I just came across an interesting-looking paper proposal by a colleague of mine at JFKU.  I will see if I can locate the full paper.

 

Husserl, Schutz, and Collective Intentionality: A Transpersonal-Her..., by Sean M. Avila Saiter.

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To clarify my inquiry to date, since some are not following. Is it relevant?

  1. The intersubjective lifeworld is largely unconscious so to what degree can it be “intentional?” And what is the relation of transpersonal theory/practice to this lifeworld? That is, can we have intentional, direct and complete transpersonal experiences of this ground? Now if we take Protevi's definition of intentionality as “not subjective, but is the 'between' of subject and object, the middle out of which objects and subjects are constituted, then it makes sense as long as we don't presume to fully experience or know such a between, heeding Morris "Speaking for the lifeworld as if one could step outside of it and know it directly inevitably leads one to 'invoke a cosmology,' a 'metaphysics of the thing-in-itself.'”

  2. How does the collective interior evolve? Via the kind of structures Kennilingam suggests? Remember Foucault that genealogy doesn't so “evolve” through such rational structures as much as change by “contingent turns of history.”

  3. Sean finds that Husserl has been misinterpreted by the likes of Foucault and Derrida to the point of being “downright inaccurate.” So I'm interested in specifically how so, since Sean finds both Levin and MP as being much more accurate, and Derrda is akin to them in some regards (explored ad nauseum in this forum). Also given that Husserl endorsed Fink and Fink is the main source of Derrida. Derrida is known for meticulously reading and understanding his subjects before critique. I can see how Derrida might have disagreed with Husserl, but to claim he was was downright inaccurate needs defense. A defense, I might add, that will be surely forthcoming under intense scrutiny by the Ph.D. oral defense committee.

  4. I agree with Sean's point about the difficulty “really understand[ing]” any philosophers meaning, Husserl notwithstanding, especially in light of his being “notoriously difficult and cryptic.” Tell me about it, with Derrida another prime example. But 2 points here: a) Is there a “real” and true interpretation of Husserl, even from himself? and b) perhaps one is also misconstruing Derrida's critique of Husserl, when Derrida might just be more in line with Husserl's project that one supposes? E.g., I agree with Sean when he says: “One way that I would articulate it [habitus] is as a middle way between social constructionism and transcendental essentialism.” This middle way is succinctly put by Protevi in the referenced quote and in fact is very much akin to Derrida on the topic.

  5. Finally, for now, I too, like Balder, am interested in the project of an intersubjective (or in Varela's phenomenological term “interbeing”), integral, postmetaphysical enaction. So I'm with the general agenda and curious to see how others frame this endeavor. Which is of course the purpose of our forum.

Xibalba!

Hermetic phrenomenology is indispesible in the field of Religionswissenschaft. My brain thinks analogically as it is, so comparison is inevitable for me. However, I like to bring out the contrasts between various philosophies, spiritual teachings, attitudinal stances, etc. Finding the similarities among traditions is basically superficial and rather sophmoric. For example, at least four forms of non-dualism in the Indian tradition can be thematized (Shankara Advaita, Mandana Advaita, Vijnanavada Advaya, Madhyamika Advaya) such that using the term without specifying which variety one is referring to is effectively useless.


xibalba said:

Hi kela

did you read his history do sexuality?

A great work of genealogy.

I remember you were interested in greco-roman philosophies, and that you read Pierre Hadot.

 

How much place take phenomenologicla methods in your "bricolage" research btw?

just curious

I'm sorry theurg. I was overcome by dickheaditis temporarily! Your comments and their content are completely relevant. Apologies.

theurj said:

I am not talking about MP; I am talking about MP's interpretation of Husserl. And Sean is taking about Shutz's, and his own, interpretation of Husserl. You yourself brought up Gadamer's interpretation, as well as Derrida and others. It's not like there is one right interpretation, even from Husserl himself.

So it seems that providing how others see Husserl is of direct pertinence, especially in light of Sean's paper arguing that some interpretations get it wrong while others get it right. I'm trying to understand what it is, exactly, about other interpretations that get it wrong. Especially since MP is supposed to be one who understands Husserl better than Derrida, when it seems they both had a lot of similarity on the topic. So I'll continue with my inquiry whether you approve or not.

Good questions, and well phrased. I find the first question most interesting. I brought up a similar question with regard to aspects of Gadamer's and Heidegger's thought at a Buddhist seminar once, and was summarily dismissed, then came later to find out that it was actually not only an important question that had been raised by interpreters of Gadamer but that was an issue in Gadamer's reflection on his own hermeneutics: how does one describe that which forms the ground and basis of description itself? It has a kind of transcendental feel to it, in my mind, and how Kant deals with transcendental argumentation would here seem to be applicable. Of course, by "transcendental" we need not mean what Kant means; we merely refer to a form of argumentation. For example, Saul Kripke makes use of transcendental arguments in his interpretation of Wittgenstein in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, one of my favorite monographs on the interpretation of the later Wittgenstein. (Witt. himself might say "it shows itself..." which is not always the most satisfactory answer, though if one follows his description, one gets one of the better senses of what intersubjectivity implies.)


theurj said:

To clarify my inquiry to date, since some are not following. Is it relevant?

  1. The intersubjective lifeworld is largely unconscious so to what degree can it be “intentional?” And what is the relation of transpersonal theory/practice to this lifeworld? That is, can we have intentional, direct and complete transpersonal experiences of this ground? Now if we take Protevi's definition of intentionality as “not subjective, but is the 'between' of subject and object, the middle out of which objects and subjects are constituted, then it makes sense as long as we don't presume to fully experience or know such a between, heeding Morris "Speaking for the lifeworld as if one could step outside of it and know it directly inevitably leads one to 'invoke a cosmology,' a 'metaphysics of the thing-in-itself.'”

  2. How does the collective interior evolve? Via the kind of structures Kennilingam suggests? Remember Foucault that genealogy doesn't so “evolve” through such rational structures as much as change by “contingent turns of history.”

  3. Sean finds that Husserl has been misinterpreted by the likes of Foucault and Derrida to the point of being “downright inaccurate.” So I'm interested in specifically how so, since Sean finds both Levin and MP as being much more accurate, and Derrda is akin to them in some regards (explored ad nauseum in this forum). Also given that Husserl endorsed Fink and Fink is the main source of Derrida. Derrida is known for meticulously reading and understanding his subjects before critique. I can see how Derrida might have disagreed with Husserl, but to claim he was was downright inaccurate needs defense. A defense, I might add, that will be surely forthcoming under intense scrutiny by the Ph.D. oral defense committee.

  4. I agree with Sean's point about the difficulty “really understand[ing]” any philosophers meaning, Husserl notwithstanding, especially in light of his being “notoriously difficult and cryptic.” Tell me about it, with Derrida another prime example. But 2 points here: a) Is there a “real” and true interpretation of Husserl, even from himself? and b) perhaps one is also misconstruing Derrida's critique of Husserl, when Derrida might just be more in line with Husserl's project that one supposes? E.g., I agree with Sean when he says: “One way that I would articulate it [habitus] is as a middle way between social constructionism and transcendental essentialism.” This middle way is succinctly put by Protevi in the referenced quote and in fact is very much akin to Derrida on the topic.

  5. Finally, for now, I too, like Balder, am interested in the project of an intersubjective (or in Varela's phenomenological term “interbeing”), integral, postmetaphysical enaction. So I'm with the general agenda and curious to see how others frame this endeavor. Which is of course the purpose of our forum.

Yes, these comments are relevant and iluminating. Collingwood also has some very interesting comments on the matter in his Essay on Metaphysics.

I would argue that in the thinking of Heidegger, Gadamer, the later Husserl, and Wittgenstein, terms like the Lebenswelt (Husserl), "historically effected consciousness" -- wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein (Gadamer) -- or "Forms of Life" (Wittgenstein), function, more or less, as "metaphysical" structures, that is, as transcendental "grounds" of some sort. Indeed, Collingwood himself refers to his own notion of "absolute presuppostions" (which Gadamer relates to Heidegger's "forestructures of the understanding" and his own conception of Vorurteil or "prejudice") as metaphysical, in fact abandoning ontology and recasting the term "metaphysics" as the "science of absolute presuppositions" (in a manner akin to Gadamer's "philosophical hermeneutics").

In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein says that "metaphysics is grammar." Well, if metaphysics is grammar, then "grammar" becomes metaphysics, which is to say that it fulfills that role, and so even in Strawson's supposedly purely "descriptive" metaphysics (modelled on Wittgenstein's later works), there are still "metaphysical" structures implied.


theurj said:

Here's Habermas on the lifeworld from Postmetaphysical Thinking (MIT Press, 1992):

"This background...constitutes a totality that ,is implicit and that comes along prereflexively -- one that crumbles the moment it is thematized; it remains a totality only in the form of implicit, intuitively presupposed background knowledge...." (142-3).

Martin Morris from “Between deliberation and deconstruction” in The Derrida-Habermas Reader (U of Chicago Press, 2006, 231-53):

“The lifeworld reveals only a portion of itself in any dialogue because it exists as a phenomenological ‘background’ of pre-theoretical, pre-interpreted contexts of meaning and relevance….the vast proportion of lifeworld convictions always remain in the background during any discussion…. The lifeworld itself cannot be the proper them of communicative utterances, for as a totality it provides the space in or ground upon which such utterances occur, even those that name it explicitly….it remains indeterminate” (235-6).

Question 4: Yes of course Derrida (and Gadamer) are meticulous readers. The fact is though, that as philosophers, they are also normative readers, and not descriptive (though Gadamer would argue that it cannot be otherwise, hence Philosophical Hermeneutics).

theurg:

"...A defense, I might add, that will be surely forthcoming under intense scrutiny by the Ph.D. oral defense committee."

Well, it depends on which way one's committee leans; if they are evenly split, sidetrack the issue by engendering a debate betweem the two sides, hopefully to the point of accrimony between them, at which point the issue recedes from view and they forget about the problem (from kela's "Handbook on the Rhetorical Manipulation of A Successful PhD Dissertation Defense." hahaha).

The fact is though, that as philosophers, they are also normative readers, and not descriptive (though Gadamer would argue that it cannot be otherwise, hence Philosophical Hermeneutics).

One of my points exactly and here Gadamer is correct. Hence no purely descriptive definition of Husserl, even by Husserl, given the unconscious lifeworld background. Or as I said quoting Kennilingam in "Who decides what Wilber means?":

"Artists are not always the best interpreters of their own works."

I now might add, not usually instead of not always.

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