Participatory Spirituality for the 21st Century
It is debatable (maybe mostly because of me) whether or not Wilber's model needs to be academically juxtaposed against Bhaskar, et al., or whether that general model should be creatively presumed to already structurally incorporate these issues.
If we side with the former view there is still the question of whether creative provocation and bridge building is most likely to be accomplished through quasi-academic "integral papers". Here is an alternate proposal:
While Wilber still lives, he could be presented with a short list of 5 issues. These simply stated issues -- phrased neutrally -- are things that he could either (a) agree are implied components of AQAL whether they are emphasized by him or not, or (b) disagree with -- thereby siding with an "anemic actualism".
This would perhaps achieve an increase of clarity on the issue of whether these points should be considered as implicate to the integral order or as outstanding observations which require modifications or additions of the standard model in order to incorporate.
If this sounds like an interesting idea then all we would have to do is come up with the 5 points...
I do not agree that any supertheory is necessarily an integral monism.
My approach goes through the lens I developed of the 3 levels of any Metaphysics of Adjacency. It exists, in part, to classify and unify the cognitive space of metatheories. So using this approach:
(a) An "integrative monism" is no different than any other monism. It is essentially NOT integrative. Politically we want a Big Tent which includes even those who support the forms of integrative intelligence from a "first tier" mentality. But levels are not characterized by primarily by content but rather by style. A monism with integral content is not fundamentally different from any other monism. It is not yet a Metaphysics of Adjacency even though it may assert itself as such.
(b) Non-integrative pluralism is an expression of MOA-1. It treats the implicit generative differential as an opportunity to transition between alternatives. This is the typical meaning of pluralism, per se.
(c) Interdisciplinary plurality is closer to an MOA-2 whereby it treats that same intra-ontological factor as an opportunity to move forward simultaneously on multiple different but complementary pathways of investigation into Reality.
(d) Integrative pluralism approximates an MOA-3. By connecting and contextualizing multiple approaches it forms a same-differential infrastructure that reifies both the diversity and performative unity which are active in all MOAs. Although flexible and transparent to a large degree this contextual infrastructure can legitimately be called a supertheory. In fact, from our point of view, it might be the only thing worthy of such a name.
Note in Sean's diagram that any super theory is integrative monism. I've yet to be convinced otherwise. I'd add that his integrative pluralism is exactly what Edwards has been doing, and hence Sean's increasing propensity to embrace that work in his own.
I think my complaints about mood, tone, etc. lie outside this particular project.
- * IT / Wilber-V commits the epistemic fallacy (?)
- * IT / W-V is committed to some form of actualism (?)
- * IT discourse around the LR, especially, is undeveloped
- * IT's account of development is inadequate, and sometimes problematically conflated with 'evolution'
- * IT is still metaphysical in ways primarily targeted by 'postmetaphysics' -- i.e., the 'metaphysics of presence'
- For instance, he argues that, as integrative meta-theories, IT, CR, and CT all include the Big 3 (or 4), but they are stronger in some of these perspectives than other (IT is stronger in the "I", CR is stronger on the "We," etc).
- He also names various forms of integrative approaches (see below) and advocates for Integrative Pluralism as the most desirable one.
These are a great place to start. I think what we want to do is turn these critiques into positive statements describing what should/could be incorporated within "IT". So:
My instinct is to disagree with Edwards that "metatheory building" is a subcomponent of "metatheorizing".
I would rather say that the work of meta-theory building involves a variety of other familial tasks which prepare, secure, critique, evaluate, test, communicate, explore, etc.
The construction of metatheory (which is pretty much the only decent definition of supertheory) is the convergent and progressive axis around which the swarm of variably divergent metatheorizing activities occur as productive team mates.
This is a slight difference in emphasis which feels essential for myself -- and perhaps a few others. It is akin to the question of whether "metaparadigm" is a paradigm. While is it not true to say Yes naively, it is no more accurate to say No.
Metaparadigm is as much a paradigm as it is not a paradigm.
This kind of statement is illustrative of the logical shape which is highlighted by all MOA-3 type approaches... and which thereby illuminates the implied architecture upon which all pluralistic and transpluralistic approaches, whether academic or colloquial, structural or tonal, are basically based.