concept of the dialectical progression in the history of philosophy,” as Duffy states.... Indeed, Deleuze’s “task” he set for Philosophy echoes the task that Nagarjuna set for himself, in his “philosophy of the middle-path,” which was to overcome the dominating philosophical dichotomy of his time, to pulverize the categories dividing the “eternalists” and the “nihilists”.... Not only does Deleuze trace out an alternative lineage in philosophy, but in so doing, he necessarily traces out an alternative lineage in mathematics, specifically of the calculus. This is because (among other reasons) with the rationalists, philosophy and mathematics were deeply intertwined.

In the abstract to his article (The Logic of Expression…) Duffy writes:

Spinoza’s philosophy should not be represented as a moment that can be simply subsumed and sublated within the dialectical progression of the history of philosophy, as it is figured by Hegel in the Science of Logic, but rather should be considered as providing an alternative point of view for the development of a philosophy that overcomes Hegelian idealism. Indeed, Deleuze demonstrates, by means of Spinoza, that a more complex philosophy antedates Hegel’s which cannot be supplanted by it. Spinoza therefore becomes a significant figure in Deleuze’s project of tracing an alternative lineage in the history of philosophy, which, by distancing itself from Hegelian idealism, culminates in the construction of a philosophy of difference. Deleuze presents Spinoza’s metaphysics as determined according to a ‘logic of expression’, which, insofar as it contributes to the determination of a philosophy of difference, functions as an alternative to the Hegelian dialectical logic (37-9).

[Balder]

Wow, what a find, Edward! This looks like quite an interesting book. With accolades from Paul Lonely.

Thanks for adding to my already-too-long reading list -- but I have to add it! Don't think I can skip this one. (Just was skimming the chapter on post-metaphysics...)

[Edward theurj Berge]

I just read a few bitz from that section, including "A Wilber encounter of the third kind." Therein the author shows how Wilber dismisses Spinoza, saying he is not postmetaphysical because he is not enlightened. The author challenges Wilber and Wilber brushes him off. The author notes Wilber's misunderstanding arises from just taking second-hand comments about Spinoza that fit with Wilber's overall agenda rather than taking the injunction to study and understand Spinoza deeply before making an evaluation.

Which of course feeds into my hypothesis about holons. Wilber takes only an infinitesimal "part" of something to include in his transcend-and-include holarchy, not the whole in itself thing. (That there is no whole, in itsef thing is another story temporarily bracketed to tell my narrative.) So Wilber's higher synthesis-model doesn't more fully take into account the "rest of the story" of any given part, and often the left-out parts are indeed antithetical to the "wholes" Wilber draws.

So to now remove the earlier brackets, even any given part-whole, aka holon, is itself not "whole in itself." That is, it does not completely subsume all of its constituents parts into a "dominant monad" that completely overides the parts. The parts of any specified holon,while partially fulfilling the greater holon's agenda, still maintain their own autonomy with functions that might be other than the more inclusive holon's agenda. And/or they might be part of other holons with other agendas. The process of defining a holon and holarchy might be useful in some ways but if it doesn't take this into account we get the kind of dominator hierarchical conceptions that Wilber demonstrates above.

[Edward theurj Berge]

Also recall the quoted excerpt above, how Spinoza should not be "subsumed and sublated" in Hegel's dialectical progression of history. And when properly understood, questions the very notion of such a dominant, monadical (akin to maniacal) holarchy.

[Balder]

I read "A Wilber Encounter of the Third Kind," too, and was rather disconcerted by the claim that Spinoza couldn't be postmetaphysical because he wasn't enlightened. That doesn't make sense to me, and I wonder if there wasn't a misunderstanding there of some kind. If not, then I don't know what to make of it, other than I don't agree. I'm doubtful such a thing is necessary. But the direction the author goes is that Spinoza was enlightened ... Go figure.

Concerning your comments about holons, I agree. From something I read last night (in the reviews, I think), the author's writings on 1 and infinity may have some bearing on what you're saying here.

Anyway, the book overall looks quite intriguing, so I'm going to start at the beginning (after having skipped around in several sections last night).

[Edward theurj Berge]

I too have only read small bitz here and there so cannot fully criticize. However after reading a small section on the empty set I'm not convinced of his argument. He says that notions like the empty set are contradictory and arise from an abstraction divorced from its perceptive-bodily roots. Here it sounds similar to the real/false reason argument, that metaphysical abstractions are not embodied and hence posit otherworldly entities. After reading Badiou's use of the empty set though I'm not convinced that such an idea is false and dissociated from embodiment, especially if we equate the empty set with Nagarjuna's emptiness as dependent origination. The empty set then becomes the structural relations between members of set(s) and between other sets, with no One unifying (transcendental) set. Which brings me to the author and his connection to One and infinity, which again seem disputed by the likes of Badiou. But not sure yet what he means by all that; we'll see.

I did a search on "Badiou" in the book and he does reference him, but only his earlier work which he uses to support his theses. But this was prior to Badiou's empty set stuff, so not included. And/or it didn't support the theses so left unexamined? And surprisingly not one reference to Lakoff's work in the entire book, not even in the bibliography! Not a good sign, especially since he's making an argument for a return to more "natural" holarchies based on fundamental percepts.

[Edward theurj Berge]

I started to read from the beginning and early on Morrison says that if you're not into linearity then don't read the book in sequence, just skip around! I'm glad I now have permission. He does say something interesting on p. 8, that there is a common, metaphysical core to all cultures of mankind. And that it is only arbitrary and superficial categories that separate this core. This sounds like it could use Balder's criticism from his expanded ITC paper? As well as the missing element of an L&J to show that categorization is at the postmetaphysical "core" of human embodiment and not at all arbitrary. "Being is univocal" he decries. Bah humbug!

[Edward theurj Berge]

On p.24 he admits that only the "useful" parts are transcended and included in what he calls a meta-paradigm. What he doesn't say is that the bias of the meta-paradigm--in this case a univocal, common, metaphysical core--will determine which parts are included and how they are transcended to fit the agenda, assuming there is an accepted, agreed-upon and common core to a definitive, correct meta-paradigm. But such are the assumption-premises of those metaphysial core folks inculcated with kennilingus.

Note: I am sort of blogging-reporting my impressions as I read. Further reading may very well change first impressions if evidence proves otherwise, such evidence culled from of course my own pride and prejudice.

[Edward theurj Berge]

The overview on p. 28 starts with something with which I can agree, that concepts are rooted in percepts, which are themselves grounded on our interactions with the environment which require categorization and distinction, aka polarity. As such boundaries are inherent to discerning this from that, me from food. But the boundary is also the connective tissue that relates the parts distinguished. E.g., there is no me without food, our relation is what defines us together, and apart we do not exist 'inherently." Morrison finds the boundary then the "third" that unites the poles in nonduality.

Of course this view can be broadly categorized as correlationist, a view with which Meillasoux disagrees. But it is a view with which I have attached and have yet to fully understand M's criticism, so for now it works for me.

However when interdependent polarity becomes disconncted dualism arises. Again agreed, and this seems the crux of L&J's criticism of false reason with its metaphysical postulates, and Wilber's criticism that the logical capacity for differentation goes overboard into dissociation. Morrison shows that such dualistic metaphysics comes from the likes of Plato and Aristotle, again agreeing with L&J. He cites as examples of the nondualist rational tradition Heraclitus and Parmenides. To be continued...

[Balder]

I appreciate your play-by-play, Ed. I'm on page 65 so far, and have had some similar reactions -- sometimes concerned or confused by some of his assertions (in a purportedly postmetaphysical frame), sometimes really appreciating his approach (as when he calls the book a toy and recommends reading playfully, experimentally). Concerning his appeal to a common metaphysical core, I've also wondered what he's suggesting -- not being very familiar with Deleuze or what Deleuze means by univocity. Panikkar speaks of biunivocity, but I'm not sure if he's drawing on Deleuzian thought when he does so. For now, I'm sort of bracketing my concerns and just pushing on, hoping things will become clarified as he proceeds, and generally feeling open to being challenged on my assumptions about postmetaphysics. I may end up disagreeing with where he goes with this, but I am hoping I might be stretched or challenged as well. (Like you, I've been rather attached to the correlationist position that Meillassoux critiques, so I don't have any objections to that part of his vision so far.)

[Balder]

Interestingly, Morisson uses a term that I was thinking about the other day, as I was reflecting on my ongoing "integral pluralist" approach to religions project: meta-metaphysics. I was thinking that postmetaphysics, rather than rejecting metaphysics, might be thought of as a meta-metaphysics. Morisson says something similar (actually using the same word). But I'm curious how his remarks about this line up with his statement, earlier in the book, that there is a singular "metaphysical core" across all the world's traditions:

"The categories of metaphysics, in Nondual Rationalism and Interface Philosophy -— as in Integral Post-Metaphysics -— can no longer be absolutized into a dogmatic stance, not even the absolutized-relative dogma of radical skepticism. Indeed, Nondual Rationalism, and especially Interface Philosophy, can take on any metaphysics whatsoever while maintaining the relative status of its truth claims. Metaphysics in Interface Philosophy, becomes a categorical or conceptual operating system or merely an application or program -— a conceptual interface of relative categories. Install if you wish, and take it for a test run, but be aware that it is only an interface between you and the hardware of reality, and that you may have to perform a hard reboot if it fails.

Thus, post-metaphysics is not ultimately a feature of the metaphysical system itself, but a cognitive or conceptual aperspectival stance which imposes an acategorical imperative -— a meta-metaphysical and metacategorical framework -— in which the absolute truth claims of any metaphysics are suspended in the relative world of justification, partly through the rational truth that all truth claims may be subject, endlessly, to further analysis. Indeed, this unbounded stance of analysis is at the very core of the synthesis of Nondual Rationalism, as we will see. It is a resonant thread to the positive infinity and secret of Rationalism. And, as we will see, the Vision-Logic Coordinate System and the Univocity Framework, form a meta-metaphysical framework within which metaphysics can find no foundational ground with which to dogmatize and ism-ize itself" (Morisson, p. 50-51).

[Balder]

Ed, I skipped ahead (p. 155ff). I think you'll find his discussion of univocity interesting.