Participatory Spirituality for the 21st Century
I'm not sure about the term 'post-metaphysical' - does it mean trying to find a ground for 'spirit' without appeal to unknowable special qualities. Or does it mean finding a place holder for that mystery other than 'God'. Or what? I'd appreciate a straightforward explanation of what is meant by the term. Or, a link to such a discussion.
I should say I come with the bias that I believe the height and the core of being alive is to surrender to mystery, that, indeed, the world is unknowable in any final sense. That said, I'm prepared to entertain other views. Or, it may even be that my views and 'post metaphysical' are compatible?
True -- you said the right brain is the "locale" of such thinking. In my dictionary, site and locale are synonyms. :-)
I'm not following you, but I really would like to. Are you saying that your descriptions are non-interpretive and non-historical because they proceed from the all?
Also, can you direct me to the question of mine you've identified above, where I imply that all is part?
I'm not certain you know the sense I mean. I mentioned already that I didn't see 'history' in Newtonian linear-causal terms (I see it more in terms of Whitehead's prehensive unification), but you came back immediately and told me that I was espousing a Newtonian view. What is the sense of 'interpretive' that you think I mean?
I want to say frankly that it appears to me you are using a double standard. You describe your view in 'historical-esque' terms -- as a view that comes after Newton and Einstein, as a kind of Bohrian two-mode integration, as a particular stage of development, as being 'the way forward' for 'a new paradigm,' etc -- and yet seem to criticize any similar appeal to 'historical-esque' terms in my language.
"All, for me, is all..."
I am not arguing with that use of all -- which is akin to Panikkar's use of the word 'God.' But in your phrase above, your use of 'for me' underlines what I'm getting at: I think it's important to acknowledge that not everyone means what you mean.
Perhaps so. How do you understand that? What's going on, when people use the same words and mean different things by them?
And if people mean different things by 'all,' is there more than one 'all'? Or is the 'all' of someone who means something other than you not 'all' at all?
Tom: All varies---that's what I took you to be saying: historicized all. All, for me, is all, everything, absolute, general, unsignified. I think Jacques would agree, but he hides too much for my taste.
Tom: We mean very different things by our use of such words as all, absolute, historical, complementarity, non-conceptual.
In both of these quotes, you are describing and attesting to a variant meaning of "all" from the one I hold (or the one you suppose me to hold). Can you tell me how you can speak in terms of variant meanings and simultaneously deny that your descriptions involve interpretation?
Also, when you say that your "all" differs from my "all," how is that different from my suggestion that, in relation to assertions about "all" (or other metaphysical terms), we should take into consideration "from whence" such claims are being made (and should acknowledge that the 'intended all' of particular speech acts thus may differ)?
Lastly, why do you describe your perspective in particular and developmental terms -- as Bohrian, post-Newtonian, post-Einsteinian -- and simultaneously criticize me for attempting to 'particularize the all' when I make reference to the importance of considering the context of claims about metaphysical entities or the nature of reality?
That's something to write home about!
I have asked you a number of questions above, and honestly would be interested in your response to them.
Personally, I don't think reference to 'history' necessarily presupposes or requires a Newtonian, linear causal perspective, and is just as consistent, say, with Whiteheadian/Wilberian prehensive unification (where we may perceive the past 'enfolded' in the present, not as linear/deterministic cause but as integral to actual occasions in the creative advance into novelty). Within the relational/embodied 'gestalt' of an actual occasion, causal 'threads' may be seen to ex-ist -- may stand forth or be 'called forth' via enactive inquiry -- and such identified 'causes' have practical and explanatory power, but this is quite different from (and does not imply) adherence to linear-mechanistic metaphysics.