Constructive and deconstructive postmodernism

[Edward theurj Berge]

Gary Hampson in his Integral Review article “Integral re-view postmodernism” (cited below) discussed how Wilber distinguishes constructive and deconstructive postmodernism. The latter is a lower level of postformal development (green) while the former is a higher postformal development (teal and above). Aside from Hampson questioning the validity of deconstruction as relativistic he also questions this placement and suggests that perhaps they are both sides of the same postformal coin (level).

In this regard Mark Edwards (2010) says:

“I regard integral metastudies as a counterpart to the more typical forms of decentering and deconstructing postmodernism which seeks to identify and give voice to the personal story, the local history, the grounded experience, and the marginalized instance. These two postmodern activities are fundamentally different and provide critical counterpoints for each other’s development. Decentering, pluralist postmodern research is not something I believe is to be integrated within an integral metastudies. Decentering postmodernism and integrative postmodernism are complementary forms of knowledge building. Where integral postmodernism develops abstractions, decentering postmoderism develops grounded stories. Where integral postmodernism creates imaginative generalized frameworks, decentering postmodernism creates particular narratives and personalized accounts of human experience.

“This is not a developmental modernism versus postmodernism battle. It is an ongoing complementarity (e.g., Plato and Aristotle). An integral metastudies should not be seen as a rational project of integrating every perspective, concept, paradigm, or cultural tradition within its domain. There must be some things that, by definition, lie outside of its capacities to accommodate and explain. Consequently, an integral metastudies needs a decentering postmodernism that it cannot integrate, that lies outside of its scientific and systematic purview, which continually challenges it and is critical of its generalizations, abstractions, and universalizings. The decentering form of particularizing postmodernism is not something that integral metatheory can locate or neatly categorize somewhere within its general frameworks. Decentering postmodernism will always provide a source of critical insight and substantive opposition to the generalizing goals of an integral metastudies. In the same way that postmodernism often misunderstands integrative approaches as just some form of scientific monism, there is a danger that integral researchers can misrepresent the decentering and localizing concerns of postmodernism as simple relativism” (408 - 09).

Recent work on metatheory suggests that postmodern decentering is itself a form of metatheory, a compliment to the more constructive kind. For example in the special Integral Review issue on metatheory Steven Wallis (2010) says:
 
"It may be noted that six of our authors describe metatheory as making implicit assumptions explicit, analysis of assumptions, analysis of underlying structure, and the analysis of structure. These are essentially deconstructive approaches.

"In contrast to this deconstructive approach, metatheory may also be understood to integrate multiple theories. The two approaches may be inseparable as one cannot combine or integrate two theories without also integrating the assumptions, structures, and concepts of those theories. In short, metatheory (as the study of theory) may be conducted in at least two ways. It may be integrative (where multiple theories are combined). It may be deconstructive (where theories are parsed into their constituent components for analysis and/or recombination). Either way, the process leads to the creation of a metatheory, metatheorum, or a 'theory of theory'” (78).

In the same issue of IR Latha Poonamallee sees Advaita non-dualism as one of the deconstructive metatheories. She says:

"Another school of thought takes the position that examining metatheory as a constellation of ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions is a useful one. This paper is more aligned with the latter view that an examination of the underlying assumptions about theorizing can increase 'theoretical consciousness'and provide an alternate framework for inquiry” (190).

I will have more to say about nondualism as a legitimate metatheory in itself later, which disagrees with using such traditional notions of nondualism because they retain metaphysical elements.

Edwards, M. G. (2010) "‘Of Elephants and Butterflies: An Integral Metatheory for Organizational Transformation," in Integral Theory in Action: Applied, Theoretical, and Critical Perspectives on the AQAL Model, Esbjörn-Hargens, S. (Ed.) Albany, NY: SUNY Press, pp.385-412.

Hampson, G. (2007). "Integral re-views postmodernism: the way out is through." Integral Review 4.

Poonamallee, L. (2010) "Advaita (non-dualism) as metatheory." Integral Reveiw 6:3, July.

Wallis, S. (2010) "Toward a science of metatheory," Integral Review 6:3, July.

[Edward theurj Berge]

Here's some more from Hampson's article:

"Wilber uses the term deconstructive postmodernism and strongly associates it with AQAL’s Green vMeme—described by Wilber as the green meme, level, stage or wave, alongside the similarly strong associations of pluralism and relativism.... In this vignette, constructive is the hero, one associated with bright, hopeful promise; whilst deconstructive is the villain, associated with nihilism, rancidity and vulgarity....constructive postmodernism is the next holarchical level after deconstructive postmodernism" (129).

"Notions of construction and deconstruction as necessary adversaries can appropriately be seen to stem from an either/or mindset. Thinking dialectically, their relationship can fruitfully be rather understood as complexly interpenetrating. Deconstructive and reconstructive postmodernisms share one genealogy which itself has a dialectical underpinning" (151).

[Edward theurj Berge]

Also recall Catherine Keller's comments in Process and Difference (SUNY, 2002) about David Ray Griffin's distinctions of these two streams, much of which Wilber vomits verbatim.

"I will suggest that his [Griffin's] analysis suffers from a fallacy of misplaced opposition....he has mounted the argument against a deconstruction of his own invention.... Reconstructive postmodernism depends on deconstruction as much as much as deconstruction depends on the speculative schemes it deconstructs" (3-4).

In this book there is also a chapter by Gare on the genealogy of the 2 streams, much of which Hampson investigates.

[Edward theurj Berge]

Also check out this article by Luis Pedraja, "Whitehead, deconstruction of postmodernism." Here are a few relevant excerpts:

"I am also breaking ranks with those, like Griffin, who place Whitehead in direct contrast to postmodern deconstructionists.... While Griffin’s interpretation of Whitehead merits serious consideration, it still attempts to salvage a 'centeredness' which is difficult to maintain in Whitehead’s philosophy....we also must recognize that Whitehead’s critique of modernism radically deconstructs the possibility of an unbiased, axiomatic center that can be abstracted from the whole. This does not mean that Whitehead advocates a radical relativism or a denial of freedom like some advocates of deconstruction. But neither does Derrida’s philosophy in its basic presuppositions advocate a radical relativism and a denial of freedom as some of his interpreters propose."

[Edward theurj Berge]

Quotes from Gare, A. “The roots of postmodernism: Schelling, process philosophy and poststructuralism.” Process and Difference (Albany: SUNY press, 2002)

“Schelling's earlier work was a major influence on process philosophy and his later work was a major influence on the poststructuralists” (33).

If we were to give credence to this notion of “later” thought in one's oeuvre as being more “developmental” in a transcend and include fashion then we might be ironically prone to see pomo as the higher level here. But continuing in the Obama theme of balance recall from Pedraja that each camp tended to emphasize one aspect of this divide while ignoring the other. Schelling himself though appeared to combine both aspects in a “nondual” embrace. For example:

“Transcendental philosophy therefore needs to be complimented by a philosophy of nature.... Schelling later pointed out that his philosophy was neither materialist nor spiritualist, neither realist nor idealist; it contained within itself these oppositions. And he affirmed the priority of the philosophy of nature over transcendental idealism” (34)

[Edward theurj Berge]

More from Gare:

[criticizing Fichte] "it is inconceivable that an Absolute I could become conscious of itself, Schelling argued that the self-conscious I needs to be explained as the product and highest potentiality of nature....he claims, moreover, that the 'unconscious' stages through which consciousness emerges can only become conscious to an I that has developed out of them and realizes its dependence upon them" (34).

"Hegel's attack on Schelling provoked a sustained response from Schelling, who defended and elaborated his philosophy to expose the defects in Hegel's philosophy. He charged Hegel with producing a self-enclosed dance of abstractions dealing with essences without any place for existence. The crucial move made by Schelling was to show that a system of reason cannot explain the fact of its own existence" (38).

He does later on though note that process philosophers are in a better position to integrate early and late Schelling since they start from Schelling's early work whereas poststructuralists reject it (47). We'll see about that! Especially in light of the American pragmatists, one being Pierce who is cited as one of those process folks who adopted Schelling's early works.

[Edward theurj Berge]

The following are some excerpts from Schelling's entry in the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy regarding his early work. Tell me this doesn't sound like Desilet's descriptions of Derrida as "not one, not two," I dare you! The latter rejects Schelling's early work indeed.

"The model is a magnet, whose opposing poles are inseparable from each other, even though they are opposites....the ‘principle of all explanation of nature’ is ‘universal duality’, an inherent difference of subject and object which prevents nature ever finally reaching stasis. At the same time this difference of subject and object must be grounded in an identity which links them together, otherwise all the problems of dualism would just reappear.

"One aspect of being, the dark force, which he sometimes terms ‘gravity’, is contractive, the other expansive, which he terms ‘light’. Dynamic processes are the result of the interchange between these ultimately identical forces. If they were wholly separate there would either be no manifest universe, because contraction would dominate, or the universe would dissipate at infinite speed because expansion would dominate. The result would be the same: there would not be a world....the One comes into contradiction with itself and the two forces constantly vie with each other. Differences must, however, be grounded in unity, as otherwise they could not be manifest at all as differences.

"This interaction between what is contained in itself and what draws something beyond itself is also what gives rise to consciousness, and thus to an inherent tension within consciousness, which can only be itself by its relation to an other."

[Edward theurj Berge]

For some not familiar with Desilet, he participated in a couple of threads at the old Gaia forum. Here are links to two of those threads: Derrida and synergist spirituality. They are stored at Google documents which is sometimes slow in loading these large documents, and sometimes they don't load at all due to system overloads. Keep trying and eventually you'll get them.

[Edward theurj Berge]

Just a link for now on what Mead said about Schelling, from Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century (Read Books, 2007). Mead's prose and articulation are so clear, a blessing in the philosophical world.

[Edward theurj Berge]

Mead says:

“The antinomy in knowledge, instead of being the indication that we are trying to know something we cannot know, is the very process by means of which knowledge itself arises. The antinomy is a stage in the process of knowledge” (120-1).

He then goes into an examination of the Sophist tradition of ancient Greece, how they used “the dialectic” to trap opponents in contradictions. For when one sets up a universal definition there will always be particular instances that refute such “orienting generalizations.” Socrates was the champ at such sophistry but for him “it was a means for getting back to certain fundamental realities” (121). That fundamental reality is that there is no perfect, ultimate or universal category as such. Nonetheless, it is in positing such universals that we discover this through the process of antinomy, the process of differánce (not difference) as such! It is a postformal dialectical relationship between the universal and the particular that is not one, not two.

[Edward theurj Berge]

Mead went into an investigation of Kant as prelude to Schelling, given the former's influence on all subsequent philosophical investigation. So let's take a brief look of his critique of metaphysics from a concise, reliable source, the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. First off, K said that we cannot know the thing-in-itself by reason alone, but that reason and sensibility (experience) combined might enact such knowledge. Reason alone generates a "formal" dialectic and irreconcilable contradictions. This type of reasoning generates an a priori world of ideas from which the world of form depends. Sound familiar? (See real and false reason thread.)

Given this split or antinomy reason seeks to find ultimate or transcendental causes to ground all conditions, to find the ultimate generalization to ground all particulars, to seek "theories of everything." Which of course presumes an ultimate as already given to be found, the now infamous myth of the given. However, this propensity of reason to seek out the ultimate or unconditioned has its functional use if not taken metaphysically, "so long as they are construed 'regulatively' and not 'constitutively.'”

Time to "work," damn it. More later.

[xibalba]

Indeed
what is striking was KW amazing elaboration of a grand narrative on fusion, differentiation and integration phases of a given fulcrum called vision-logic. And to remember also that this past label centauric level was attacked for its phallocentric symbolism by Jenny Wade.

These phases are correlatingly corresponding to early, middle and late vision logic. The deconstructive postermodernism as the early phase has as main representants the early Derrida of "Writing and difference" and Foucault "the order of things". The middle to the late vision-logic stage corresponds to the hsirotry itself of the writings of Habermas - from the 70ies critical hermeneutics period of "knowledge and its interests" and Habermas cbate with Hans-Georg Gadamer (the final critique of subjectivism) to his magnum opus !The theory of communicative action" and the decentering of subject philosophy with his pragmatics methodology to highlight the space of intersubjectivity This book represents to KW the most mature stage, the integral, the past label turquoise meme value level.

What KW omitted in all this metatheoretical re-arrangement is emprical evidence that it is so. But this system doesn´t work because the construct validity of his fulcrum phases is too vague and impossible to assert with serious empirical studies. It has just remained at the level of speculation claims without any further empirical support (through several sorts of hermeneutics). Because ot this lack, It looks so a classical ad Hoc explanation, a way of preserving his system from collapse and to go on sell it. Thus his use of cognitive aberrations like mean green. It looked more and more as a political agenda used to discredit other interpretations of integral studies represented by CIIS. The famous hegemony fight betwen him and them in theearly 2000)

What KW omitted to tell us was the spirit of a new cooperation whichc started between Derrida and Habermas in their common writing "philosophy in the time of terror". So this is amazing for the KW public selectively reading him in a bisased form to see an unliekly "greenie" Derrida closely collaborating with the "tealist" Habermas. Yes, here can we alas sense KW´s over use of dogmatic hyperbolism, orcan we sense another hidden aspect of KW ´s will to power?

just an interrogation

[Edward theurj Berge]

Continuing with Kant's SOP entry, what the author means by regulative use is "as devices for guiding and grounding our empirical investigations and the project of knowledge acquisition." To construe constitutively "is provide the concepts through which we might access objects that could be known through the speculative use of reason." Take away the literal belief in an ultimate but use conditional generalities (quasi-ultimates via metaphor) as categories to organize, manipulate and add meaning to events. Here we seem some roots of the American pragmatists and their offspring the cogscipragos in grounding reason is empirical events and embodiment sans the metaphysical commitments. And again, in this way the ultimate and the particular are in relation, not diametrically opposed, both and neither.

However it doesn't appear Kant went all the way to this conclusion, instead postulating a transcendental idealism (at least according to Mead) as the solution to the antinomies. It seems Fichte went along with this but it was Schelling that took the more "pragmatic" turn.