The Postmetaphysics of Religious Difference - Integral Post-Metaphysical Spirituality2024-03-29T15:07:20Zhttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/the-postmetaphysics-of-religious-difference?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A38441&feed=yes&xn_auth=noCross-post:
I'm finding an i…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2012-02-19:5301756:Comment:400062012-02-19T19:07:32.594ZBalderhttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/BruceAlderman
<p>Cross-post:</p>
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<p>I'm finding an interesting and fruitful resonance in <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/e-t-gendlin?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A39751" target="_self">an essay by Gendlin</a> with something I suggested above: </p>
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<blockquote><p>In relation to this, I was thinking about a technical term I might use: generative (en)closure. Here, enclosure can be read not only as a noun, but also actively, like enaction (en-closing). The…</p>
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<p>Cross-post:</p>
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<p>I'm finding an interesting and fruitful resonance in <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/e-t-gendlin?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A39751" target="_self">an essay by Gendlin</a> with something I suggested above: </p>
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<blockquote><p>In relation to this, I was thinking about a technical term I might use: generative (en)closure. Here, enclosure can be read not only as a noun, but also actively, like enaction (en-closing). The reflexive closure of autopoietic systems is generative. One reason I am considering using this term -- I'm actually still thinking it through, to see if I want to keep it -- but if I keep it, then I'd like to do so because, in the context of religious studies, it can be related to structures such as temples or churches (as generative enclosures) or to the Sabbath (as a generative enclosure in time, a temple carved out of time) as well as to the autopoietic body (body-as-temple).</p>
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<p>Reading Gendlin's paper, I see a direct complement to this in his discussion of body-constituting as generative. Body-constituting is what I mean by (autopoietic) generative (en)closure: this active enclosure is generative of objects, i.e. enactive, in a single process of body-world flowering or co-constitution. I was playing with the word 'enclosure' for a couple reasons, as I noted above: 1) I could extend this term to cover not only the organismic body, as it is used in the enactive model, but also other 'bodies,' such as religious traditions, cultures, contemplative disciplines, etc; 2) I could use it as a complement to Jean-Luc Nancy's notion of <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Dis-Enclosure-Deconstruction-Christianity-Perspectives-Continental/dp/0823228363" target="_blank">dis-enclosure</a>, which I will discuss in more detail later.</p>
<p>I was not thinking, at the time, of an etymological connection between enclosure and implication, but it is obviously there: the root of implication is enfold, enwrap, entangle. For the purposes of my discussion of an integral enactive model of religious phenomena, this connection to the Gendlinian body is useful: <br/>The body is a temple, <em>and</em> the temple is a body -- a body which (ongoingly) implies a world.</p> So, I'm working on the follow…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2012-02-12:5301756:Comment:395822012-02-12T05:33:17.368ZBalderhttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/BruceAlderman
<p>So, I'm working on the follow-up to my <em>Kingdom Come</em> paper (which explored an integral postmetaphysical approach to interreligious relationship), focusing now on a broader program of "integral religious studies." I'm collecting thoughts and notes, but I'm having a hard time writing this weekend, so I thought I would post a few of my thoughts here to get the juices flowing (and, of course, would welcome feedback if anyone has any)...particularly since some of these thoughts are…</p>
<p>So, I'm working on the follow-up to my <em>Kingdom Come</em> paper (which explored an integral postmetaphysical approach to interreligious relationship), focusing now on a broader program of "integral religious studies." I'm collecting thoughts and notes, but I'm having a hard time writing this weekend, so I thought I would post a few of my thoughts here to get the juices flowing (and, of course, would welcome feedback if anyone has any)...particularly since some of these thoughts are related to our OOO discussions.<br/><br/><br/>The "call for papers," to which I'm responding, calls for papers which enact a dialogue between Integral Theory and three major fields within contemporary religious studies: history of religions, comparative philosophy of religions, and constructive theology. I will do this, to a degree, but will not limit myself to a simple comparison or integration of these fields. For the constructive theology part, I am bringing in the work of constructive theologians such as Catherine Keller and Sharon Betcher (of <em>Polydoxy</em>); for comparative philosophy of religions, I'm using Panikkar of course (among others). But given Jorge Ferrer's significant work in this area, and the consonance of his postmetaphysical/enactive/participatory orientation with aspects of Wilber 5, I'll also be looking at that in more detail -- particularly at the differences I have with Ferrer in relation to my own (still-forming) Integral Postmetaphysical orientation.<br/><br/><br/>Two things I will write about here tonight: 1) What role(s) might an Integral approach play in the field of religious studies? 2) Speculative gestures towards an Integral onto-epistemology (as matrix for a religious studies IMP), drawing on some of our recent explorations of Critical Realism, OOO, etc.<br/><br/><br/>1) The first idea is simple and directly derivative from recent readings of Bhaskar (and others): In my <em>Kingdom Come</em> paper, I discussed my general agreement with Steve McIntosh's call for the differentiation of Integral spirituality from Integral philosophy (focusing on philosophy when it comes to interreligious 'mediation'). In relation to this, I think Bhaskar's discussion of philosophy as under-laborer for science is useful: IT, in focusing on articulating an integral postmetaphysical philosophy, can "under-labor" for the field of religious studies. It can do this in various ways, perhaps primarily by providing heuristic principles and an integrative framework for transdisciplinary research. An IMP of religious studies (as I outlined <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/the-eight-zones-of-religion" target="_self">here</a>, using the 8 zones to map the field). Here, it serves a meta-theoretical role. But it might also help further, philosophically, by developing its (tetra-)enactive onto-epistemology, which takes me to point number 2.<br/><br/><br/>2) One of Ferrer's strategies (for moving beyond the postmodern linguistic turn) is to rehabilitate ontology. In <em>Kingdom Come</em>, I looked to Wilber-5, Cobb's Deep Pluralism, Ferrer's participatory ontology, Panikkar's radical pluralism, Varela's enactive model, and a number of other perspectives to argue for an integral postmetaphysical enactive onto-epistemology, which can provide a means for conceptualizing (and non-reductively holding or accommodating) multiple religious soteriological horizons and worldspaces. While I do not think the approach I recommended is correlationist in the strict sense (since it is not anthropocentric, one of correlationism's primary offenses according to SR and OOO), it still could stand to be more clearly differentiated from correlationism, and it also needs to be revised somewhat to deal with Bhaskar's critique of the epistemic fallacy. So, here are some rough notes on how I'd like to draw on some of the ideas we've discussed here recently to revise my integral pluralist model.<br/><br/><br/>First, I'll start with a quote by Bonnie to address the charge of epistemic fallacy: <em>"IT commits the epistemic fallacy: IT confuses the “known world” from the “real world”, resulting in a “many worlds” view. In the symposium we talked a lot about the differences between CR’s one(shared)world versus IT’s many –worlds view. IT describes all these “worlds” that are enacted at different altitudes across different methodologies. This is problematic, because all those worlds are actually world*views – or known worlds. This is the epistemic fallacy."</em><br/><br/><br/>In my paper, I did endorse a "many worlds" view. In fact, I still do. One way I would address this charge, then, is to grant that "known world" is indeed the realm of the actual. This seems in keeping with an enactive orientation, after all: the multiple objects and worlds we encounter, describe, navigate, etc, are enactments, in this understanding. I think Latour's "democracy of actors" here will be a useful term to possibly incorporate and further explore (actors, enactments, actualities); perhaps also Sean's "multiple object" can here be read in these terms, as a multiple actuality -- a site or vector (even Nishidan <em>bassho</em>?) of multiplistic enaction. But what about the real world? One of my thoughts here is to reserve the word, "world," for the actual. I suggested this to Bonnie: <em>One tack, in this debate, may be to identify "world" as a category properly belonging to the "actual" -- since the etymology of the word, which is "the age of man," appears to be related to the concerns of sentient beings -- and then to describe the Real in different terms.</em> Although I'm not fully on board with the OOO framing of this issue, if we want to discuss Reality, and preserve it as a necessary (necessarily presupposed) matrix for actuality and enactment, I think we can follow the OOO resistance to the notion of a single all-encompassing super-context on holonic grounds, as I argued before: To be consistent, in a holonic view, there can be no 'smallest' (foundational, atomic) holon, nor can there be a single 'super-holon' that encompasses all holons. Both the imagined base-level objects or the ultimate super-object would be non-holons (since the former would not contain any constitutive smaller units, and the latter would not be included within anything else -- e.g., neither would be a part-whole). Thus, there is no single-entity foundationalism, nor can there be a final 'over-mastering' super-entity (ass-holon, in Theurj's language). In light of this understanding, we should not speak of "real world" in contrast to "actual world," as Bonnie did above, since "world" itself would be understood as a holon. If we admit talk of the Real -- and I am for doing that -- it should not be in the form of world-language.<br/><br/><br/>In a number of different posts, I've been touching on the possibility of a Latour/OOO-informed AQAL. As I mentioned, I appreciate his insistence on the irreducible particularity of each actuality (actual occasion?) and have suggested ways to apply this to AQAL: In OOO-related thought, there is the Latourian claim that everything is absolutely particular and thus irreducible to anything else. Rather than holding that this irreducible particularity is related to island-like thing-in-itselfness (wholly withdrawn from all relationship), my suggestion is to hold reducibility and irreducibility at once, where each particular is (as Bortoft says) the unique and particular bodying forth of the whole, and thus each particular is infinitely reducible (there's no end to the relational lines we can trace out), which (following Joel's principle) is the same as saying that it is irreducible. Using Latour's notion of irreduction, then, everything is both irreducible and thus an "object" (UR) but also subject to reduction, i.e. understandable in terms of its parts or its being-part of something else (endo- and exo-systemic relations, LR), although there is some "loss" in any such reduction and an object also exceeds any such reductive relational description. Objects or holons are able to contact or "experience" other objects in some way (UL) and this contact will be mediated by its own internal code (LL). <br/><br/><br/>I've mentioned previously, particularly in relation to Bryant's work, that I think autopoietic 'closure' may be sufficient to explain an object's relative autonomy and 'detachability' from particular contexts, without having to insist on a Harmaneque thing-in-itself-ness. But I have a few additional thoughts to add to this. One thought that occurred to me today was that we might also see 'interiority' (subjectivity) as the site of OOO's looked-for withdrawal. I can connect this, for instance, to Panikkar's discussion of the divine as the depth dimension of individual beings, described in terms of infinitude, freedom, and nothingness. Bhaskar, in his recent work, emphasizes 'inwardness' as an important dimension of Being, and in his talk at the recent IT/CR conference, he noted appreciatively the similarity of this notion to Wilber's interiority. But there's another way to look at this that connects more directly to autopoiesis. As I noted in a post to Thomas last year: <em>A well-known implication of autopoietic organization is the enactive model of perception, in which it is held that the nervous system is not only self-organizing but self-referring, such that perception does not consist of "representation" of the environment, but rather the ongoing creation of new relationships within the neural network. In Maturana's view, this process of circular organization, even without a nervous system, is identical to the process of cognition... He and Varela define the activity of self-generation and self-perpetuation exhibited by living systems as 'cognition.'</em> In other words, there is a direct correlation here between autopoietic closure and interiority or subjectivity. Following what I said above, then 'withdrawal' could be seen, if not in terms of the indefinite reducibility that I suggested earlier, then as 'closure' (from a 3p perspective) and 'interiority' or subjectivity (from a 1p perspective).<br/><br/><br/>In relation to this, I was thinking about a technical term I might use: generative (en)closure. Here, enclosure can be read not only as a noun, but also actively, like enaction (en-closing). The reflexive closure of autopoietic systems is generative. One reason I am considering using this term -- I'm actually still thinking it through, to see if I want to keep it -- but if I keep it, then I'd like to do so because, in the context of religious studies, it can be related to structures such as temples or churches (as generative enclosures) or to the Sabbath (as a generative enclosure in time, a temple carved out of time) as well as to the autopoietic body (body-as-temple).<br/><br/><br/>And this will conclude my rambling for this evening. I feel good, at least, to have given some shape to these ideas, rough as this treatment is. <br/><br/></p> And the concluding paragraph:…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2012-01-19:5301756:Comment:390402012-01-19T18:45:07.976ZBalderhttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/BruceAlderman
<p>And the concluding paragraph:</p>
<p> </p>
<blockquote><p>When we look at the rules Panikkar institutes for intrareligious dialogue and what he means by pluralism as a vigilant openness to the mystery of reality, it is clear that it does not fall prey to the common criticisms made of the pluralist position and does advance the goals of peace, cooperation, and mutual understanding. Most important, and most attractive, I think, is that Panikkar’s pluralist position aims not at some kind of…</p>
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<p>And the concluding paragraph:</p>
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<blockquote><p>When we look at the rules Panikkar institutes for intrareligious dialogue and what he means by pluralism as a vigilant openness to the mystery of reality, it is clear that it does not fall prey to the common criticisms made of the pluralist position and does advance the goals of peace, cooperation, and mutual understanding. Most important, and most attractive, I think, is that Panikkar’s pluralist position aims not at some kind of live and let live tolerance among different perspectives, but instead at a dynamic religious interaction. While Hick’s pluralism presumes a neat ordering of different paths to one common and higher religious goal, Panikkar’s pluralism prescribes a religious posture of openness that stays quite messy and dynamic. It is this dynamism that marks the religious posture of kenosis for Panikkar, as we humans respond to an eternally infinite mystery that continually interrupts the totalities of our respective experiences and reminds us of their very incompleteness. Dialogue is justifiable not primarily because we all need to get along with each other, but because we need contradictory truth claims to jolt us out of our complacency, ignorance, and ingrained preconceptions. Rather than subject religion to some comprehensive Reason, Panikkar’s pluralism presents the challenges of inter-religious encounter as first and foremost a religious task. Subjecting our myths to the criticisms of others helps us grow in our sacred interrelationality. Pluralism describes reality’s infinite transcendence of our attempts to contain it, and it prescribes the religious task of kenotic unknowing to better grow in our dynamic relationship with others, with God, and with the world.</p>
</blockquote> In doing research this mornin…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2012-01-19:5301756:Comment:391462012-01-19T18:21:51.149ZBalderhttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/BruceAlderman
<p>In doing research this morning for another essay on integral religious studies, I came across <a href="http://irdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Raimon-Panikkar-John-Hick-and-a-Pluralist-Theology-of-Religions-by-Madhuri-M.-Yadlapati-.pdf" target="_blank">an essay discussing Panikkar in relation to John Hick's work</a>, and in it, I found the following passage, which I thought was worth sharing in light of some of our other discussions on this forum.</p>
<blockquote><p><br></br>Too many…</p>
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<p>In doing research this morning for another essay on integral religious studies, I came across <a href="http://irdialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Raimon-Panikkar-John-Hick-and-a-Pluralist-Theology-of-Religions-by-Madhuri-M.-Yadlapati-.pdf" target="_blank">an essay discussing Panikkar in relation to John Hick's work</a>, and in it, I found the following passage, which I thought was worth sharing in light of some of our other discussions on this forum.</p>
<blockquote><p><br/>Too many critics lump together the different proposals of pluralism and most often attack all of them on the basis of the particular pluralist hypothesis made by John Hick. Panikkar’s pluralism is quite different, first and foremost because while Hick accepts the skeptical consequences of Kantian epistemology, Panikkar rejects the premise of Enlightenment epistemology and instead proposes discourse based on the relational ontology of the cosmotheandric intuition. Panikkar explicitly denies that pluralism means that there are many different truths or that there are different ways of expressing one truth (as Hick’s pluralism suggests). The word pluralism may not be ideal to suggest the posture he prescribes of openness to the mystery and contingency and freedom of reality to manifest itself. Terms like Trinity and Advaita express this non-objectifiable mystery in orthodox Christian and Hindu language. (Panikkar 1981, 24) Pluralism is not a theoretical system or an attitude that respects religious diversity, but an attitude that respects the freedom of reality to transcend our systematizing efforts to contain and define it. It actively resists the tendency to absolutize any claims to validity. Pluralism affirms that “there is a fluxos quo which will never permit us to freeze anything real, that reality and the logos itself are open-ended.” (Panikkar 1996, 255) Contra Hegel, Panikkar rejects a panlogicism and denies that logos is the whole of human truth, and with the spirit of Heidegger, he affirms the opacity of Being as it unconceals itself and yet maintains itself outside the light of logos. In Panikkar’s usage, then, pluralism becomes a rejection of a rational logocentrism. As he writes, “pluralism is not a supersystem, a metalanguage...an intellectual panacea. Pluralism is an open, human attitude, which therefore entails an intellectual dimension that overcomes any kind of solipsism, as if we - any we - were alone in the universe, the masters of it, the holders of the Absolute.” (Panikkar 1996, 257) For Panikkar, pluralism is a religious prescription of extreme humility and a reminder to live without total security, to dwell religiously in our vulnerability. He describes this in the paradigm of Christian mysticism as kenosis. “Only when a Man is completely empty of himself, is in a state of kenosis, of renunciation and annihilation, will Christ fulfill his incarnation in him. Only kenosis allows incarnation and incarnation is the only way to redemption.” (Panikkar 1981, 61) The exercise of self-emptying or deconstruction is a religious mandate, in a sense. This is why pluralism and intrareligious dialogue are necessary for Panikkar.</p>
</blockquote> Just a note. I've been asked…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2012-01-09:5301756:Comment:387102012-01-09T17:55:33.957ZBalderhttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/BruceAlderman
<p>Just a note. I've been asked to do a follow-up on my article for an issue of JITP which will be dedicated to Integral Religious Studies. Specifically, they are looking for an approach which integrates history of religions, comparative philosophy of religions, and constructive theology (in a kind of "religious studies IMP"). I'm thinking of using Panikkar's work for the comparative philosophy section, but may also bring in something like the essay that was the genesis of this thread; and…</p>
<p>Just a note. I've been asked to do a follow-up on my article for an issue of JITP which will be dedicated to Integral Religious Studies. Specifically, they are looking for an approach which integrates history of religions, comparative philosophy of religions, and constructive theology (in a kind of "religious studies IMP"). I'm thinking of using Panikkar's work for the comparative philosophy section, but may also bring in something like the essay that was the genesis of this thread; and will likely draw on some of the essays from Polydoxy for the constructive theology component (though Panikkar will be good there as well).</p> Here are some excerpts from t…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2012-01-04:5301756:Comment:383922012-01-04T01:53:54.358ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>Here are some excerpts from the article on social neuroscience linked on p. 3:</p>
<p>"Principles of social neuroscience</p>
<p>The first principle, multiple determinism, specifies that a social behavior at one level of organization (for example, attachment at the dyadic level) can have multiple antecedents within or across levels of organization (for example, various hormonal influences on attachment).</p>
<p>The second principle, nonadditive determinism, specifies that properties of the…</p>
<p>Here are some excerpts from the article on social neuroscience linked on p. 3:</p>
<p>"Principles of social neuroscience</p>
<p>The first principle, multiple determinism, specifies that a social behavior at one level of organization (for example, attachment at the dyadic level) can have multiple antecedents within or across levels of organization (for example, various hormonal influences on attachment).</p>
<p>The second principle, nonadditive determinism, specifies that properties of the whole are not always readily predictable by the simple sum of their parts.</p>
<p>The third principle, reciprocal determinism, specifies that there can be mutual influences among biological and social factors in determining behavior.</p>
<p>If the solitary computer is a metaphor for cognitive neuroscience, the Internet is a metaphor for social neuroscience.... Both perspectives can produce valuable insights into the functions of neural structures and processes, but the functions that each perspective reveals are different."</p> Yes, and since any relationsh…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2012-01-03:5301756:Comment:382662012-01-03T23:36:08.767ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>Yes, and since any relationship between objects (holons) is also an object (holon), this would be like Edwards' mediating holons. It certainly seems like another form of an IMP, sans the super dominant ideology. Where Harman (and OOO generally) are more specific seems to be in the withdrawal aspect of objects a la Derrida. Edwards accounts for this by noting pomo cannot be assimilated in an overall integral paradigm but he hasn't articulated this particular aspect like the OOOers.…</p>
<p>Yes, and since any relationship between objects (holons) is also an object (holon), this would be like Edwards' mediating holons. It certainly seems like another form of an IMP, sans the super dominant ideology. Where Harman (and OOO generally) are more specific seems to be in the withdrawal aspect of objects a la Derrida. Edwards accounts for this by noting pomo cannot be assimilated in an overall integral paradigm but he hasn't articulated this particular aspect like the OOOers. Conversely, he seems to suggest that an object can exist without its (at least exo) relations (or is that just Bryant?), and that would be taboo in Edwards holons.</p> Yes, I think there is some po…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2012-01-03:5301756:Comment:383912012-01-03T22:39:05.510ZBalderhttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/BruceAlderman
<p>Yes, I think there is some possibility for overlap with the quadrants. He is certainly proposing something like an integral methodological pluralism in the above. And he also sees these four poles as connected within, or as constituting objects: hence, the fourfold object, rather than the four objects.</p>
<p>Yes, I think there is some possibility for overlap with the quadrants. He is certainly proposing something like an integral methodological pluralism in the above. And he also sees these four poles as connected within, or as constituting objects: hence, the fourfold object, rather than the four objects.</p> If I understand Harman correc…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2012-01-03:5301756:Comment:383902012-01-03T21:52:00.745ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>If I understand Harman correctly, and I may not, his fourfold sort of tracks to the inside and outside of agency and communion in this way. Real objects exist in the physical world so they're like the outside of a holon (right quadrant(s). The sensual object exists only on the interior, perhaps the left quadrant(s)? Whereas the sensuous qualities might be more the agentic endo-relations, as Bryant might say (upper quadrant(s)), and the real qualities more the exo-relations (lower…</p>
<p>If I understand Harman correctly, and I may not, his fourfold sort of tracks to the inside and outside of agency and communion in this way. Real objects exist in the physical world so they're like the outside of a holon (right quadrant(s). The sensual object exists only on the interior, perhaps the left quadrant(s)? Whereas the sensuous qualities might be more the agentic endo-relations, as Bryant might say (upper quadrant(s)), and the real qualities more the exo-relations (lower quadrant(s)? I'm not clear if how they might be more specific to UL, UR, LL or LR.</p>
<p>Agentic sensual object UL; agentic real object UR; communal sensual object LL, communal real object LR? But could all this be one holon, as with Edwards?</p> I started typing this up yest…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2012-01-03:5301756:Comment:381802012-01-03T15:48:33.151ZBalderhttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/BruceAlderman
<p>I started typing <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/object-oriented-ontology?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A38388" target="_self">this</a> up yesterday, but got sidetracked with the music project. I finished typing it this morning, and have posted it <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/object-oriented-ontology?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A38388" target="_self">here</a>. I'm concerned, though, that while the connection to an…</p>
<p>I started typing <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/object-oriented-ontology?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A38388" target="_self">this</a> up yesterday, but got sidetracked with the music project. I finished typing it this morning, and have posted it <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/object-oriented-ontology?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A38388" target="_self">here</a>. I'm concerned, though, that while the connection to an integral/integrative orientation will be clear, the links to Edwards' model will be less clear without more background on what Harman means by real and sensual objects and qualities (his fourfold distinctions).</p>
<p><br/><br/><cite>theurj said:</cite></p>
<blockquote cite="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/the-postmetaphysics-of-religious-difference?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A38148#5301756Comment38382"><div><p>Did you find the time for the above project. I'm curious how it relates to Edwards' ideas.</p>
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