Stephen Batchelor - Integral Post-Metaphysical Spirituality2024-03-29T11:23:12Zhttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/stephen-batchelor?id=5301756%3ATopic%3A1630&feed=yes&xn_auth=noAlso see the thread on Newlan…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2016-09-01:5301756:Comment:662322016-09-01T19:57:05.265ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>Also see the <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/introduction-to-emptiness-by" target="_self">thread</a> on Newland's book <em>Introduction to Emptiness</em>. Recall above that Newland is on the rangtong side of the debate. Of particular relevance to this thread, from an interview therein:</p>
<p>"Some traditions focus on the idea that emptiness is the absolute reality, the fundamental thing that exists, and that other things that appear are illusions. The practices…</p>
<p>Also see the <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/introduction-to-emptiness-by" target="_self">thread</a> on Newland's book <em>Introduction to Emptiness</em>. Recall above that Newland is on the rangtong side of the debate. Of particular relevance to this thread, from an interview therein:</p>
<p>"Some traditions focus on the idea that emptiness is the absolute reality, the fundamental thing that exists, and that other things that appear are illusions. The practices involve allowing the fundamental purity that is the nature of things to shine out. I think that's a common way to practice in Tibetan Buddhism; you can find parallels to it in other Mahayana traditions outside of Tibet as well.</p>
<p>"And then there is another way of looking at things. It doesn't disagree with that, exactly, but it shifts the focus a little and says, well, nothing absolutely exists. Nothing, including emptiness, exists in and of itself. Everything exists only conventionally because everything exists only interdependently. This is fundamentally true of even emptiness itself. That's what Nagarjuna said; that's what he meant when he said not to take dogmatic views of emptiness. He meant not to reify emptiness as an absolute essence. Therefore, in this view, emptiness is another conventionally existing thing. All things exist conventionally. Emptiness is the name that we give to one particular existing thing: the fact that nothing exists ultimately. And that's a very different way of talking about things."</p> Indeed, and certainly within…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2016-09-01:5301756:Comment:662302016-09-01T17:15:10.233ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>Indeed, and certainly within the kennilingus crowd. But even then, it was the shentong (non-Gelug) versions they espouse. Gelug rangtong is a different story. This thread explores those nuances in detail. Thakchoe does so in even much finer detail, being an expert, while I am just an interested layman.</p>
<p>Indeed, and certainly within the kennilingus crowd. But even then, it was the shentong (non-Gelug) versions they espouse. Gelug rangtong is a different story. This thread explores those nuances in detail. Thakchoe does so in even much finer detail, being an expert, while I am just an interested layman.</p> I have very limited understan…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2016-09-01:5301756:Comment:664182016-09-01T16:16:51.236ZDavidM58http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/DavidM58
<p>I have very limited understanding of the different Buddhist schools. I get the impression that a lot of attention (at least in the West?) is given to <span>Madhyamaka (Mahayana?), and less to Abidharma philosophy?</span></p>
<p><span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madhyamaka#Abhidharma" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madhyamaka#Abhidharma</a></span></p>
<p>I have very limited understanding of the different Buddhist schools. I get the impression that a lot of attention (at least in the West?) is given to <span>Madhyamaka (Mahayana?), and less to Abidharma philosophy?</span></p>
<p><span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madhyamaka#Abhidharma" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madhyamaka#Abhidharma</a></span></p> For those not inclined to rea…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2016-09-01:5301756:Comment:664172016-09-01T15:45:41.616ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>For those not inclined to read Thakchoe's lengthy and very nuanced book, see his shorter Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-tibet/#Gel" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">entry</a> on the same topic. It too is quite nuanced on the subtle differences between the four main Tibetan Buddhist schools. The following is from the concluding implications section sort of summing up:</p>
<p>"Gelug considers the two natures of each phenomenon as the…</p>
<p>For those not inclined to read Thakchoe's lengthy and very nuanced book, see his shorter Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy <a rel="nofollow" href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-tibet/#Gel" target="_blank">entry</a> on the same topic. It too is quite nuanced on the subtle differences between the four main Tibetan Buddhist schools. The following is from the concluding implications section sort of summing up:</p>
<p>"Gelug considers the two natures of each phenomenon as the defining factor of the two truths. It argues that the conventional nature of an entity, as verified by a conventionally reliable cognitive process, determines the defining criterion of conventional truth; the ultimate nature of the same entity, as verified by an ultimately reliable cognitive practice, determines the defining criterion of ultimate truth. Since both truths are ontologically as well as epistemologically interdependent, knowledge of conventionally real entitity as dependently arisen suffices for knowledge of both truths. In contasty non-Gelug schools—Nyingma, Kagyü and Sakya Non-Gelug, as we have seen, rejects Gelug's dual-nature theory, treating each conventional entity as satisfying only the definition of conventional truth and taking the definition of ultimate truth to be ontologically and epistemologically transcendent from conventional truth. They argue, instead, it is through the perspectives of either an ordinary being or an unenlightened exalted being <em>(āryas)</em> that the definition of conventional truth is verified—fully enlightened being <em>(buddhas)</em> do not experience the conventional truth in any respect. Similarly, for non-Gelug, no ordinary being can experience the ultimate truth. Ultimate truth transcends conventional truth, and the knowledge of empirically given phenomena as dependently arisen could not satisfy the criterion of knowing ultimate truth.</p>
<p>"For Gelug, there is an essential compatibility between between the two truths, for the reason that there is a necessary harmony between dependently arisen and emptiness of intrinsic reality. As dependently arisen, empty phenomena are not constructions of ignorant consciousness, so neither is conventional truth such a construction. Both truths are actual truths that stand on an equal footing. Moreover, according to this view, whosoever knows conventional truth, either directly or inferentially, also knows ultimate truth; whosoever knows ultimate truth, also knows phenomena as dependently arisen, and hence knows them as empty of intrinsic reality. Where there is no knowledge of conventional truth, the converse applies. For non-Gelug, the incommensurability between dependently arisen and emptiness of intrinsic reality also applies to the two truths. Accordingly, whosoever knows conventional truth does not know ultimate truth, and one who knows ultimate truth does not know conventional truth; whosoever knows phenomena as dependently arisen does not know them as empty, whereas whosoever knows phenomena as empty does not know them as dependently arisen.</p>
<p>"While Gelug thus distances itself from the subjective division of the two truths, Nyingma, Kagyü and Sakya attempt to demonstrate the validity of their view by arguing that perspective provides the primary basis for the division of the two truths. Unlike Gelug, non-Gelug schools hold that the two truths do not have any objective basis. Instead they are entirely reducible to the experiences of the deluded minds of ordinary beings and the experiences of the wisdom of exalted being.</p>
<p>"According to Gelug, the agent who cognizes the two truths may be one and the same individual. Each agent may have all the requisite cognitive resources that are potentially capable of knowing both truths. Ordinary beings have only conceptual access to ultimate truth, while exalted beings, who are in the process of learning, have direct, but intermittent, access. Awakenened beings, however, invariably have simultaneous access to both truths. The view held by non-Gelug argues for separate cognitive agents corresponding to each of the two truths. Ordinary beings have direct knowledge of conventional truth, but are utterly incapable of knowing ultimate truth. The exalted beings in training directly know ultimate while they are meditative equipoise and conventional truth in post meditative states. Fully awakened buddhas, on the other hand, only have access to ultimate truth. Awakened beings have no access to conventional truth whatsoever from the enlightened perspective, although they may access conventional truth from unenlightened ordinary perspectives."</p> I'd also recommend Manu Bazza…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2016-08-31:5301756:Comment:661552016-08-31T23:30:16.231ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
I'd also recommend Manu Bazzano (2016) "House of cards: on Ken Wilber's neo-traditionalism." Self & Society, 44:2, 145-156: <a href="http://www.manubazzano.com/uploads/House%20of%20Cards.pdf" target="_blank">http://www.manubazzano.com/uploads/House%20of%20Cards.pdf</a>
I'd also recommend Manu Bazzano (2016) "House of cards: on Ken Wilber's neo-traditionalism." Self & Society, 44:2, 145-156: <a href="http://www.manubazzano.com/uploads/House%20of%20Cards.pdf" target="_blank">http://www.manubazzano.com/uploads/House%20of%20Cards.pdf</a> And in this Thakchoe paper he…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2016-08-30:5301756:Comment:663282016-08-30T21:32:37.172ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody"><span>And in <a href="http://www.academia.edu/12902752/How_many_truths_Are_there_two_truths_or_one_in_the_Tibetan_Pr%C4%81sa_ndot_gika_Madhyamaka" target="_blank">this</a> Thakchoe paper he lays out the differing views in modern interpreters. Wilber got a lot of his stuff from Murti.</span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody"><span>"The debate among the modern interpreters of Madhyamaka philosophy…</span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody"><span>And in <a href="http://www.academia.edu/12902752/How_many_truths_Are_there_two_truths_or_one_in_the_Tibetan_Pr%C4%81sa_ndot_gika_Madhyamaka" target="_blank">this</a> Thakchoe paper he lays out the differing views in modern interpreters. Wilber got a lot of his stuff from Murti.</span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody"><span>"The debate among the modern interpreters of Madhyamaka philosophy belongs to two different camps: Chr. Lindtner (1986, 321), Jaideva Singh(1989, 52), Stcherbatsky (1998, 19), T. R. V. Murti (1985, xxvi) and the like argue that the Madhyamika is ontologically absolute and monist about the truth.In their view the Madhyamika vehemently rejects the validity of conventional truth and upholds ultimate truth as the absolute truth. On the contrary, interpreters such as Kalupahana (1991, 69), Jay Garfield (2002, 24–5), JeffreyHopkins (1983, 418–9), Paul William (1996, 71) and Guy Newland (1992,60) —all maintain that the distinction between the two truths is minimal and strictly epistemological in nature. Conventional and ultimate truth are, in their understanding of Madhyamaka philosophy, mutually entailing—that the two truths are not ontologically hierarchical. Therefore a Madhyamika is, they hold, not an absolute monist about the truth. This debate, not surprisingly, has been an ongoing phenomenon among the traditional Buddhist thinkers."</span></span></span></span></span></p> Wilber, btw, takes the shento…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2016-08-30:5301756:Comment:661542016-08-30T21:15:26.879ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span>Wilber, btw, takes the shentong view most recently in <a href="https://vimeo.com/83948023" target="_blank">this</a> video (around 5:20) on The Fourth Turning. He obviously overlooks rangtong, likely because it's just so green meme in his view.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span>"The idea being, to clear the mind of any and all concepts…</span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span>Wilber, btw, takes the shentong view most recently in <a href="https://vimeo.com/83948023" target="_blank">this</a> video (around 5:20) on The Fourth Turning. He obviously overlooks rangtong, likely because it's just so green meme in his view.</span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span>"The idea being, to clear the mind of any and all concepts abou</span></span><span><span><span>t reality so that reality itself can be directly experienced: A notion that became the foundation of virtually every Mahayana (greater vehicle) and Vajrayana (diamond vehicle) teaching henceforth."</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p></p> From the conclusion of TTTD o…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2016-08-30:5301756:Comment:663272016-08-30T21:14:11.175ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span>From the conclusion of TTTD on ontology, rangtong and shentong in a nutshell:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span>"Tsongkhapas ontology treats the two truths as mutually entailing. He argues that they share the same ontological status, and that they are empty and dependently arisen. The</span></span> <span><span><span>same principle applies to his…</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span>From the conclusion of TTTD on ontology, rangtong and shentong in a nutshell:</span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span>"Tsongkhapas ontology treats the two truths as mutually entailing. He argues that they share the same ontological status, and that they are empty and dependently arisen. The</span></span> <span><span><span>same principle applies to his ontology of samsara and nirvana. Since both samsara and nirvana are dependently arisen and empty, they have equal ontological status. Gorampas ontology treats the two truths as hierarchical and contradictory. He argues that conventional</span> <span>truth and ultimate truth each have their own distinct and independent ontological status. The same distinction is applied in the way he treats samsara and nirvana ontologically. While conventional truth and samsara are treated as dependently arisen, and thus as ontologically conditioned, Gorampa argues that ultimate truth and nirvana are ontologically unconditioned and transcendent" (160-61).</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> Thakchoe's book The Two Truth…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2016-08-30:5301756:Comment:662292016-08-30T20:05:37.099ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>Thakchoe's book <em>The Two Truths Debate</em>, much referenced in this thread, can be found <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/free-harvard-classic-e-books?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A66153" target="_self">here</a> for free.</p>
<p>Thakchoe's book <em>The Two Truths Debate</em>, much referenced in this thread, can be found <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/free-harvard-classic-e-books?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A66153" target="_self">here</a> for free.</p> Integral World posted this ne…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2016-01-06:5301756:Comment:632502016-01-06T17:56:51.360ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>Integral World posted <a href="http://www.integralworld.net/abramson3.html" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">this</a> new article on Madhyamaka. <span><span><span class="UFICommentBody"><span>I discussed a lot of this debate in this thread. I disagree with the abstract thesis though that the absolutist and non-absolutist views can be reconciled. Abstract follows:</span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody"><span>This dissertation identifies a substantial…</span></span></span></span></p>
<p>Integral World posted <a rel="nofollow" href="http://www.integralworld.net/abramson3.html" target="_blank">this</a> new article on Madhyamaka. <span><span><span class="UFICommentBody"><span>I discussed a lot of this debate in this thread. I disagree with the abstract thesis though that the absolutist and non-absolutist views can be reconciled. Abstract follows:</span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody"><span>This dissertation identifies a substantial opposition among many Buddhist scholars to the authenticity of an Absolute interpretation of reality in Mâdhyamaka. Its thesis is that this opposition is profoundly mistaken, but not in the sense that an Absolute interpretation of reality is correct and a non-Absolute interpretation is incorrect. An account of reality in Mâdhyamaka is articulated that argues not only are both interpretations correct but, despite their apparent contradiction, they can be presented as mutually compatible. The methodology for presenting this account is centred on a robust comparison of well-known exemplars of Absolutist and non-Absolutist accounts of reality in Mâdhyamaka. Firstly this is implemented by an emic Mâdhyamaka comparison of Jay Garfield's non-Absolutist and T.R.V. Murti's Absolutist accounts of reality. For Garfield, this comparison draws on a selection of his work that is intended to be a proxy for the tide of scholarly opinion that often cites Murti's work as a paradigm of its anti-Absolutist views of reality in Mâdhyamaka. Secondly, I turn to, arguably, the two most prominent figures in the field of Transpersonal Psychology to provide a similarly stimulating but etic comparison from that discipline's perspective of reality in Mâdhyamaka. Thus I compare Jorge Ferrer's non-Absolutist and Ken Wilber's Absolutist account of reality in Mâdhyamaka. I conclude that reality in Mâdhyamaka is perennialist and panentheistic and thereby embraces both Absolutist and non-Absolutist versions of reality; and tie this in with Buddha's famous story of the elephant and the blind men. Finally I suggest the properties of infinity can provide additional explanatory power to this conclusion.</span></span></span></span></p>