The REAL (sic) Post-Metaphysical Issue - Integral Post-Metaphysical Spirituality2024-03-28T23:54:53Zhttps://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/the-real-post-metaphysical-issue?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A58845&feed=yes&xn_auth=noYeah, if we focus on the "vi…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2014-11-07:5301756:Comment:589382014-11-07T01:59:46.379ZLayman Pascalhttps://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/LaymanPascal
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<p>Yeah, if we focus on the "view from" then we might -- as Wilber often does -- note the problem which arises when the structure of inter/subjectivities is not accounted for. But when we treat that as a natural move appropriate to higher level cognition, our attention may shift to the "from nowhere" which reminds us of an apparent process arising from implied non-being. And THAT is a problem whether we are at a metaphysical or postmetaphysical level.</p>
<p>Local, relative absence an…</p>
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<p>Yeah, if we focus on the "view from" then we might -- as Wilber often does -- note the problem which arises when the structure of inter/subjectivities is not accounted for. But when we treat that as a natural move appropriate to higher level cognition, our attention may shift to the "from nowhere" which reminds us of an apparent process arising from implied non-being. And THAT is a problem whether we are at a metaphysical or postmetaphysical level.</p>
<p>Local, relative absence an essential tool in the cognitive toolkit from Modernism onwards. Without "zero" there is no real algebra or absence-initiated flows of mechanical function and economics (High MOSP). It is expanded into the root of contextual background awareness among pluralists (MOA-1). Intuited as co-present with any particular being (basic MOA-2 models) and demanded as the pre-included form of being itself when we start to build out toward MOA-3 models. </p>
<p>If I understand the terms properly, Bhaskar's notion of becoming as a process driven by local absences (a concept useful at all MOA levels in different ways) is very much like my remarks about the implicit gap in being which ensures that all manifestation is energetic/temporal (and therefore motivated by a very generalized "love" or "intention" approximated by Nietzsche's w2p).</p>
<p>The rest of the 7 Stadia seem like a mixed bag. Although I concede them all, I am initially at a loss to see why they are all grouped together. They do not strike me as comprehensive nor as "of a type". </p> Yes, I agree, there is a nihi…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2014-11-06:5301756:Comment:591252014-11-06T17:09:46.577ZBalderhttps://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/BruceAlderman
<p>Yes, I agree, there is a nihilistic metaphysics that is often preserved in postmodern relativism -- in, as you say, the (implicit/practical) assumption of perspectives all arising and floating in a prior nothing/nowhere. <br></br><br></br>Relative to this, and to your thoughts in this thread, I'm thinking Bhaskar's metaphysical model might be useful here. It retains 'nothingness' as absence, but this is a 'local' absence in a sense, not a primordial one -- the negativity or negating/absenting…</p>
<p>Yes, I agree, there is a nihilistic metaphysics that is often preserved in postmodern relativism -- in, as you say, the (implicit/practical) assumption of perspectives all arising and floating in a prior nothing/nowhere. <br/><br/>Relative to this, and to your thoughts in this thread, I'm thinking Bhaskar's metaphysical model might be useful here. It retains 'nothingness' as absence, but this is a 'local' absence in a sense, not a primordial one -- the negativity or negating/absenting implicit in the conception of being-in/as-becoming. Bhaskar describes "7 stadia of being" or of the "ontological-axiological chain."<br/><br/>* being as such (as structured and differentiated; non-identity)<br/><br/>* becoming (processuality of being through absence/negativity)<br/><br/>* totality (correlativity of being, all beings enfolded in each being)<br/><br/>* intentional transformative agency (reflexivity of being)<br/><br/>* spirituality<br/><br/>* re-enchantment (world as intrinsically meaningful, valuable, processual, and creative or spiritual)<br/><br/>* non-duality (of subject and object, fact and value, sacred and profane, etc)</p> Yes, the advent of a Metaphys…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2014-11-05:5301756:Comment:591222014-11-05T21:47:22.830ZLayman Pascalhttps://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/LaymanPascal
<p>Yes, the advent of a Metaphysics of Adjacency (postmetaphysics) requires a variety of things such as irreducible inter(subjectivity). The objectification and inclusion of such element in our overt theory is a natural component of theory at this level -- and it stands in some degree of distinction from the less packaged way in which people explored objective and (inter)subjective parts of their experience at previous levels. Such elements are less likely to feature prominently in the…</p>
<p>Yes, the advent of a Metaphysics of Adjacency (postmetaphysics) requires a variety of things such as irreducible inter(subjectivity). The objectification and inclusion of such element in our overt theory is a natural component of theory at this level -- and it stands in some degree of distinction from the less packaged way in which people explored objective and (inter)subjective parts of their experience at previous levels. Such elements are less likely to feature prominently in the discussion at more primitive levels. Not because they are not widely experienced and acknowledged, but because holding that slippery "edge" between them is not done very successful in the moment of enacting their theories. However their metaphysics is still very appropriate to their level and not that much of a issue except where it gets into patterns associated with this limiting temporal arrangements.</p>
<p>The difficulty of a "view form nowhere" does two things:</p>
<p>(a) It reminds us that that inter-perspectival threshold, epitomized in the meta-contextual slide to include the perceiver, is a normal and natural part of an advanced model of reality. </p>
<p>(b) It also highlights the nihilistic assumptions hidden in many forms of traditional metaphysics (even those which are continued under modernist logic). Yet this nothingness is not added to my model by virtue of the fact that I forget to include myself in the picture. Relativists frequently invoke an explicit view from nowhere by simply noting a primordial and meaningless space in which all perspectives are possible. "That's just your opinion, man" is a kind of colloquial microcosm of the view-from-nowhere which persists under the inclusion of (inter)subjective contexts. </p>
<p>The idea that "before" my perspective, or "before" anyone's perspective, or "before" God created the universe, there was Nothing is a prior implicit retroactive assumption which smuggles the Nowhere into the system. Then it is either noticed (MOA) or not noticed (MOSP).</p>
<p></p> Yes, I think you have a good…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2014-11-05:5301756:Comment:591212014-11-05T21:33:34.414ZBalderhttps://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/BruceAlderman
<p>Yes, I think you have a good point about temporal closure being more problematic than spatial closure -- meaning, it is more problematic to say, <em>This is so complete that it is complete for all time</em>, as has been claimed regarding certain revealed texts or teachings, than it is to say, <em>This is comprehensive with regard to our present state of knowledge</em>. However, given the complexity and scope of existing human perspectives, even the latter claim is generally suspect. A…</p>
<p>Yes, I think you have a good point about temporal closure being more problematic than spatial closure -- meaning, it is more problematic to say, <em>This is so complete that it is complete for all time</em>, as has been claimed regarding certain revealed texts or teachings, than it is to say, <em>This is comprehensive with regard to our present state of knowledge</em>. However, given the complexity and scope of existing human perspectives, even the latter claim is generally suspect. A theory may contain or present "an" All, conceptually, but that is different from claiming that a theory is functionally THE All for our current needs -- that it leaves nothing essential out, that it has accounted for everything, that there are no meaningful gaps, aporias, distortions, or oversights, etc... Still, it is not necessarily a show-stopper to claim a theory is "comprehensive enough" for present needs; that's what we should aim for.<br/><br/><strong>LP:</strong> <em>The issue was not the 3rd person externality and mere thingness of things (which in some way IS balanced in MOSP and MOA metaphysics alike) but the space-like objectification. The confinement of beings to Being. The fixity of their dynamism and the collapse of their next-ness.</em><br/><br/>I think this may be part of it, but for postmetaphysical concerns there seems to be an irreducible (inter)subjective component to the issue: it is not just that such formulations "fix" being in a particular form, rather than acknowledging it may change, but they fix being in a form without acknowleding the role our own (inter)subjectivity plays in their very apprehension and positing. Meaning, we posit these things as if in a view from nowhere.<br/><br/><strong>LP:</strong> <em>Adjacency occurs. It is does not ONLY occur -- but too often we discuss it as a structural present fact of a being or beings rather than a movement performed by the perspective which is admitting additional potentials into an identity.</em><br/><br/>At least in our discussions here on IPS over the past couple years, discussion of this 'more' as (also) structural rather than primarily or exclusively temporal/emergent (via perspectival enactment) has arisen because of some of the metaphysical issues that attend the latter interpretation. I mean here the issues of correlationism and the epistemic fallacy, among others. In other words, we should distinguish between something like Bryant's object-oriented (process) philosophy which includes a (MOA-2- or MOA-3-like) understanding of the radical 'nearness' of being/becoming and which still includes reference to things such as endo-structure and withdrawal, and either 1) a more MOSP-like, (spatial) metaphysics of substance, being, etc; or 2) a more radically perspectival-processual view such as Whitehead's.</p> Time & Space have a pecul…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2014-11-05:5301756:Comment:590162014-11-05T01:05:23.394ZLayman Pascalhttps://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/LaymanPascal
<p>Time & Space have a peculiar relationship. It is uncertain whether "more" is a movement of addition or an existing fact. So while we certainly cannot reduce space to time, or fix all the former problems by address to the latter, we also remain open to the possibility that <em>dynamic closure</em> is a considerably more important problem than ontological closure. </p>
<p>Thinking over your comments about Wilber, I consider that, obviously, a lot of official MOSP metaphysics are largely…</p>
<p>Time & Space have a peculiar relationship. It is uncertain whether "more" is a movement of addition or an existing fact. So while we certainly cannot reduce space to time, or fix all the former problems by address to the latter, we also remain open to the possibility that <em>dynamic closure</em> is a considerably more important problem than ontological closure. </p>
<p>Thinking over your comments about Wilber, I consider that, obviously, a lot of official MOSP metaphysics are largely characterized by 3rd person objectifications. And this is challenged at MOA-1 by the alterity of 1st and 2nd person perspectives. But I think these perspectives are not absent from the worldspaces prior to postmetaphysics. </p>
<p>They are, perhaps, not as tightly woven together into the explicit assertions about reality as subsequent layers permit -- but that is to be expected. People at all the MOSP levels have shared and subjective perceptions of reality which form motivational and central aspects of their experience even though not being consistently displayed in their written philosophies. We notice this very obviously when we have come to wrangle ontology and epistemology side-by-side but it was previously present. </p>
<p>The issue was not the 3rd person <em>externality</em> and <em>mere thingness</em> of things (which in some way IS balanced in MOSP and MOA metaphysics alike) but the space-like objectification. The confinement of beings to Being. The fixity of their dynamism and the collapse of their next-ness.</p>
<p>Adjacency occurs. It is does not ONLY occur -- but too often we discuss it as a structural present fact of a being or beings rather than a movement performed by the perspective which is admitting additional potentials into an identity.</p>
<p>Development occurs. Every healthy level gives birth to its successors and therefore we can suppose that ill health or error at any level (including all the postmetaphysical levels) is characterized, in part, by confined to the apparently inherited, apparently pre-established forms of the present rather than permitting subsequent flowering.</p>
<p>The way that occurring is held, in metaphysics or in that metaphysics called Postmetaphysics, seems to be a key concern. While the way in which ontology is held relative to epistemology is natural for MOSPs and grown beyond by MOAs. </p>
<p></p> For your list of problematic…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2014-11-03:5301756:Comment:586972014-11-03T18:13:05.447ZBalderhttps://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/BruceAlderman
<p><br></br>For your list of problematic temporal metaphysics, you might add the following:<br></br><br></br></p>
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<li>Time consists of moments - with the corrolaries that time had a first moment, or that it consists of a linear series of moments.</li>
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<p><br></br>The main culprit you have identified for bad temporal metaphysics (and thus bad metaphysics), the belief that there is a primordial authorizing agent that originally set the patterns of the universe or established a purpose, is mainly…</p>
<p><br/>For your list of problematic temporal metaphysics, you might add the following:<br/><br/></p>
<ul>
<li>Time consists of moments - with the corrolaries that time had a first moment, or that it consists of a linear series of moments.</li>
</ul>
<p><br/>The main culprit you have identified for bad temporal metaphysics (and thus bad metaphysics), the belief that there is a primordial authorizing agent that originally set the patterns of the universe or established a purpose, is mainly problematic for you, I gather, because this move appears to "pre-determine" emergence and/or to subordinate time to space by placing a (spatial, thing-like or very subtle thing-like) fixed being at the source of time. Is this right? Reality is conceived metaphysically, in the problematic sense, when we take it to consist of things that are fixed-in-advance by, or given by, this primordial author(iz)ing agency?<br/><br/>If so, I'd like to take a step back and take a slightly different look -- particularly in relation to Wilber's framing of metaphysics and postmetaphysics. You know this already, but I'll tell the story anyway. For Wilber, even the elemental, momentary "dharmas" or "perceptions" of Buddhism are metaphysical (in the problematic sense). But here, the elemental dharmas or perceptions are not metaphysical because they are fixed in advance by an authorizing deity or agency at the beginning of time, but because they are still (apparently unconsciously) 3rd-person abstractions of perspective-events. Wilber's postmetaphysical turn definitely includes a temporal element, in that he frames reality in evental terms -- here, specifically, as perspective-events (in which things are definitely "outputs of the process" (of perspective-taking), not simply "given" or "self-existing"). <br/><br/>As I mentioned above, "time" is often associated with epistemology, and Wilber's temporal (processual/evental) framing is also a strongly epistemological one: ontology per se is called into question; the "usual metaphysical suspects" at the base of reality -- whether atoms, perceptions, elements, consciousness, energetic or material processes, etc -- are all revealed as subtle or gross abstractions of perspectival events. Wilber notes postmodernism's 'contextualization' of identities and objects as outputs of cultural or linguistic processes, but argues that most of these formulations are also still subtly metaphysical, since they tend not to acknowledge or recognize these generative or formative background contexts themselves as perspectival enactions.<br/><br/>Wilber may be seen as objecting to an arbitrary 'cut' in temporal/evental process, not necessarily at the beginning of time or the universe, but at least as a 'settling' on gross or subtle abstraction as 'given' -- as a pre-given constitutive element of some sort.<br/><br/>However, as we've discussed on this forum and elsewhere at some length, there are other problematic metaphysical issues that arise if we privilege time/epistemology in such a way that space/ontology is subordinate to and only ever generated by perspectives (the epistemic fallacy, correlationism, etc). To locate the "more" of adjacency only in the temporal/epistemological "next," we verge on an epistemological reductionism (and a form of actualism) if the adjacent excess is only ever a matter of subsequent temporal en-actualization.<br/><br/>Regarding space as finite, I am not convinced this is necessarily the only viable position. See Spinoza, or more recently Joel Morrison's works, for compelling accounts of ontological infinity; or see Universal Cycle Theory for a scientific account of both spatial and temporal infinity.</p> A few more thoughts which mig…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2014-10-29:5301756:Comment:588492014-10-29T19:21:39.445ZLayman Pascalhttps://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/LaymanPascal
<p>A few more thoughts which might (or might not) clarify:</p>
<p>1.</p>
<p>If we are interested in preserving the terminology of totalization/closure we can just as easy posit two "types" as we can posit an alternative. I favor the latter for some very simple reasons. I wish to root out certain spatial metaphors. Closure, like containment, is originally a spatialized concept. </p>
<p>However when it applies to space it is appropriate rather than problematic. Articulations in physics such…</p>
<p>A few more thoughts which might (or might not) clarify:</p>
<p>1.</p>
<p>If we are interested in preserving the terminology of totalization/closure we can just as easy posit two "types" as we can posit an alternative. I favor the latter for some very simple reasons. I wish to root out certain spatial metaphors. Closure, like containment, is originally a spatialized concept. </p>
<p>However when it applies to space it is appropriate rather than problematic. Articulations in physics such as "finite but unbounded" point to the functional closure of spatiality. Space is not open-ended. In order to indefinitely extend our imaginary vision of space we have to temporalize it. Infinity is a valid temporal concept but not valid spatial concept. Therefore we must be open to embrace spatial finitude, closure, totalization.</p>
<p>2.</p>
<p>Compare the following two notions:</p>
<p>(a) THE PRESENT ASSUMPTION OF ALL. This is a totalized statement applicable to the domain which exists in the current reality, the space-like domain. An example of such a statement is: <em>Reality consists of only and all real things.</em> That is currently a totalized closure - the onlyness -- of beings. It is non-problematic.</p>
<p>(b) THE PRE-TEMPORALIZED NON-ALL. This is a statement which connects a non-totalized reality to a metaphysically presumed extra-temporal authorization. Example: <em>The Non-All Universe appeared from an original Nothing</em>.</p>
<p>3.</p>
<p>Time is necessarily open-ended (at both ends). So NEXT is the position which makes adjacency viable. The "next" is always a potential discover following the apparent presence.</p>
<p>But this is frequently not invoked by discussions of totalization which, as often as not, revolve around the presumed insufficiency of omni-concepts and logical assertions. For example, the position that Integral Theory (or anything else) ought to be cautious about giving rise to the impression that it incorporates, includes, contains, everything is a critique of the insufficiency of space-like containment. Yet it is not terribly relevant. Any theory can accurately include an All. The word "everything" is a micro-theory which totally includes all things. Nothing in the present falls outside of everything.</p>
<p>Yet the meaning of that everything can change. This change is temporal. If we presumed that the theory was temporally closed (the reciprocal of pre-temporally authorized) then we would make a grievous error. </p>
<p>The lion's share of the problems associated with "totality" and "closure" and "all" (which are spatially suggestive terms) exist via implied temporal metaphysics. They are not very problematic when applied to spatial metaphysics.</p>
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<p><br/> <br/> <cite>Balder said:</cite></p>
<blockquote cite="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/the-real-post-metaphysical-issue?page=3&commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A59004&x=1#5301756Comment59004"><div><div class="xg_user_generated"><p>In any event, more on topic:</p>
<p>I've read your "reboot" post several times, and while I agree with you that the question of time is indeed important for our shifts to post/modern and integral-aperspectival thought and appreciate the inquiry you're opening, I'm not quite following the argument you are making here -- particularly the contrast you are setting up. I might be missing some subtleties in your argument. It seems to me that you are still identifying 'totalization'/'closure' as <em>the</em> postmetaphysical problem, re-framed or re-applied in temporal terms. You are objecting to the totalizing 'cut' (and foreclosure) in temporal process that belief in a First One, a Primordial Authorizing Agent, inserts. From what I have followed of your argument thus far, I would say you are exploring another dimension of this issue of totalization, rather than an alternative to it.</p>
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</blockquote> In any event, more on topic:…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2014-10-29:5301756:Comment:590042014-10-29T05:16:54.753ZBalderhttps://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/BruceAlderman
<p>In any event, more on topic:</p>
<p>I've read your "reboot" post several times, and while I agree with you that the question of time is indeed important for our shifts to post/modern and integral-aperspectival thought and appreciate the inquiry you're opening, I'm not quite following the argument you are making here -- particularly the contrast you are setting up. I might be missing some subtleties in your argument. It seems to me that you are still identifying 'totalization'/'closure' as…</p>
<p>In any event, more on topic:</p>
<p>I've read your "reboot" post several times, and while I agree with you that the question of time is indeed important for our shifts to post/modern and integral-aperspectival thought and appreciate the inquiry you're opening, I'm not quite following the argument you are making here -- particularly the contrast you are setting up. I might be missing some subtleties in your argument. It seems to me that you are still identifying 'totalization'/'closure' as <em>the</em> postmetaphysical problem, re-framed or re-applied in temporal terms. You are objecting to the totalizing 'cut' (and foreclosure) in temporal process that belief in a First One, a Primordial Authorizing Agent, inserts. From what I have followed of your argument thus far, I would say you are exploring another dimension of this issue of totalization, rather than an alternative to it.</p> Although this is not directly…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2014-10-29:5301756:Comment:590032014-10-29T03:26:52.122ZBalderhttps://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/BruceAlderman
<p>Although this is not directly responsive to your last post -- as yours wasn't directly to mine :-) -- I wanted to add that, given my <em>Sophia</em> project, I'm inclined to see this thread here as a depiction of the postmetaphysical turn as entailing a critique of and movement away from nounal metaphysics, towards (at the least) more verbal and/or pronounal forms.</p>
<p>Although this is not directly responsive to your last post -- as yours wasn't directly to mine :-) -- I wanted to add that, given my <em>Sophia</em> project, I'm inclined to see this thread here as a depiction of the postmetaphysical turn as entailing a critique of and movement away from nounal metaphysics, towards (at the least) more verbal and/or pronounal forms.</p> I think a "temporal turn" is…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2014-10-29:5301756:Comment:586902014-10-29T02:31:17.016ZLayman Pascalhttps://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/LaymanPascal
<p>I think a "temporal turn" is one of the key modern insights which liberates us toward the possibility of a postmetaphysical view. But more specifically I think postmetaphysics must be responsible for a critique of the various metaphysical assumptions about Time -- both casual and philosophical. </p>
<p>The shift in ontology from a metaphysics of simple presence to a metaphysics of adjacency "is" good, important, natural. However I do not think this shift is adequate to free us from some…</p>
<p>I think a "temporal turn" is one of the key modern insights which liberates us toward the possibility of a postmetaphysical view. But more specifically I think postmetaphysics must be responsible for a critique of the various metaphysical assumptions about Time -- both casual and philosophical. </p>
<p>The shift in ontology from a metaphysics of simple presence to a metaphysics of adjacency "is" good, important, natural. However I do not think this shift is adequate to free us from some of the most thorny dimensions of metaphysics which persist despite (or are even obfuscated by) the concern for whether our ontologies are closed or open.</p>
<p>At the risk of sounding like Badiou, the limiting power of metaphysics may be retroactively "evental" -- rather than located in our assumptions about the existential status of how entities in the present relate to our uses and perceptions of those entities.</p>
<p><br/> <br/> <cite>Balder said:</cite></p>
<blockquote cite="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/the-real-post-metaphysical-issue?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A58846&xg_source=msg_com_forum#5301756Comment58846"><div><div class="xg_user_generated"><p>Hi, LP, I apologize for the long delay in responding; I've been under the weather for the past several days but am poking my head out into sunnier health again. I see you have substantially re-written your opening post. I'll start with just an initial question that arises for me.<br/><br/><strong>LP:</strong> <em>Temporal metaphysics deals with how we hold becomings -- not beings. Instead of asking ourselves about the manner in which we currently hold the ontology of beings, we instead inquire about the way we assume the arising of patterns. Here our postmetaphysics shifts. It becomes a "process postmetaphysics".</em><br/><br/>Traditionally, space is often associated with ontology and time with epistemology. Your phrasing in the above statement suggests an epistemological emphasis as well: inquiring into our assumptions about the arising/emergence of (perceived) patterns. Is this what you are suggesting with your space vs time contrast, that postmetaphysics is a turn towards time and thus epistemology?</p>
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