Bill Torbert - Integral Post-Metaphysical Spirituality2024-03-29T11:43:13Zhttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/bill-torbert?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A19701&feed=yes&xn_auth=noAt the above link a number of…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2014-02-28:5301756:Comment:542602014-02-28T15:32:01.713ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>At the above link a number of Torbert's works have to do with collaborative inquiry. Which reminds me of John Heron's work in this regard, and his kennilingus criticisms e.g. <a href="http://www.integralworld.net/heron3.html" target="_blank">here,</a> which point to a collaborative or participatory integral spirituality, one of the points of this very forum.</p>
<p>At the above link a number of Torbert's works have to do with collaborative inquiry. Which reminds me of John Heron's work in this regard, and his kennilingus criticisms e.g. <a href="http://www.integralworld.net/heron3.html" target="_blank">here,</a> which point to a collaborative or participatory integral spirituality, one of the points of this very forum.</p> A number of Torbert's writing…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2013-09-05:5301756:Comment:515322013-09-05T00:04:03.285ZBalderhttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/BruceAlderman
<p>A number of Torbert's writings are <a href="http://dcollections.bc.edu/R/?func=search&local_base=gen01-bcd03" target="_blank">accessible here</a> by typing in his name.</p>
<p>A number of Torbert's writings are <a href="http://dcollections.bc.edu/R/?func=search&local_base=gen01-bcd03" target="_blank">accessible here</a> by typing in his name.</p> Given the recent discussion o…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2013-05-25:5301756:Comment:479802013-05-25T12:38:40.309ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>Given the recent discussion of time above I came upon <a href="http://www.frontiersin.org/Perception_Science/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00046/full" target="_blank">this scientific article</a> today. Some excerpts with lengthy citations removed:</p>
<p>"A popular model for the representation of time in the brain posits the existence of a single, central-clock. In that framework, temporal distortions in perception are explained by contracting or expanding time over a given interval. We here present…</p>
<p>Given the recent discussion of time above I came upon <a href="http://www.frontiersin.org/Perception_Science/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00046/full" target="_blank">this scientific article</a> today. Some excerpts with lengthy citations removed:</p>
<p>"A popular model for the representation of time in the brain posits the existence of a single, central-clock. In that framework, temporal distortions in perception are explained by contracting or expanding time over a given interval. We here present evidence for an alternative account, one which proposes multiple independent timelines coexisting within the brain."</p>
<p>"We propose that our results are best explained by an appeal to multiple representations of time that coexist within the brain. Trapped by the assumption of a Cartesian theater in which sensory input is passively recorded, modern theories of brain time have largely avoided this framework. Mounting evidence, however, suggests that a single clock-rate model of perceptual time is untenable. Instead, different aspects of time appear to be underpinned by separate neural mechanisms that sometimes act in concert, but are not required to do so."</p>
<p>"Previous work has provided compelling evidence for the existence of independent motor and sensory timelines in the brain. The current experiment extends these findings and shows that individual sensory modalities have their own adjustable timelines.... In light of evidence from other labs, we suggest that a paradigm shift is underway within the field of time perception. Discarding the notion of a single central timer allows for novel frameworks and predictions that will force us to think critically about what it means for time to be represented in the brain."</p> Nonetheless, we can see simil…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2013-05-10:5301756:Comment:478832013-05-10T11:02:14.377ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>Nonetheless, we can see similarities and differences with the Lingam's notion of the Causal, his version of the virtual. It is more like DeLanda and Deleuze in that it is a sort of timeless continuum within which the actual manifests. But unlike them his is unchanging and of a "radically different order,"* i.e., not immanent. And ironically one might argue that his different orders relate to the difference between epistemology and ontology, relative and absolute, which he most certainly does…</p>
<p>Nonetheless, we can see similarities and differences with the Lingam's notion of the Causal, his version of the virtual. It is more like DeLanda and Deleuze in that it is a sort of timeless continuum within which the actual manifests. But unlike them his is unchanging and of a "radically different order,"* i.e., not immanent. And ironically one might argue that his different orders relate to the difference between epistemology and ontology, relative and absolute, which he most certainly does separate and divide contrary to his claims in <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/wilber-s-initial-response-to-critical-realism" target="_self">this thread</a>.</p>
<p>* <a href="http://www.kenwilber.com/Writings/PDF/ExcerptG_KOSMOS_2004.pdf" target="_blank">Excerpt G</a>, p. 33: The two truths "are of radically different orders.... Conventional truths are known by science; absolute truth is known by satori. They simply are not the same thing."</p> Of course, as is my wont I pi…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2013-05-09:5301756:Comment:481092013-05-09T13:34:17.962ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>Of course, as is my wont I picked apart the subtle differences in the above recent posts <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/object-oriented-ontology?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A40690">here:</a></p>
<p>From chapter 2 of BDD* Lorraine says:</p>
<p>“Deleuze takes the notion of the incorporeal realm of the event....the time of this realm of becomings is the time of Aion – an achronilogical time where everything has always has already happened and is yet to…</p>
<p>Of course, as is my wont I picked apart the subtle differences in the above recent posts <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/object-oriented-ontology?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A40690">here:</a></p>
<p>From chapter 2 of BDD* Lorraine says:</p>
<p>“Deleuze takes the notion of the incorporeal realm of the event....the time of this realm of becomings is the time of Aion – an achronilogical time where everything has always has already happened and is yet to come....the 'pure event'” (32).</p>
<p>He goes on to describe the pure event in much the same terms as DeLanda, a a virtual that does not apparently ever actualize. Bryant notes that not <i>all</i> of the withdrawn virtual is ever actualized in toto, but that some of it is usually actualized via exo-relations. This seems quite different from Lorraine's (and apparently DeLanda's) version, which forever remain virtual in a separate realm. This is highlighted by Lorraine:</p>
<p>“In the achronilogical time of Aion all events can relate in a pure becoming freed from the restrictions of physical becoming” (34).</p>
<p>Obviously not so with Bryant's virtual realm. In TDOO Bryant uses Deleuze's virutal but admits it is his recontextualizatin and it differs from Deleuze's own use. For example:</p>
<p>“As such, the virtual...refers to powers and capacities belonging to an entity. And in order for an entity to have powers or capacities, it must actually exist. In this connection, while the virtual refers to potentiality, it would be a mistake to conflate this potentiality with the concept of a potential object. A potential object is an object that does not exist but which could come to exist. By contrast, the virtual is strictly a part of a real and existing object” (3.2).</p>
<p>This is not at all a pure event “freed from the restrictions of physical becoming.” He goes on:</p>
<p>“In evoking Deleuze's concept of the virtual, we must proceed with caution.... he is committed to the thesis that there is only one substance that is then broken up into discrete entities through a process of actualization.... The suggestion here is that the virtual seems to consist of a single continuum, such that there is only one virtual, one substance, that is then partitioned into apparently distinct entities” (3.2)</p>
<p>It is this single continuum of the pure event that allows for such readings of non-material virtuality that somehow underlies matter and gives it form, ideas Bryant repeatedly refutes. As does Derrida's an-archic khora and his sense of ordinal time, which Bryant lays out quite well. Lorraine is trying to make connections between Deleuze and Derrida based on the above but I don't see it.</p>
<p>Also note in chapter 3.2 Bryant goes into Protevi's reading of Deleuze on the virtual. But he thinks that Protevi, while also recontextualizing him, nonetheless attributes things to Delequze not there to begin with.</p>
<p><em>* <a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/81351399/Paul-Patton-John-Protevi-Between-Deleuze-and-Derrida" target="_blank">Between Deleuze and Derrida</a></em> (Continuum, 2003).</p> And this post:
Also see this…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2013-05-09:5301756:Comment:481082013-05-09T13:33:34.112ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>And <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/object-oriented-ontology?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A40681">this post</a>:</p>
<p>Also see <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/derrida/#BasArgImpTimHeaOneSpeSecSov" target="_blank">this section</a> of the SEP entry on Derrida. Derrida follows Kant's transcendental approach in exploring the condition(s) that make experience possible, which requires that irreducible singularity and iterability are distinct yet…</p>
<p>And <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/object-oriented-ontology?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A40681">this post</a>:</p>
<p>Also see <a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/derrida/#BasArgImpTimHeaOneSpeSecSov" target="_blank">this section</a> of the SEP entry on Derrida. Derrida follows Kant's transcendental approach in exploring the condition(s) that make experience possible, which requires that irreducible singularity and iterability are distinct yet inseparable. And of course this occurs <em>in time</em>. But what kind of time per above, successive or ordinal? This is where the critique of the metaphysics of presence come in, for there is no pure present, which is always conditioned by a relation to the past and future. As in Deleuze's notions above of the irreducible ordinal relations of past, present and future from Bryant's D&G. We see Derrida also use the phrase "time out of joint" to express this, as did Bryant. This kind of time replaces "a linear relation between foundational conditions and and founded experience," i.e., successive time.</p> And from this post in the OOO…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2013-05-09:5301756:Comment:479272013-05-09T13:21:58.483ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>And from <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/object-oriented-ontology?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A40854">this post</a> in the OOO thread introducing Bryant's earlier book <em><a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/55509302/Difference-and-Givenness-Deleuze-s-Transcendental-Empiricism-and-the-Ontology-of-Immanence" target="_blank">Difference and Givenness</a>: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence</em> (NW UP, 2008). In the following…</p>
<p>And from <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/object-oriented-ontology?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A40854">this post</a> in the OOO thread introducing Bryant's earlier book <em><a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/55509302/Difference-and-Givenness-Deleuze-s-Transcendental-Empiricism-and-the-Ontology-of-Immanence" target="_blank">Difference and Givenness</a>: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence</em> (NW UP, 2008). In the following post:</p>
<p>The section "time out of joint" in chapter 7 (starting at 185) sounds similar to DeLanda above, but not quite.</p>
<p>"Rather than approaching time cardinally in terms of succession, we instead seek to determine its <em>ordinal</em> structure...as the immutable form of change conditioning movement.... Put alternatively, conceived transcendentally, the past is that which <em>was never</em> present, the present is that which <em>is only ever present</em>, and the future is that which <em>will never</em> arrive" (186-7).</p>
<p>I'm reminded of Bryant's paper "Time of the object" introduced on <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/object-oriented-ontology?id=5301756%3ATopic%3A27138&page=7#comments" target="_self">p. 7</a>. In the article he discusses this notion of ordinal time as the foundation for the withdrawn (virtual).</p> I’m also reminded of DeLanda’…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2013-05-09:5301756:Comment:478822013-05-09T13:17:42.149ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>I’m also reminded of DeLanda’s book <em><a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/46673954/DeLanda-M-Intensive-Science-and-Virtual-Philosophy-on-Deleuze-Continuum-2002" target="_blank">Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy</a></em> (Continuum, 2002) introduced in <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/complexity-and-postmodernism?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A40222">this post</a> from the complexity and pomo thread. From the ensuring discussion in…</p>
<p>I’m also reminded of DeLanda’s book <em><a href="http://www.scribd.com/doc/46673954/DeLanda-M-Intensive-Science-and-Virtual-Philosophy-on-Deleuze-Continuum-2002" target="_blank">Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy</a></em> (Continuum, 2002) introduced in <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/complexity-and-postmodernism?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A40222">this post</a> from the complexity and pomo thread. From the ensuring discussion in <a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/complexity-and-postmodernism?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A40326">this post</a>:</p>
<p>About 10 pages from the end of chapter 3:</p>
<p>“This virtual form of time, involving the idea of <i>absolute simultaneity</i>, would seem to violate the laws of relativity. In relativistic physics two events cease to be simultaneous the moment they become separated in space, the dislocation in time becoming all the more evident the larger the separating distance....[but] in virtual space there are no <i>metric distances</i>, only ordinal distances that join rather than separate events.... Unlike a transcendent heaven inhabited by <i>pure beings without becoming</i> (unchanging essences or laws with a permanent identity) the virtual needs to be populated exclusively by pure <i>becomings without being</i>. Unlike actual becomings which have at most an intensive form of temporality (bundles of sequential processes occurring in parallel) a pure becoming must be characterized by a parallelism without <i>any trace of sequentiality, or even directionality</i>. Deleuze finds inspiration for this conception of time in phase transitions, or more exactly, in the critical events defining <i>unactualized</i> transitions. When seen as a pure becoming, a critical point of of temperature of 0 degrees C, for example, marks neither a melting nor a freezing of water, both of which are actual becomings...occurring as the critical threshold is crossed in a definite direction. A pure becoming, on the other hand, would involve both directions at once, a melting-freezing event which never actually occurs, but is 'always forthcoming and already past.'”</p> Also see Gidely above. To rei…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2013-05-08:5301756:Comment:478722013-05-08T13:53:58.422ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>Also see Gidely above. To reiterate, she notes in <a href="http://integral-review.org/documents/Gidley,%20Evolution%20of%20Consciousness%20as%20Planetary%20Imperative%205,%202007.pdf" target="_blank">this work</a> that Wilber recognizes linear time and the ever present (177). It seems though that the 3rd sort of time above, akin to Gebser's concretion, is either missing or underdetermined in kennilingus.* Hence we see such deficiencies in elucidating the kind of virtuality or excess…</p>
<p>Also see Gidely above. To reiterate, she notes in <a href="http://integral-review.org/documents/Gidley,%20Evolution%20of%20Consciousness%20as%20Planetary%20Imperative%205,%202007.pdf" target="_blank">this work</a> that Wilber recognizes linear time and the ever present (177). It seems though that the 3rd sort of time above, akin to Gebser's concretion, is either missing or underdetermined in kennilingus.* Hence we see such deficiencies in elucidating the kind of virtuality or excess discussed in t<a href="http://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/forum/topics/wilber-s-initial-response-to-critical-realism?commentId=5301756%3AComment%3A48004" target="_self">his recent post</a> (et seq.)</p>
<p>* "Wilber tends to swing between a primarily linear developmental model—albeit one that<br/> includes higher stages beyond the formal, mental mode—and the spiritual Timelessness of the<br/> non-dual. Sometimes, he brings both voices through in the same piece of writing, as indicated<br/> above. However, it is unclear whether Wilber sees Timelessness as being synchronous with<br/> Gebser’s origin. It appears likely that for Wilber this is an endpoint to be strived for rather than<br/> something that can be experienced as a concretion of all the temporicities" (180).</p> I was re-reading the thread t…tag:integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com,2013-05-08:5301756:Comment:479142013-05-08T13:29:18.537ZEdward theurj Bergehttp://integralpostmetaphysics.ning.com/profile/theurj
<p>I was re-reading the thread today and this stuck out for me, given recent ruminations on time, axes and the virtual:</p>
<p>""A third dimension of time can again be imagined as orthogonal (the Z axis) to the plane defined by chronological time (X axis) and eternity (Y axis). The three-dimensional 'volume' of time can be imagined as holding all possibilities, all the potentialities of the future and the still-hidden meanings of the past, some of which emerge into the present (become…</p>
<p>I was re-reading the thread today and this stuck out for me, given recent ruminations on time, axes and the virtual:</p>
<p>""A third dimension of time can again be imagined as orthogonal (the Z axis) to the plane defined by chronological time (X axis) and eternity (Y axis). The three-dimensional 'volume' of time can be imagined as holding all possibilities, all the potentialities of the future and the still-hidden meanings of the past, some of which emerge into the present (become act-ualized) and then pass into linear, historical time, through a translation process that quantum physics now describes as a 'quantum collapse.'"</p>