Husserl, Schutz, and Collective Intentionality - Integral Post-Metaphysical Spirituality2024-03-29T16:03:41Zhttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/husserl-schutz-and-collective?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A20614&feed=yes&xn_auth=noThe fact is though, that as p…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2011-07-01:5301756:Comment:207332011-07-01T23:35:23.848ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p><em>The fact is though, that as philosophers, they are also</em> normative <em>readers, and not descriptive (though Gadamer would argue that it <span style="text-decoration: underline;">cannot be otherwise</span>, hence Philosophical Hermeneutics).</em></p>
<p>One of my points exactly and here Gadamer is correct. Hence no purely descriptive definition of Husserl, even by Husserl, given the unconscious lifeworld background. Or as I said quoting Kennilingam in "…</p>
<p><em>The fact is though, that as philosophers, they are also</em> normative <em>readers, and not descriptive (though Gadamer would argue that it <span style="text-decoration: underline;">cannot be otherwise</span>, hence Philosophical Hermeneutics).</em></p>
<p>One of my points exactly and here Gadamer is correct. Hence no purely descriptive definition of Husserl, even by Husserl, given the unconscious lifeworld background. Or as I said quoting Kennilingam in "<a href="http://www.integralworld.net/berge.html" target="_blank">Who decides what Wilber means?</a>":</p>
<p>"Artists are not always the best interpreters of their own works."</p>
<p>I now might add, not usually instead of not always.</p> Question 4: Yes of course Der…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2011-07-01:5301756:Comment:212152011-07-01T23:24:21.585Zkelamunihttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/kelamuni
<p>Question 4: Yes of course Derrida (and Gadamer) are meticulous readers. The fact is though, that as philosophers, they are also <em>normative</em> readers, and not descriptive (though Gadamer would argue that it cannot be otherwise, hence <em>Philosophical</em> Hermeneutics).</p>
<p>theurg:</p>
<blockquote><p>"...A defense, I might add, that will be surely forthcoming under intense scrutiny by the Ph.D. oral defense committee."</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Well, it depends on which way one's…</p>
<p>Question 4: Yes of course Derrida (and Gadamer) are meticulous readers. The fact is though, that as philosophers, they are also <em>normative</em> readers, and not descriptive (though Gadamer would argue that it cannot be otherwise, hence <em>Philosophical</em> Hermeneutics).</p>
<p>theurg:</p>
<blockquote><p>"...A defense, I might add, that will be surely forthcoming under intense scrutiny by the Ph.D. oral defense committee."</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Well, it depends on which way one's committee leans; if they are evenly split, sidetrack the issue by engendering a debate betweem the two sides, hopefully to the point of accrimony between them, at which point the issue recedes from view and they forget about the problem (from kela's "<em>Handbook on the Rhetorical Manipulation of A Successful PhD Dissertation Defense."</em> hahaha).</p> Yes, these comments are relev…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2011-07-01:5301756:Comment:207322011-07-01T22:45:54.904Zkelamunihttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/kelamuni
<p>Yes, these comments are relevant and iluminating. Collingwood also has some very interesting comments on the matter in his <em>Essay on Metaphysics</em>.</p>
<p>I would argue that in the thinking of Heidegger, Gadamer, the later Husserl, and Wittgenstein, terms like the <em>Lebenswelt</em> (Husserl), "historically effected consciousness" -- <em>wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein</em> (Gadamer) -- or "Forms of Life" (Wittgenstein), function, more or less, as "metaphysical" structures, that…</p>
<p>Yes, these comments are relevant and iluminating. Collingwood also has some very interesting comments on the matter in his <em>Essay on Metaphysics</em>.</p>
<p>I would argue that in the thinking of Heidegger, Gadamer, the later Husserl, and Wittgenstein, terms like the <em>Lebenswelt</em> (Husserl), "historically effected consciousness" -- <em>wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein</em> (Gadamer) -- or "Forms of Life" (Wittgenstein), function, more or less, as "metaphysical" structures, that is, as transcendental "grounds" of some sort. Indeed, Collingwood himself refers to his own notion of "absolute presuppostions" (which Gadamer relates to Heidegger's "forestructures of the understanding" and his own conception of <em>Vorurteil</em> or "prejudice") as metaphysical, in fact abandoning ontology and recasting the term "metaphysics" as the "science of absolute presuppositions" (in a manner akin to Gadamer's "philosophical hermeneutics").</p>
<p>In the <em>Philosophical Investigations</em>, Wittgenstein says that "metaphysics is grammar." Well, if metaphysics is grammar, then "grammar" becomes metaphysics, which is to say that it fulfills that role, and so even in Strawson's supposedly purely "descriptive" metaphysics (modelled on Wittgenstein's later works), there are still "metaphysical" structures implied.</p>
<p><br/><cite>theurj said:</cite></p>
<blockquote><div><p>Here's Habermas on the lifeworld from <strong><i>Postmetaphysical Thinking</i></strong> (MIT Press, 1992):</p>
<p>"This background...constitutes a totality that ,is implicit and that comes along prereflexively -- one that crumbles the moment it is thematized; it remains a totality only in the form of implicit, intuitively presupposed background knowledge...." (142-3).</p>
<p>Martin Morris from “Between deliberation and deconstruction” in <i>The Derrida-Habermas Reader</i> (U of Chicago Press, 2006, 231-53):</p>
<p>“The lifeworld reveals only a portion of itself in any dialogue because it exists as a phenomenological ‘background’ of pre-theoretical, pre-interpreted contexts of meaning and relevance….the vast proportion of lifeworld convictions always remain in the background during any discussion…. The lifeworld itself cannot be the proper them of communicative utterances, for as a totality it provides the space in or ground upon which such utterances occur, even those that name it explicitly….it remains indeterminate” (235-6).<br/><br/></p>
</div>
</blockquote> Good questions, and well phra…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2011-07-01:5301756:Comment:212132011-07-01T21:43:43.422Zkelamunihttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/kelamuni
<p>Good questions, and well phrased. I find the first question most interesting. I brought up a similar question with regard to aspects of Gadamer's and Heidegger's thought at a Buddhist seminar once, and was summarily dismissed, then came later to find out that it was actually not only an important question that had been raised by interpreters of Gadamer but that was an issue in Gadamer's reflection on his own hermeneutics: how does one describe that which forms the ground and basis of…</p>
<p>Good questions, and well phrased. I find the first question most interesting. I brought up a similar question with regard to aspects of Gadamer's and Heidegger's thought at a Buddhist seminar once, and was summarily dismissed, then came later to find out that it was actually not only an important question that had been raised by interpreters of Gadamer but that was an issue in Gadamer's reflection on his own hermeneutics: how does one describe that which forms the ground and basis of description itself? It has a kind of transcendental feel to it, in my mind, and how Kant deals with transcendental argumentation would here seem to be applicable. Of course, by "transcendental" we need not mean what Kant means; we merely refer to a form of argumentation. For example, Saul Kripke makes use of transcendental <em>arguments</em> in his interpretation of Wittgenstein in <em>Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language</em>, one of my favorite monographs on the interpretation of the later Wittgenstein. (Witt. himself might say "it <em>shows</em> itself..." which is not always the most satisfactory answer, though if one follows his description, one gets one of the better senses of what intersubjectivity implies.)</p>
<p><br/><cite>theurj said:</cite></p>
<blockquote><div><p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">To clarify my inquiry to date, since some are not following. Is it relevant?</p>
<ol>
<li><p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">The intersubjective lifeworld is largely unconscious so to what degree can it be “intentional?” And what is the relation of transpersonal theory/practice to this lifeworld? That is, can we have intentional, direct and complete transpersonal experiences of this ground? Now if we take Protevi's definition of intentionality as “<em><span style="font-style: normal;">not subjective, but is the 'between' of subject and object, the middle out of which objects and subjects are constituted,</span></em><em>”</em> then it makes sense as long as we don't presume to fully experience or know such a between, heeding Morris "Speaking for the lifeworld as if one could step outside of it and know it directly inevitably leads one to 'invoke a cosmology,' a 'metaphysics of the thing-in-itself.'”</p>
</li>
<li><p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">How does the collective interior evolve? Via the kind of structures Kennilingam suggests? Remember Foucault that genealogy doesn't so “evolve” through such rational structures as much as change by “contingent turns of history.”</p>
</li>
<li><p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">Sean finds that Husserl has been misinterpreted by the likes of Foucault and Derrida to the point of being “downright inaccurate.” So I'm interested in specifically how so, since Sean finds both Levin and MP as being much more accurate, and Derrda is akin to them in some regards (explored ad nauseum in this forum). Also given that Husserl endorsed Fink and Fink is the main source of Derrida. Derrida is known for meticulously reading and understanding his subjects before critique. I can see how Derrida might have disagreed with Husserl, but to claim he was was downright inaccurate needs defense. A defense, I might add, that will be surely forthcoming under intense scrutiny by the Ph.D. oral defense committee.</p>
</li>
<li><p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">I agree with Sean's point about the difficulty “really understand[ing]” any philosophers meaning, Husserl notwithstanding, especially in light of his being “notoriously difficult and cryptic.” Tell me about it, with Derrida another prime example. But 2 points here: a) Is there a “real” and true interpretation of Husserl, even from himself? and b) perhaps one is also misconstruing Derrida's critique of Husserl, when Derrida might just be more in line with Husserl's project that one supposes? E.g., I agree with Sean when he says: “One way that I would articulate it [habitus] is as a middle way between social constructionism and transcendental essentialism.” This middle way is succinctly put by Protevi in the referenced quote and in fact is very much akin to Derrida on the topic.</p>
</li>
<li><p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">Finally, for now, I too, like Balder, am interested in the project of an intersubjective (or in Varela's phenomenological term “interbeing”), integral, postmetaphysical enaction. So I'm with the general agenda and curious to see how others frame this endeavor. Which is of course the purpose of our forum.</p>
</li>
</ol>
</div>
</blockquote> I'm sorry theurg. I was overc…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2011-07-01:5301756:Comment:207312011-07-01T21:28:03.097Zkelamunihttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/kelamuni
I'm sorry theurg. I was overcome by dickheaditis temporarily! Your comments and their content are completely relevant. Apologies.<br></br><br></br><cite>theurj said:</cite>
<blockquote><div><p>I am not talking about MP; I am talking about MP's interpretation of Husserl. And Sean is taking about Shutz's, and his own, interpretation of Husserl. You yourself brought up Gadamer's interpretation, as well as Derrida and others. It's not like there is one right interpretation, even from Husserl…</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
I'm sorry theurg. I was overcome by dickheaditis temporarily! Your comments and their content are completely relevant. Apologies.<br/><br/><cite>theurj said:</cite>
<blockquote><div><p>I am not talking about MP; I am talking about MP's interpretation of Husserl. And Sean is taking about Shutz's, and his own, interpretation of Husserl. You yourself brought up Gadamer's interpretation, as well as Derrida and others. It's not like there is one right interpretation, even from Husserl himself.</p>
<p>So it seems that providing how others see Husserl is of direct pertinence, especially in light of Sean's paper arguing that some interpretations get it wrong while others get it right. I'm trying to understand what it is, exactly, about other interpretations that get it wrong. Especially since MP is supposed to be one who understands Husserl better than Derrida, when it seems they both had a lot of similarity on the topic. So I'll continue with my inquiry whether you approve or not.</p>
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</blockquote> Xibalba!
Hermetic phrenomenol…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2011-07-01:5301756:Comment:207302011-07-01T20:53:31.940Zkelamunihttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/kelamuni
<p>Xibalba!</p>
<p>Hermetic phrenomenology is indispesible in the field of Religionswissenschaft. My brain thinks analogically as it is, so comparison is inevitable for me. However, I like to bring out the contrasts between various philosophies, spiritual teachings, attitudinal stances, etc. Finding the similarities among traditions is basically superficial and rather sophmoric. For example, at least four forms of non-dualism in the Indian tradition can be thematized (Shankara Advaita, Mandana…</p>
<p>Xibalba!</p>
<p>Hermetic phrenomenology is indispesible in the field of Religionswissenschaft. My brain thinks analogically as it is, so comparison is inevitable for me. However, I like to bring out the contrasts between various philosophies, spiritual teachings, attitudinal stances, etc. Finding the similarities among traditions is basically superficial and rather sophmoric. For example, at least four forms of non-dualism in the Indian tradition can be thematized (Shankara Advaita, Mandana Advaita, Vijnanavada Advaya, Madhyamika Advaya) such that using the term without specifying which variety one is referring to is effectively useless.</p>
<p><br/><cite>xibalba said:</cite></p>
<blockquote><div><p>Hi kela</p>
<p>did you read his history do sexuality?</p>
<p>A great work of genealogy.</p>
<p>I remember you were interested in greco-roman philosophies, and that you read Pierre Hadot.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>How much place take phenomenologicla methods in your "bricolage" research btw?</p>
<p>just curious</p>
</div>
</blockquote> To clarify my inquiry to date…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2011-06-30:5301756:Comment:210022011-06-30T13:24:59.215ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">To clarify my inquiry to date, since some are not following. Is it relevant?</p>
<ol>
<li><p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">The intersubjective lifeworld is largely unconscious so to what degree can it be “intentional?” And what is the relation of transpersonal theory/practice to this lifeworld? That is, can we have intentional, direct and complete transpersonal experiences of this ground? Now if we take Protevi's definition of intentionality as “…</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">To clarify my inquiry to date, since some are not following. Is it relevant?</p>
<ol>
<li><p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">The intersubjective lifeworld is largely unconscious so to what degree can it be “intentional?” And what is the relation of transpersonal theory/practice to this lifeworld? That is, can we have intentional, direct and complete transpersonal experiences of this ground? Now if we take Protevi's definition of intentionality as “<em><span style="font-style: normal;">not subjective, but is the 'between' of subject and object, the middle out of which objects and subjects are constituted,</span></em><em>”</em> then it makes sense as long as we don't presume to fully experience or know such a between, heeding Morris "Speaking for the lifeworld as if one could step outside of it and know it directly inevitably leads one to 'invoke a cosmology,' a 'metaphysics of the thing-in-itself.'”</p>
</li>
<li><p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">How does the collective interior evolve? Via the kind of structures Kennilingam suggests? Remember Foucault that genealogy doesn't so “evolve” through such rational structures as much as change by “contingent turns of history.”</p>
</li>
<li><p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">Sean finds that Husserl has been misinterpreted by the likes of Foucault and Derrida to the point of being “downright inaccurate.” So I'm interested in specifically how so, since Sean finds both Levin and MP as being much more accurate, and Derrda is akin to them in some regards (explored ad nauseum in this forum). Also given that Husserl endorsed Fink and Fink is the main source of Derrida. Derrida is known for meticulously reading and understanding his subjects before critique. I can see how Derrida might have disagreed with Husserl, but to claim he was was downright inaccurate needs defense. A defense, I might add, that will be surely forthcoming under intense scrutiny by the Ph.D. oral defense committee.</p>
</li>
<li><p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">I agree with Sean's point about the difficulty “really understand[ing]” any philosophers meaning, Husserl notwithstanding, especially in light of his being “notoriously difficult and cryptic.” Tell me about it, with Derrida another prime example. But 2 points here: a) Is there a “real” and true interpretation of Husserl, even from himself? and b) perhaps one is also misconstruing Derrida's critique of Husserl, when Derrida might just be more in line with Husserl's project that one supposes? E.g., I agree with Sean when he says: “One way that I would articulate it [habitus] is as a middle way between social constructionism and transcendental essentialism.” This middle way is succinctly put by Protevi in the referenced quote and in fact is very much akin to Derrida on the topic.</p>
</li>
<li><p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">Finally, for now, I too, like Balder, am interested in the project of an intersubjective (or in Varela's phenomenological term “interbeing”), integral, postmetaphysical enaction. So I'm with the general agenda and curious to see how others frame this endeavor. Which is of course the purpose of our forum.</p>
</li>
</ol> In relation to my question to…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2011-06-29:5301756:Comment:210012011-06-29T21:18:44.243ZBalderhttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/BruceAlderman
<p><br></br>In relation to my question to Sean re: his proposal for a transpersonal-hermeneutic phenomenology, I've been doing a little background research on my own and came across the following article: <a href="http://www.newschool.edu/nssr/husserl/Future/Part%20Two/Kaushik.html" target="_blank">Reeling Phenomenology Away from Theology</a>, by Rajiv Kaushik.</p>
<p><br></br>I found it interesting, given my own interest in articulating a postmetaphysical, integral, enactive model of religious…</p>
<p><br/>In relation to my question to Sean re: his proposal for a transpersonal-hermeneutic phenomenology, I've been doing a little background research on my own and came across the following article: <a target="_blank" href="http://www.newschool.edu/nssr/husserl/Future/Part%20Two/Kaushik.html">Reeling Phenomenology Away from Theology</a>, by Rajiv Kaushik.</p>
<p><br/>I found it interesting, given my own interest in articulating a postmetaphysical, integral, enactive model of religious pluralism. I expect Sean is interested in something similar, based on several of the elements he weaves together in his proposal, so I am curious to hear his thoughts on this brief article, especially in relation to his own use of Marion in his work. (In particular, Sean, I wonder if you see the problem in Marion that Kaushik identifies, and if so, how you reconcile his approach, or the elements you draw from it, with what appears to be a pluralist-participatory orientation in your own approach [a la Ferrer, for instance]).</p>
<p><br/>Briefly, the author of the article argues that Marion's theological reading of Husserl is antithetical to religious pluralism, and offers instead a reading of Husserl which he believes is truer to Husserl's project and better preserves a pluralist orientation.</p>
<p><br/>A couple relevant quotes:</p>
<blockquote><p><br/>Especially in various circles of current European thought, the readings of Husserl by Jean-Luc Marion are becoming of more and more interest. Marion’s work appears to be the latest in what Dominique Janicaud has diagnosed as “the theological turn” from Husserlian phenomenology. (1) His main thesis does not seek to confront Husserl’s phenomenology with a theology of exteriority so much as it seeks to re-read Husserl’s phenomenology as a propaedeutic for a revealed theology. I see this direction in phenomenology as dangerous because it leads phenomenology into something that the latter sought to overcome. It introduces phenomenology to a justification for a religious dogmatism that is antithetical to the possibility of pluralism, and religious pluralism in particular. As James K. Smith says, it even “colonizes being.”(2)</p>
<p><br/>...Of a theologico-metaphysics, Husserl writes in the Cartesian Meditations that it is undermined: truth, he writes, “has gained a new significance” because it now excludes “every naïve metaphysics that operates with absurd things in themselves” by providing a distinct opening into the investigation of “ethico-religious problems.” (12) Phenomenology can even break open an investigation of the “problem-motivates that inwardly drive the old tradition into the wrong line of inquiry and the wrong method.” (13) Just what these “motivates” are according to Husserl is not quite clarified until a lecture given in the 1930’s: they are certain “horizons of knowledge and feeling” so that any phenomenology of religious experience is really a matter pertaining to “Existenz.” (14) If Husserl is employing the term in the sense that Karl Jaspers employs it, phenomenology can include an exposition of what Jaspers calls “limit situations,” e.g., death, sorrow, anxiety, etc., which, because they transgress intentionality, are not initially begun with pure reflexivity. <br/> The question of a human relation to the theophany is thereby transformed by phenomenology into an inquiry in which the question grounds itself not on theology but on certain meta-noetical and factical modes of being in which the world is always already meaningful for the human when that human reflexively or intuitively turns to it. When we bring these comments connection with the above paragraph, the consequent Husserlian position is not merely that there are inner, temporal motivations of the religious life but also that these motivations are premised on a certain understanding of the present of consciousness which allows for a more sophisticated pluralism of the religious life. After all, here we have a temporal ground of consciousness that relies neither on a claim to the absolute nor on a naively relativistic understanding of thought. What we seem to encounter in Husserl is a rejection of absolutes that is not, on the other hand, a rejection of all understandings of grounds.</p>
</blockquote> Protevi's introductory lectur…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2011-06-29:5301756:Comment:204462011-06-29T18:13:06.493ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>Protevi's <a href="http://www.protevi.com/john/DH/PDF/IntroductoryLecture.pdf" target="_blank">introductory lecture</a> on Derrida and Husserl clearly sets out the issues with his own ideas about Husserl. For example:</p>
<p><em>Now perhaps the most basic guiding thread of Husserl's scripts is that of the parallelism of subjective act and objective correlate, which becomes known as the "constitution" of noesis and noema, a constitution performed ultimately by temporalization. Perhaps a…</em></p>
<p>Protevi's <a href="http://www.protevi.com/john/DH/PDF/IntroductoryLecture.pdf" target="_blank">introductory lecture</a> on Derrida and Husserl clearly sets out the issues with his own ideas about Husserl. For example:</p>
<p><em>Now perhaps the most basic guiding thread of Husserl's scripts is that of the parallelism of subjective act and objective correlate, which becomes known as the "constitution" of noesis and noema, a constitution performed ultimately by temporalization. Perhaps a useful schema, but one to be used carefully, is to think of Husserl as a thinker of the "middle."</em></p>
<p><em>A...way to see the difference is to think that Kantians work from the top-down, describing a structure to which all objects must submit, then transposing that structure to the subject's a priori formation of objects, which could do nothing but conform; phenomenology, on the other hand, would work from below, from concrete descriptions of the constitutive middle between subject and object.</em></p>
<p><em>We start in the natural attitude, which (falsely: the fallacy of "objectivism" or "realism" or "Platonism") assumes the independent existence of things--tables and chairs, or ideal objects like "triangle"--in the world: independent that is, of consciousness. We perform the phenomenological reduction, by suspending the thesis of the independent existence of things and consciousness, and observe things as they appear to consciousness in order to trace their constitution by transcendental subjectivity, both at the act-intentional level, and at the ultimate level of temporaliztion. We should note that this is not an abstraction to the universal and anonymous "epistemological ego" of Kant, but revelation of a concrete individual ego, at a transcendental level. Husserl will eventually call the concrete ego a "monad" because it includes not just the living streaming present, but also its past and future, its habits and capabilities, even its idiosyncracies. Nevertheless, there is a certain plurality of transcendental egos interrelated in such a way as to form an intersubjectively verifiable, objectively shared, world.</em></p>
<p><em>The transcendental ego is concrete and singular, but intersubjectively related to other egos so as to insure objectivity as truth for everyone everywhere. Husserl now faces a difficult problem: he must maintain a reference to concrete singular world-constituting consciousness without at the same time falling into solipsism. The Fifth Cartesian Meditation tackles this problem: how to constitute, as part of the world constituted within me, the other as other: in other words, how can I as absolute origin of the world see another as another absolute origin of the same world? This problem provokes Levinas--the translator of CM and the author of the first book on Husserl in French--to his own project of articulating a philosophy of "absolute alterity."</em></p>
<p><em>Now the transcendental ego is not an ontic double of the always singularly-placed empirical ego, but is uncannily "related" to it. Fink writes concerning the "logical paradox of transcendental determinations,"--in language that we can only see as provocative for Derrida--of the relation of transcendental and empirical egos, as "this singular identity-in-difference, this sameness in being-other" (Fink, 144). This relation, which will come to be called différance, is the key to JD's investigation, as it is for all philosophers writing in a post-Kantian world.</em></p>
<p><em>The essential structures of consciousness are: intentionality and time-consciousness. Intentionality is the relation of the subject to what is other than itself, what can become an object for it and everyone else. Intentionality is an explosion out of subjectivity toward objectivity; consciousness is being-toward- difference. We must stress that intentionality is not subjective, but is the "between" of subject and object, the middle out of which objects and subjects are constituted.</em></p>
<p><em>Husserl came at the end to investigate the "lifeworld." This is not the mute world of preconceptual, prelinguistic, pre-predictative experience, as it was for Husserl in the 1920s, but in the Crisis, becomes the actual historical cultural world of everyday experience. Out of the lifeworld, as one area of human praxis among others, arises the project of science: the establishment of an objective world and the ideal truths explaining this world. The establishment of objectivity is a historical European project for Husserl, beginning with the Greeks and applied by Galileo to nature. In a sense, then, modern science is the realization of Platonism: the discovery of independently existing objective being. This Platonist project, reason, culminates in phenomenology, which is the supercession of metaphysics in that it shows the subjective constitution of objectivity.</em></p> For example, in Lawlor's Derr…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2011-06-29:5301756:Comment:204432011-06-29T13:25:06.718ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">For example, in Lawlor's <i><a href="http://books.google.com/books?id=YsdDrOJ4dSoC&pg=PA11&lpg=PA11&dq=derrida+merleau-ponty+husserl&source=bl&ots=27_Ze0yetO&sig=qShC8c1S5kyKAOAHRfiDwke1xhA&hl=en&ei=xh8LTpXjL8Gbtwf2p7ha&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CCMQ6AEwATgK#v=onepage&q=derrida%20merleau-ponty%20husserl&f=false" target="_blank">Derrida and Husserl…</a></i></p>
<p style="margin-bottom: 0in;">For example, in Lawlor's <i><a href="http://books.google.com/books?id=YsdDrOJ4dSoC&pg=PA11&lpg=PA11&dq=derrida+merleau-ponty+husserl&source=bl&ots=27_Ze0yetO&sig=qShC8c1S5kyKAOAHRfiDwke1xhA&hl=en&ei=xh8LTpXjL8Gbtwf2p7ha&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CCMQ6AEwATgK#v=onepage&q=derrida%20merleau-ponty%20husserl&f=false" target="_blank">Derrida and Husserl</a></i> <span style="font-style: normal;">(IUP, 2002) he notes that Fink* was Derrida's prime source for his own interpretation. Lawlor goes even further though is saying “Derrida's philosophy—his deconstruction—is continuous with Husserl's phenomenology” (11). He argues that to get at a more accurate interpretation of Husserl requires us to get at the underlying operating assumptions of phenomenology versus critical philosophy, the latter misconstruing Husserl by assuming he had the same premises. In that regard Fink says (via Lawlor, of course) that Husserl's phenomenology is “world transcendent” (13). And yet it is a transcendence that is not only not within the world but not without it either, unlike critical philosophy that saw the transcendent as a strict dichotomy with the immanent. And it is here where we start to see Husserl's brand of transcendence show up in Derrida.</span></p>
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<p style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-style: normal;">More later, work beckons.</span></p>
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<p style="margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-style: normal;">* Fink is mentioned above as one who is a more accurate interpreter of Husserl, and Husserl himself “unqualifiedly authorized Fink's interpretation of his philosophy.” Lawlor also notes that “anyone interested in criticizing Derrida's interpretation of Husserl cannot ignore this authorization” (21).</span></p>