Evan Thompson - Integral Post-Metaphysical Spirituality2024-03-29T15:56:25Zhttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/evan-thompson?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A64178&feed=yes&xn_auth=noChapter one of Thompson's boo…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2018-03-21:5301756:Comment:719202018-03-21T20:16:04.493ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>Chapter one of Thompson's book <em>Mind in Life</em> attached is on the definitions and differences between the computational, connectivist and embodied theories of cognition, enactivism being a variety of the last.</p>
<p>Chapter one of Thompson's book <em>Mind in Life</em> attached is on the definitions and differences between the computational, connectivist and embodied theories of cognition, enactivism being a variety of the last.</p> "The serpent's gift: evolutio…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2018-03-10:5301756:Comment:721182018-03-10T23:56:36.616ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>"The serpent's gift: evolutionary psychology and consciousness" by Bering & Bjorklund, is Chapter 22 of <i>The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness</i> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). A copy of the chapter is attached. The abstract:</p>
<p>"As a higher-order cognitive system enabling access to intentional states, and one that few (if any) other species even marginally possess, consciousness or, more appropriately, self-consciousness has likely been both selectively…</p>
<p>"The serpent's gift: evolutionary psychology and consciousness" by Bering & Bjorklund, is Chapter 22 of <i>The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness</i> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). A copy of the chapter is attached. The abstract:</p>
<p>"As a higher-order cognitive system enabling access to intentional states, and one that few (if any) other species even marginally possess, consciousness or, more appropriately, self-consciousness has likely been both selectively advantageous and the source of adaptive conflict in human evolutionary history. Consciousness was likely advantageous to early human beings because it built on more ancient primate social adaptations. Individuals likely profited by having the capacity to track the intentions of the self and of social others in that consciousness permitted behavioral strategies involving deception and declarative communication. However, consciousness was likely also a source of adaptive conflict in that it interfered with the functioning of more ancient social adaptations, such as infanticide and male sexual coercion of females. Having access to the epistemic states of others meant that knowledge of social transgressions could be rapidly conveyed between parties. For many evolved psychological mechanisms, what was adaptive in human ancestral history suddenly became maladaptive when consciousness appeared."</p> Development and evolution is…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2018-03-10:5301756:Comment:718162018-03-10T23:51:06.163ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>Development and evolution is the subtitle of Evan Thompson's Chapter 7 in his book <i>Life in Mind</i> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), the main title of which is "Laying down a path in walking." Therein he details the received view of biological evolution and compares it with the enactive, dynamic systems view. It is highly technical and beyond my current knowledge of the topic, but nonetheless instructive in my burgeoning education down this path in walking. A copy of this…</p>
<p>Development and evolution is the subtitle of Evan Thompson's Chapter 7 in his book <i>Life in Mind</i> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), the main title of which is "Laying down a path in walking." Therein he details the received view of biological evolution and compares it with the enactive, dynamic systems view. It is highly technical and beyond my current knowledge of the topic, but nonetheless instructive in my burgeoning education down this path in walking. A copy of this chapter is attached.</p> "Who am I: the conscious and…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2017-09-16:5301756:Comment:702012017-09-16T14:23:32.978ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<div class="post-body entry-content" id="post-body-6236496746078832627"><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody"><span>"<a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5355470/">Who am I</a>: the conscious and unconscious self." Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 2017; 11: 126. Some excerpts:</span><br></br><br></br><span>"In this article we suggest the idea that the processing of self-referential stimuli in cortical midline structures (CMS) may represent an important part of the conscious…</span></span></span></span></span></div>
<div class="post-body entry-content" id="post-body-6236496746078832627"><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody"><span>"<a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5355470/">Who am I</a>: the conscious and unconscious self." Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 2017; 11: 126. Some excerpts:</span><br/><br/><span>"In this article we suggest the idea that the processing of self-referential stimuli in cortical midline structures (CMS) may represent an important part of the conscious self, which may be supplemented by an unconscious part of the self that has been called an 'embodied mind' (Varela et al., 1991), which relies on other brain structures."</span><br/><br/><span>"When we describe the self as structure and organization we understand it as a system. But the concept of the embodied self states that the self or cognition is not an activity of the mind alone, but is distributed across the entire situation including mind, body, environment (e.g., Beer, 1995), thereby pointing to an embodied and situated self."</span><br/><br/><span>"Furthermore, we argue that through embodiment the self is also embedded in the environment. This means that our self is not isolated but intrinsically social. [...] Hence, the self should not be understood as an entity located somewhere in the brain, isolated from both the body and the environment. In contrast, the self can be seen as a brain-based neurosocial structure and organization, always linked to the environment (or the social sphere) via embodiment and embeddedness."</span></span></span></span></span></div> On p. 6 I introduced Garfield…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2017-09-15:5301756:Comment:701012017-09-15T01:43:44.027ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>On p. 6 I introduced Garfield's review of Thompson's latest book. Thompson responds to all the commentators of that issue of Philosophy East and West <a href="http://enlight.lib.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/phil567546.pdf" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">here</a>. His specific response to Garfield begins on p. 991. He said he was using the notion of a conventional self "in order to criticize contemporary views, such as Thomas Metzinger’s, that argue that there is no self in any sense because…</p>
<p>On p. 6 I introduced Garfield's review of Thompson's latest book. Thompson responds to all the commentators of that issue of Philosophy East and West <a rel="nofollow" href="http://enlight.lib.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/phil567546.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>. His specific response to Garfield begins on p. 991. He said he was using the notion of a conventional self "in order to criticize contemporary views, such as Thomas Metzinger’s, that argue that there is no self in any sense because there is no substantially existent self. In my view and in Madhyamaka terms, such views, while avoiding the extreme of 'reification,' fall prey to the other extreme of 'nihilism.' So what was at stake for me in using Madhyamaka was to show why 'neuro-nihilism' is misguided, and how the Madhyamaka idea of the person as conventionally existent can be illuminated by a cognitive-science account of how the conventional self gets constituted."</p> I.e., the center of self and…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2017-08-28:5301756:Comment:700142017-08-28T18:53:28.163ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>I.e., the center of self and consciousness "<span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span><span>is determined by the distributed tensile stress of the entire system," a "<span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span><span>co-determination of inner and outer."</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p>I.e., the center of self and consciousness "<span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span><span>is determined by the distributed tensile stress of the entire system," a "<span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span><span>co-determination of inner and outer."</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> Which of course reminds me of…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2017-08-28:5301756:Comment:699142017-08-28T18:47:15.578ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span>Which of course reminds me of what Edwards et al. said in <a href="http://integral-review.org/pdf-template-issue.php?pdfName=vol_11_no_3_k%C3%BCpers_deeg_and_edwards_inter-bridging.pdf&fref=gc" target="_blank">their article</a> on syntegrity in another application:</span><br></br><br></br><span>“‘Syn-integrality’ resonates in particular with the idea of ‘tensegrity’ as this concept refers to the integrity of structures as being…</span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span>Which of course reminds me of what Edwards et al. said in <a href="http://integral-review.org/pdf-template-issue.php?pdfName=vol_11_no_3_k%C3%BCpers_deeg_and_edwards_inter-bridging.pdf&fref=gc" target="_blank">their article</a> on syntegrity in another application:</span><br/><br/><span>“‘Syn-integrality’ resonates in particular with the idea of ‘tensegrity’ as this concept refers to the integrity of structures as being base</span></span><span><span><span>d in a synergy between the inseparable and balanced components of tension and compression (Fuller and Applewhite, 1975). [...] Instead of using compression, ‘syn-integral’ bridging achieves stability by the distribution and concurrent application of tension and pressure on the entire bridge and in relation between its poles. Thus, the integrity of the structure is determined by the distributed tensile stress of the entire system. [...] Remarkably these tensile structures have empty centres. Correspondingly, every point is visible and connectable from every other, suggesting a desirable form of transparency. […] For a tensegrity-oriented approach the centre is a virtual one, rather than being occupied by some dominant body, individual, concept or value. [...] Therefore syn-integral bridging does not follow the ideas of a metaphysical harmony, nor an underlying unity-oriented ideal(ism)" (127-8).</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p></p> Recall that Thompson worked w…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2017-08-28:5301756:Comment:699132017-08-28T18:46:08.623ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span>Recall that Thompson worked with Varela on neurophenomenology. <a href="http://brainimaging.waisman.wisc.edu/~lutz/VarelaHommage_Biological_research_2003.pdf?fref=gc" target="_blank">This</a> article on Varela has some pertinent Varela quotes:</span><br></br><br></br><span>"From both the biophysical and the concrete experiential points of view there is no central "I" other than the one sporadically…</span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span>Recall that Thompson worked with Varela on neurophenomenology. <a href="http://brainimaging.waisman.wisc.edu/~lutz/VarelaHommage_Biological_research_2003.pdf?fref=gc" target="_blank">This</a> article on Varela has some pertinent Varela quotes:</span><br/><br/><span>"From both the biophysical and the concrete experiential points of view there is no central "I" other than the one sporadically ac</span></span><span><span><span>tualized in a linguistic, self-referential mode in communication. The "I" can only be localized as an emergence but it acts as the center of gravity of the subject himself, of his real life experiences" (36).</span><br/><br/><span>But said self has no specific location. It is "co-determination of inner and outer." It is a "selfless self" or "virtual self" and yet "can provide an occasion for coupling in a dynamical process." Thus through the history of its interactions it maintains a "cognitive self."</span><br/></span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p></p> I used Garfield quite a bit i…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2017-08-28:5301756:Comment:697292017-08-28T18:44:34.900ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span>I used Garfield quite a bit in my discussion of the differences between shentong and rangtong Buddhism in <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/stephen-batchelor" target="_blank">this</a> Ning thread. Shentong indeed mixes and matches Yogacara with Buddhism and hence gets this metaphysical consciousness per se at the heart of</span></span> <span><span><span>reality that Wilber maintains in his…</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span>I used Garfield quite a bit in my discussion of the differences between shentong and rangtong Buddhism in <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/stephen-batchelor" target="_blank">this</a> Ning thread. Shentong indeed mixes and matches Yogacara with Buddhism and hence gets this metaphysical consciousness per se at the heart of</span></span> <span><span><span>reality that Wilber maintains in his writings.</span> <br/><br/><span>But I'm more sympathetic with Thompson, who on other Buddhist issues sides with Tsongkhapa (rangtong) while arguing against Gorampa (shentong). On this issue of the self Thompson uses a lot from dynamic systems science to support his rangtong position of a constructed self that is not illusory. And that consciousness is primary not in a metaphysical sense but acknowledging that we can't step outside it to measure it.</span><br/><br/><span>But like the linked discussion in another thread on developmental dynamic systems, Garfield agrees that this self and consciousness isn't a "narrative center of gravity." I don't see that Thompson is saying that either, but it will require further research.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p> Therein Garfield also challen…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2017-08-28:5301756:Comment:699122017-08-28T02:56:48.976ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span>Therein Garfield also challenges Thompson's notion of consciousness, in effect similar to Wilber's notion as consciousness per se, in that it is a mystification.</span> <br></br><br></br><span>"The smoke gets thicker when we turn consciousness into a kind of inner mirror in the co</span></span><span><span><span>ntext of analyzing it as reflexive awareness, a temptation to which Thompson succumbs partly in the thrall of Yogācāra…</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p>
<p><span><span><span><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><span><span>Therein Garfield also challenges Thompson's notion of consciousness, in effect similar to Wilber's notion as consciousness per se, in that it is a mystification.</span> <br/><br/><span>"The smoke gets thicker when we turn consciousness into a kind of inner mirror in the co</span></span><span><span><span>ntext of analyzing it as reflexive awareness, a temptation to which Thompson succumbs partly in the thrall of Yogācāra Buddhism and partly due to the influence of Husserl and his contemporary interpreters. Candrakīrti, as Thompson is well aware, would have none of this (he is one of the most trenchant critics of the idea of the reflexivity of awareness), and neither should we. [...]</span> <br/><br/><span>"Thompson is right to say that the self-illumination viewpoint regards consciousness as self-luminous like a lamp. But it also regards</span> <span>it as a thing, and it regards the metaphor of illumination, according to</span> <span>which this property or substance, or process, shines out on things in the world so that I can see them. I think that is a terrible metaphor. Things in the world become apparent to us by virtue of their effects on us, not by virtue of a light we shine on them. They shine forth; we don’t."</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p>